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CHA.PrER I

THE PERSONAL CHARACTER OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF WILLIAM JAM.bS
It has been said of contemporary existentialists that
they philosophize from the viewpoint of one deeply involved
in the action of life rather than from the viewpoint of a

spectator.

Yhile historians do not usually number William

James among the existentialists, there are striking similarities between his approach to philosophical questions and
the decidedly personal philosophy for which certain existentialists, notably Kierkegaard and Marcel, are so well known.
From their point of view, genuine philosophy can be done
only by one who is intimately involved with the problems with
which he concerns himself.

These problems must be problems

which arise out of the philosopher's own personal existence-problems which are of vital interest to him precisely because
he is a human being.

In general, existentialists have little

use for the cold abstractions of logic.

They are primarily

interested in the problems of concrete human existence with
all of its emotional and dramatic overtones.
Although William James was not an· existentialist, his
philosophy, like the philosophy of men like Kierkegaard and
Marcel, was never a matter of abstract logical speculation;
1

2
tor him it was always a living endeavor--a vocation.

He

knew well the belief of such philosophers as the rationalists
an~

positivists of his day that philosophy, as well as all

knowledge worthy of the name, must somehow be coldly objective.

And he knew well that such a demand was unrealistic.

For man is not pure intellect--he is flesh and blood, "a
bundle.of desires," 1 who lives inasmuch as they are gratified and dies to the extent that they are refused.

According

to James, it is this whole man, not just his intellect, that
philosophizes.

Certainly this was true in James's own case.

Some might say that for James abstract rational objectivity
was impossible because of his volatile, active, and emotional
nature.

Be that as it may, James did not philosophize from

the viewpoint of one looking at the issues from the outside,
nor did he think it wise that anyone should.
philosophize as one removed from the fray.

He did not
Rather he philos-

ophized from the middle of the battlefield, so to speak; and
what he gave us was not an abstract analysis of reality, but
a blow by blow account of life as concretely lived, a vivid
description of the world as he experienced it.
the

fullnes~

fines of any

For James,

of reality could never be held within the con~bstract genera~izations

or constructions.

For existential thinkers, the purpose of philosophy has
always been to furnish a way of life rather than to develop
1 Villiam James, notes on man, cited by Ralph Barton
Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (2 vols.;
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), I, 301.
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an abstract doctrinal system.

Certainly, the problems about

which James philosophized were more than mere objects of
speculative curiosity for him; they were questions, the
answers.to which, he believed, ought determine the whole
course of one's existence.

They were issues which he con-

sidered vital to himself and to all men.
The questions with which James concerned himself were
common subjects of philosophical discussion in his day.

They

were problems which his father, Henry James, Sr., debated
with his friends, friends such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, who
frequently visited the James household, and Thomas Carlyle,
with whom Henry James, Sr., carried on a lively correspondence.
Through his father and his father's friends, as well as
through his own extensive reading, William James was introduced to philosophical questions:
or many?

Is reality basically one

Is the course of the world determined by blind

physio-chemical forces or is the world guided by some higher
power possessing intelligence?

How can the presence of evil

in the world be reconciled with the reality of an all-good
God

traditiona~ly

held to be infinite and omnipotent?

What

is the real significance of human existence and what is its
relationship to reality as a whole?

To what extent, if any,

is man free and responsible for his own life and for what
becomes of the world?

These concerns as well as many other

questions, especially questions dealing with science and
religion, were matters.which William James discussed at
length with his friends and contemporaries--with men like
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Charles Peirce, Chauncey Wright, John Fiske, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
fo~ed

These men along with James and a few others

a small group known as "The Metaphysical Club" which

met regularly in Cambridge in the early 18?0's for the express
purpose of philosophical discussion.
Although the questions discussed by James with his
friends and associates concerned problems which occupied
many of the philosophic minds of the nineteenth century, for
James they held a special fascination.

They involved issues

which were vitally important to him personally.

He saw that

the answers to these questions could influence his own way
of life.

More than that, the answers to these questions held

the key to that most vital of all issues--the very value of
life itself.

Many and varied were the problems about which

William James philosophized; and yet underlying all of them,
even those which seemed the most metaphysical, was one burning
issue--"Is life worth living?"

And for James this was more

than a merely academic question.
No doubt, there are men who have never asked themselves
this question, because,

~

facto, life for them is generally

pleasant; their days are relatively free of tragedy and pain;
they are not reflective and perhaps are not often touched by,
or vividly aware of, the pain of others.

Ask them whether

life is worth living or not, and they are likely to reply,
"Of course it is," because they have never had any great
reason to suspect that it might not be.

There are still

other men, perhaps like Henry James, Sr., for whom life,

5
with whatever pains and sorrows and tragedies it may embody,
is worth living in virtue of some ultimate outcome of it,
such as promised happiness in heaven or the oneness with God
that the faith of Henry James, Sr., promised him.

But for

all those for whom the question does not pose a problem-either because they do not have a faith which guarantees
them a happy ending, no matter what, or because even though
they anticipate or at least hope for some repose or joy when
life is over, they need something
live !!:2:!•

~

to make them want to

The hope of heavenly bliss may make dying somewhat

easier, but it does not in every case provide a compelling
motive for living.

It is not always enough to keep the fire

of life burning from day to day.
The youthful William James did not share his father's
Swedenborgian faith in the eventual ·mergence of man's selfhood
in the selfhood of God.

Even if he had had no intellectual

difficulties with his father's theology, his own longing for
self-identity and self-realization would have made any theory
which even suggested the loss of the individual creature's
identity in that of the Creator repugnant to him.

As far as

any individual personal survival after death is concerned,
William James in his youth did not seem to have any convictions in that regard, although in later life he confessed a
growing need for such a belief.

But even if he had believed

in some sort of eternal reward or life after death, it is not
likely that this belief in some future happiness would in
itself have been enough to give him any zest for living, for

6

the intervening time would still be devoid of meaning.
For James, living to the full meant using all of his
po~ers;

it meant being productive and creative; it meant

alleviating as much of the pain and evil in the world as
possible; it meant contributing in some way to the beauty
and goodness of the universe.

For James, to live with zest

and gusto was to live the moral life to the full, ·i.e., to
live a life of responsible human action by which one resists
evil and seeks good, not merely one's own private good but
the good of one's neighbors, the community, and the world as
a whole.

James felt that in order for life to be worth

living, reality must somehow be commensurate with and.congenial to man's most intimate and cherished powers.

His

desires, motives, and abilities must have some real relevance
to the universe as a whole.

Man longs to make some lasting,

significant, and uniquely personal contribution to the world's
goodness and beauty; and he wants to know that, even if he
himself should not survive, the ideals which he admired,
loved, and helped to actualize by his efforts will in some
way last forever.

Thus the only life worth living for James

was the moral life authenticated and sanctioned by an eternal
moral order.

The only life

~orth

living was an active moral

life in a universe in which one's striving, however feeble,
could never completely come to naught.
To meet the challenges of the world with spirit and
determination, to fight for the good and to overcome evil,
meant living to the full.

But as early as 1861, poor health

?
began to weaken the vigor of James's own activities.

He be-

came afflicted with eye trouble, digestive problems, back
pains, and numerous attacks of neurasthenia, all of which
hampered his physical activities as well as his intellectual
pursuits for many years.

A certain mental depression fre-

quently accompanied the physical ailments.

It is not possi-

ble to say whether the physical ailments caused the mental
depression or the mental condition caused the physical difficulties; but in all probability, no matter what the basic
causes of either, it seems safe to say that they augmented
each other.

Certainly James's sense of inactivity and unpro-

ductiveness as well as the difficulty he experienced in making decisions must have contributed to a feeling of futility
which could make a.n:y man wonder whether life was worth living
or not.

That he thought of suicide is admitted in his diary

as well as mentioned in his correspondence with his friend,
Tom Ward; apparently it was not always clearly evident to the
young William James _that life !!.!! worth living.
To what extent his disillusionment with life was brought
about by his own ill health and the sufferings of his brother
Henry and his sister Alice (which he witnessed with great
anguish on his part) is difficult to say.

But it is apparent

that James's early philosophical reflections had much to do
with his disenchantment with living.

There was in fact a

kind of reciprocal relation between his ill health and his
philosophizing; for while it is true that his early reflections upon life contributed to his mental depression, it is
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also true that his illnesses in turn spurred James on to
still deeper philosophical thought.

His illnesses not only

provided the leisure necessary for speculation by putting a
damper upon his more active life; but Ralph Barton Perry suggests that James's melancholia and·neurasthenia to a great
extent required a philosophical cure inasmuch as they were
due at least in part to his lack of a philosophy by which to
live.

In Perry's view, James's survival depended upon his

finding answers to the basic questions of life, particularly
to the question of. man's real relationship to the universe as
a whole. 2
James's early philosophical outlook and, one might add,
his permanent philosophical outlook were greatly colored by
his concern with the particulars of experience.

He was

strongly attracted by the philosophy of empiricism; and such

an attraction was·quite natural, given his scientific background.

Certainly his training in biology, as well as in the

other sciences with their emphasis upon observation and experiment, contributed much to his conviction that the sole reliable source of knowledge is the experience of particulars.
Of course, Jame·s was influenced also by his reading of the
early British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill,
as well as by his association with "The Metaphysical Club,"
particularly with such devotees of exact science as Chauncey
2Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William
James, Briefer Version, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1964), pp. 120-22.
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Wright and Charles Peirce.

But the influence of .these men

might not have been so strong had James not encountered them
already predisposed by his own scientific background to lo.ok
fa~orably

upon experience as the fount of all k:nowle~e.

The empirical philosophy with which the young William
James was familiar, however, seemed to be tending more and
more toward sensationalism, materialism, and determinism;
and although his religious heritage and moralistic tendencies
prevented James from ever accepting such theories wholeheartedly, he nevertheless was vulnerable to their influence
and at times momentarily fell under their sway.
wrote to his father from Berlin:

11

In 1867 he

I feel myself • • • more and

more drifting towards the sensationalism closed in by scepticism • • • • "3 To Tom Ward he wrote from Cambridge in 1869:
I'm swamped in an empirical philosophy--! feel that
we are nature through and through, that we are wholly
conditioned, that not a· wiggle of our will happens
save as the result of physical laws, and yet notwithstanding1 we are en ra~ort with reason. How
to conceive it? Who knows·.
These lines reveal the dilemma faced by William James
and other young thinkers of his time.

On the one hand, the

industrialization which scientific discovery and human invention made possible after the Civil War seemed to testify to
the fact that the individual person had a free and actively
creative role to play in the progress of society.

On the

· 3The Letters of William James, ed. by Henry James, Jr.
(2 vols.; Boston: Atlantic :Monthly Press, 1920), I, 97.

472.

4Ferry, The Thought and Character of William James, I,
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other hand, there were philosophers and scientists who seemed
to be robbing man of his unique place in nature by interpreting both man and nature mechanistically--thus reducing man to
a mere cog in a machine and making freedom nothing but an

illusion.

The horns of the dilemma faced by James were spir-

itualism (theism) and freedom on the one hand and materialism
and determinism on the other.
All the evidence in favor of man's free creative role
in the universe notwithstanding, James was pulled by his
scientific tendencies and empiricist outlook toward the view
that all that happens in the universe is rigidly determined
by blind forces of nature and that the course of human life
and the course of the world as a whole can be reduced to a
process of mechanical evolution.

Such a materialistic inter-

pretation of life, however, meant the complete frustration of
James's moral aspirations; for according to the theory of
mechanical evolution, whatever good and beautiful things have
thus far evolved, whether the work of man or not, must one
day be destroyed.

As the result of the continual redistribu-

tion of matter and energy, evolution must inevitably be followed by dissolution.

As A. J. Balfour put it,

The energies of our system will decay. • • • 'Imperishable monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself,
and love stronger than death, will be as if they had
not been. Nor will anything that is, be better or
worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and
suffering of man have striven through countless ages
to effect.5
from The
New or :
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Viewing the future or the world from a materialistic
point of view could only lead to despair, for materialism
meant that all man's cherished aspirations and all or his
ex.Pansive emotions such as admiration and love, hope, fortitude, and joy had no real

objects-~for

in reality, all the

ideas loved, desired, hoped for, and fought for would one day
be reduced to nothing.

As James himself said,

That is the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the cosmic weather, though many a jewelled
shore appears, and many an enchanted cloud-bank floats
away, long lingering ere it be dissolved--even as
our world now lingers, for our joy--yet when these
transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely
nothin~, remains, to represent those particular
qualities, those elements of preciousness which they
may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone
utterly from the very sphere and room of being.
Without an echo; without a memory; without an influence on aught that may come after, to make it care
for similar ideals.
This utter final wreck and
tragedy is of the essence or scientific materialism
as at present understood. The lower and not the
higher forces are the eternal forces, or the last
surviving forces within the gnly cycle of evolution
which we can definitely see.
Thus materialism's final word was that all striving is in vain.
Insofar as it made the lower and blind forces in the world
control the world's destiny and insofar as it posited the
eventual

annih~lation

of all human values, the materialism of

James's time rendered man's role in the universe meaningless
and insignificant.

Such a philosophy which legitimized only

the emotions of fear and despair left man with little for
which to care and nothing for which to live.

It certainly

The World Publishing Company, 1963), p. ?6, quoting A. J.
Balfour, The Foundations of Belief, p. 30.
6 Ibid.

-
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rendered impossible what James himself considered the only
life worth living--a moral life warranted by an "eternal
moral order." "This need of an eternal moral order," James
wrote, "is one of the deepest needs of our breast."?

Man

needs to feel that his active striving is never totally fruitless.

He

needs to feel that the ideals of goodness and beauty

for which he lives and works will survive even if he should
perish, that these ideals will not decay along with the
material universe.
Despite materialism's bleak outlook,· however, James
found its stress upon the developmental aspects of reality
congenial to his way of thinking and in harmony with his
experience.

Thus he found it difficult to reject materialism

completely.

But although he could not at the time reject it

entirely, his attitude toward it was largely negative, as
the following lines from a memorandum sent to Oliver Yendell
Holmes, Jr., in the winter of either 1866 or 1867 reveal.
But as a man's happiness depends on his feeling, I
think materialism inconsistent with a high degree
thereof, and in ~hl.s sense [I] maintained that a
materialist should not be an optimist, using the
latter word to signify one whose philosophy authenticates, by guaranteeing the objective significance of,
his most pleasurable feelings.8
Although James at this period in his life seemed intellectually compelled to examine deterministic naturalism, the
kind of world he really needed and wanted was a world in
?Ibid., P• ?7.
8 Gay Wilson Allen, William James (New York: The Viking
Press, 196?), pp. 125-26.
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which mind, rather than the blind forces of nature, was in
control--a spiritual or theistic world, in other words--a
world in which some higher spiritual power, which one might
call God if he wished, guaranteed an _ideal order that would
be permanently preserved.

James needed a world in which his

cherished ideals would be looked after and cared for even if
he failed to bring them to fruition.

A letter to Tom Yard in

1868 expressed the religious desire which James felt that he
shared with most men.
~ersonal

"W'e long for sympathy, for a purely

communication, first with the soul of the world, and

then with the soul of our fellows.

And happy are they who

think, or know, that they have got them!"9
James's father was one of those who thought he enjoyed
such-communication--but youthful William James was not.

He

was continually tossed about on the waves of doubt; he wanted
to believe, but intellectual difficulties made him uncertain.
Thus unable to find meaning for his -existence in religious
belief, young William James tenaciously clurig to the moral life.
He saw the moral life as the only response to the universe
which could make life at all worth living in a materialistic
scheme of things.

For even if there were no God to guarantee

an eternal moral order in which his ideals would be preserved,
even if someday all of his efforts would count as nothing,
still he could find some satisfaction in life by helping his
contemporaries to suffer less and enjoy more, and perhaps he
9The Letters of William James, I, 131.

14
could even contribute in some way to the well-being of whatever
generations were still to come.
James's experience, from one point of view at least,
seemed to lend support to the view that a man by his actions
could contribute something to the good in the world and help
ease the suffering therein.

For his experience revealed beyond

any doubt that men did indeed suffer and enjoy, and· that indi-

viduals by their actions could alleviate some of that suffering and add to that enjoyment.

Even though his philosophical

outlook at that time might prevent him from believing in a
God who cared for him and for his ideals, James felt that he
could still find reason for living and some value in his own
existence by helping others.

James wrote to Tom Ward:

All I can tell you is the thought that with me outlasts
all others, and onto which, like a rock, I find myself
washed up when the waves of doubt are weltering over
all the rest of the world; and that is the thought of
my having a will, and of my belonging to a brotherhood
of men possessed of a capacity for pleasure and pain of
different kinds. For even at one's lowest ebb of belief, the fact remains empirically certain (and by our
will we can, if not absolutelt refrain from looking
beyond that empirical fact, a least practically and
on the whole accept it and let it suffice us)--that
men suffer and enjoy. And if we have to give up all
hope of seeing into the purposes of God, or to give
up theoretically the idea of final causes, and of God
anyhow as vain and leading to nothing for us, we can,
by our will, make the enjoyment of our brothers stand
us in the stead of a final cause; and through a knowledge of the fact that that enjoyment on the whole
depends on what individuals accomplish, lead a life so
active, and so sustained by a clean conscience as not
to fret much.10
But even this moral life preserver in a sea of doubt had a
lOibid., p. 130.
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way of slipping from James's grasp--!or empiricism as he was
familiar with it seemed to

~mply

determinism.

At least the

empiricism of Bain and Mill, who were much discussed by James
and.the other members of "The Metaphysical Club," was decidedly
deterministic.

Determinism, however, took all the zest out of

the moral life.

What merit or value could human actions have

(however salutary they might be) if they could not _have been
otherwise?

What could James personally and creatively contrib-

ute to the world for better or worse if he were but a cog in
the vast machine of the universe--if all he did were rigidly
determined?

Determinism not only took.the satisfaction out of

the moral life, it rendered the moral life non-moral--for moral
action is moral action only to the extent that it is free and
responsible.

And so the young William James floated back and

forth between lights and shadows, grasping at rays of hope
only to find them vanish again and again in the dark fog of
nihilism.
It is not difficult to see how William James's philosophical turmoil, combined with physical and mental ills, could
have led him to the brink of despair.

For if all the world's
'

affairs are rigidly governed by blind physio-chemical forces,
then all physical ailments as well as all mental difficulties
must be rigidly rletermined or the result of chance; and all
efforts to overcome them must be useless.

Indeed, there were

times when James felt that nature and life had simply 'unfitted' him for all the activities to which he aspired.
result was apathy and a kind of paralysis of the will.

The
But
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James's despair was never final.

He could never unreservedly

resign himself to the life of inactivity and waste to which
his illness and philosophic determinism seemed to relegate
him·

He could never unreservedly accept materialism and its

deterministic implications.

He could never wholeheartedly

accept a philosophy which took all the joy out of living by
rendering human action ineffective and meaningless.

James's

inward rebellion against determinism and the inexorability of
evil, suggested by the unrelenting character of his own illness,
found articulate expression in some notes written during the
summer of 1869.

Although he did not seem to espouse a doctrine

of freedom definitively until almost a year later, these notes
indicate that he was inclined to believe that man does have
some freedom of choice.

He suggested, for example, that to

accept the universe or to protest against it are two voluntary
alternatives.
So that in a given case of evil the mind seesaws between
the effort to improve it away, and resignation. The
second not being resorted to till the first has failed,
it would seem either that the second were an insincere pis aller, or the first a superfluous vanity.
The solution can only lie in taking neither absolutely,
but in making the resignation only provisional (that is,
voluntary, conditional), and the attempt to improve
to have its worth in the action rather than the result.
Thus resignation affords grounds and leisure to advance
to new philanthropic action. Resignation should not
say, "it is good," "a mild yoke, 11 and so forth, but
"I'm willing to stand it for the present. 11 11 .
Apparent in this passage is James's conviction that what is
important is the fight, even if the battle be lost--that it is
11Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, I, 301.

l?
a man's moral fibre that counts even if his effor.ts come to
naught.

One also sees James's refusal to close his eyes to

evil, to consider evil in some way good, or to consider it as
irremediable.

For James, evil was a part of his experience;

his own life would not allow him to blink it away.

He could

not go along with the idealism of Francis H. Bradley.

For

Bradley evil was not fully real; it was only an appearance-·simply one aspect of the Absolute which in itself was perfect
in every respect. 12 Nor could James go along with those who
absolved man from all responsibility toward evil, either by
denying man's freedom or by placing the responsibility ultimately upon God as Yilliam's father was wont to do.

For Henry

James, Sr., man really does nothing; God does all; all men
are merely manifestations of God who has alienated himself
from himself for the purpose of an eventual free and loving
reunion.

According to Henry, Sr., all the vicissitudes of the

12 ".bVil and good are not illusions, but they are most ·
certainly appearances. They are one-sided aspects, each overruled and transmuted in the Whole • • • • As with truth and
error, so with good and bad, the opposition is not absolute.
For, to some extent and in some manner, perfection is everywhere realized. And yet, upon the other hand, the distinction
of degrees is no less vital. The interval which exists between,
and which separates, the lower and the higher, is measured by ·
the idea of perfect Reality. The lower is that which, to be
made complete, would have to undergo a more total transformation of its nature. And viewed from the ground of what is
higher--of what they fail to reach or even oppose--the lower
truth and lower goodness become sheer error and evil. The
Absolute is ·perfect in all its detail, -it is equally true and
good throughout. But, upon the other side, each distinction of
better and more true, every degree and each comparative stage
?f reality is essential." (F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Real~ty [London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim.; New York: Macmillan
~pany, 1899], p. 401.)
·
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spiritual life, its ups and downs, its triumphs and its falls,
are all God's work and man is deserving of neither praise nor
blame.

God, He said, will eventually bring good out of all--

the ultimate good being the final reunion of God with Himself

in the eventual mergence of all individual human selves with
the divine Selfhood.
William was not at all in sympathy with his father's view
of evil.

He was sympathetic, however, with the views of his

father's friend and opponent, Thomas Carlyle.

Carlyle was

militant in his attitude toward evil; he recognized it as
real and set the moral will against it.

Henry, Sr., however,

saw the struggle between good and evil as somehow transcended

in the movement of the Divine Spirit toward ultimate reunion
with itself.

For Carlyle, on the other hand, the conflict

between good and evil was absolutely valid in itself, and so
it was for William James also.

For William James, good and evil

were both real in experience and could not be identified or
subsumed into one.

Furthermore, righteousness demanded that

man love the good and hate the evil.

And to hate evil meant

not merely to brood over it, to grieve over it; it meant actively to combat it--to attack and effectually overcome it
within the world of action.
According to William James, man must fight evil as best
he can and contribute as much good to the world as possible.
This was the moral life to which he aspired, the life for which
he longed with all of his heart; but his empiricist philosophy
with its apparent deterministic implications and his own
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pbYsical weaknesses had seemed to put thumbs down on it.

How-

ever, by the end of 1869, James was beginning to overcome the
psychological inhibitions which prevented him from actively
espousing the moral life although his physical difficulties
still tended to paralyze him.

'Whatever else he could not do,

he could still make decisions that affected life and appreciate
lite as he saw others live it.
enjoy--but I can will.

"I may not study, make, or

I can find some real life in the mere

respect for other forms of life as they pass, even if I can
never embrace them as a whole or incorporate them with myself."l3

on

February 1, 18?0, William James decided to give the moral

lite a try for its own sake.
Today, I about touched bottom, and perceive plainly
that I must face the choice with open eyes: shall I
frankly throw the moral business overboard, as one
unsuited to my innate aptitudes, or shall I follow
it, and it alone, making everything else merely stuff
for iti I will give the latter alternative a fair
trial. 4
The problem of intellectual unification still remained,
however.

How could the possibility of moral action be recon-

ciled with the determinism which empiricism seemed to entail?
It was the French philosopher, Charles Renouvier, who finally
helped James to recognize that determinism is not a necessary
implication of empiric.ism at all.

Renouvier believed that the

only philosophical doctrine that could be the logical enemy of
l3'William James, "Diary," quoted in Allen, William James,
p. 163.
14
Villiam James, "Diary," The Writings of William James
ed. by John J. McDermott (New York: Random House, Inc., 196?),
p. ?.
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rreedom is the pantheistic doctrine of substance-~the doctrine
that men and all other phenomena are but manifestations of the
one absolute substance from which all phenomenal appearances
tloW necessarily.

But there is nothing in empiricist philosophy

as such that logically demands determinism.

In fact, from the

point of view of Renouvier and finally from that of James himself, empirically one can not prove that either determinism or
freedom characterizes human activity.
But in that case, how does one settle the issue?
does one do---suspend judgment?

What

To suspend judgment implies

that a judgment is equally possible; it implies a choice; it
implies freedom.

Doubting is itself an option--a state of

voluntary inhibition and suspense.

According to Renouvier,

the possibility of doubting our freedom, of doubting anything,
implies the possibility of affirming it; but that means that
one has a choice. ·Since determinism and freedom are alike
indemonstrable, whichever one a person accepts, he accepts,
not because his intellect is coerced by any incontrovertible
evidence -but simply because he chooses to accept i t--he accepts
it on faith--he freely believes in it.

And so Renouvier wrote-•Let our liberty pronounce on its own real existence." 1 5 The

impact of Renouvier's reflections on William James was decidedly salutary.

In one of James's notebooks, we find the fol-

lowing entry, dated April 30, 1870:
l5William James, "Bain and Renouvier," Collected Essays
!fd Reviews (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
~2g), p. 34, quoting Charles Renouvier, Essais de Critique
generale.
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I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I
finished the first part of Renouvier's second "Essais"
and see no reason why his definition of Free Will-"the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when
I might have other thoughts"--need be the definition
of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the
present--until next year--that it is no illusion. My
first act of free will shall be to believe in free
will. For the remainder of the year, I will abstain
from the mere speculation and contemplative Gri.iblei
in which my nature takes most delight, and voluntarily
cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading
books favorable to it, as well as by acting • • • • Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative,
like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form
to put my daring into; now, I will go a step further
with my will, not only act with it, but believe as
well; believe in my individual reality and creative
power. My belief, to be sure, can't be optimistic-but I will posit life (the real, the good) in the
self-governing resistance of the ego to the world.
Life shall (be built in] doing and suffering and
creating.16
James's acceptance of the fact that the will is free,
that the mind can act without being determined in its activity
by physical or psychic coercion, and his determination to cul-

tivate the belief in his own freedom by voluntarily exercising
it was clearly a turning point in his life.

His posture at

this time was the beginning of his physical and mental recovery.
His decision freely to accept freedom and to affirm actively
as well as theoretically that lif e--the good lif e--the life
worth living--consists in resisting evil, struggling for the
good, in '-'doing and suffering and creating," had more _than a
therapeutic value, however.

Together with the empiricist

insight, which James never lost, this concrete espousal of the
16

James, "Diary," The Writings of William James, pp. ?-8.
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moral life as the life worth living functioned as a fundamental
principle by which he not only directed his entire life but
navigated his philosophical vessel as well.

(He was not pre-

pared to distinguish between how he lived his life and how he
operated philosophically, for in him the two in fact formed a
single unity.)

James lived the moral life first of all, and

finding it eminently livable, adopted moralism not only as a
philosophical position but as a kind of standard to which any
philosophical view had to measure up if it was to win his support.

No theory which would render the moral life impossible

could hope for a favorable reception.

This does not mean that

James would dispute some one else's right to believe it, if
he chose to do so; it simply means that James himself would be
unable to espouse it, because it ran counter to the evidence
in his experience.

From his acquaintance with the thought of Renouvier, not
only did James come to realize that he had the right to believe
in his own freedom, but he also began to see that he might have

the right to believe other things which while not logically
or philosophically demonstrable were nevertheless necessary
for effective moral action.

Renouvier confirmed in James's

mind something which James himself had much earlier felt but
which his rigorous scientific training had no doubt prevented
him·from espousing--namely the fact that heart and head work
together in determining convictions.

As Renouvier pointed

out, when a judgment is necessary for action and when experience and reason can not determine one's judgment, then it is

p

a. . .
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the will's place to do so and faith must come into play.

In

this doctrine of Renouvier, James found the confirmation of

hiS own insight--an insight Which was to play a central role
in the development of his entire philosophy and from which he

was to develop the pragmatic method for which he became famous.
In enumerating the factors which may have influenced a

given man's philosophy, it is not uncommon-to include his family background, the social and cultural milieu in which he
lived, and his formal education, including the earlier philosophers with whose works he was familiar as well as those
contemporary thinkers with whom he may have had direct or
indirect contact.

Certainly in the case of William James, all

of these can be said to have helped to shape his thought in
one way or another.
ing

But it is obvious that the one overwhelm-

influence, which functioned not only as the primary source

of his own doctrines but also as the test of the opinions
offered to him by other thinkers, past and present, was his own
lived experience in which all of these elements found a place.
The

grea~est

single factor which shaped James's philosophy and

which in a sense determined the effects which all other influences were to have on it was James's own life and his living
of it.
Ralph Barton Perry speaks of Renouvier as "the greatest
individual influence upon the development of James's thought";l?
and James, himself, acknowledges his great indebtedness to

655.

17Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, I,

~.
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R~nouvier

in the dedication of Some Problems of Philosophy.

Nevertheless, Renouvier's contribution to James was not that
o! revealing to him facts otherwise unknown; rather his acquaintance with Renouvier's writings helped James to realize
fUllY the truth of what he had already suspected.

The influ-

ence of Renouvier, of course, must not be discounted; but it
must be said that it was James's own life which contributed
the most to, and provided the ultimate warrant for, the philosophy which James was to develop--a philosophy, which unlike
the rationalistic and positivistic schools of thought enjoying popularity in his day, provided a legitimate and necessary
place for faith in the lives of men.
The purpose of this thesis will be to examine in depth
the position of William James in regard to faith.

Considera-

tion will be given to what faith in general is, its legitimate
place in human life, indeed its necessity for both thought and
human action.

Special attention will be paid to religious

faith in particular, especially to James's justification of
religious belief as a necessity not only for the :t'ulfillment
of man but also for the :t'ulfillment of the universe as a whole.
Much has been done on the question of faith since the death
of William James.

In this thesis, however, no attempt will

be made to evaluate James in terms of the work of later writers
or to reconcile his position with current trends on the subject.

Since the purpose of this thesis is primarily exposition.,

the reader will find a minimum of critical assessment.
There is a sense in which James's philosophy is presently
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being rediscovered, and when a man's thought is thus being

reexamined, the first task to be accomplished is that of exposition and unification.

CHAPTER II
THE OPEN WORLD OF RADICAL EMPIRICISM

In reflecting upon life as he lived it, Yilliam James
shared reverence for experienced fact with the empiricists and
respect for reason and logic with the rationalists; but he
refused to allow sense and reason exclusive access to reality
or an exclusive franchise on truth.

The

~orld,

as James ex-

perienced it, was a world in which faith was not only an
empirical datum, in the sense that men did in fact believe
when conclusive evidence was lacking, but also a necessary
factor in the world's development, as well as the key without
which many of its doors would never be unlocked and many of
its secrets never discovered.
Having found faith to be a practical necessity for his own
life, James was forced by his understanding of experience to
take account of faith in his philosophy.

The quality of his

experience demanded the recognition of faith as an indispensable factor in the evolution of reality as well as a necessary
avenue to truth.

Our purpose in this chapter will be to exam-

ine some of the more salient features of James's philosophy in
order to discover what there was about experience, as James
interpreted it, that made him assign to faith such a significant role.
26
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William James's metaphysics can be appropriately described
as s: biographical metaphysics.

Indeed the influence of his

life upon his thought was so great that his metaphysics became
almost a mirror of his lived experience.

As an examination

of his philosophy reveals, his life and his metaphysics to a
great extent paralleled each other, the latter involving the
conceptualization of the felt experiences of the former.

That his life and his metaphysics went hand in hand was as it
should be from James's own point of view, for in his opinion
the only raw

materia~

out of which a man can legitimately

build a metaphysics is his own experience.

man• s philosophy as. the way

Describing.a

in which he feels the "whole push"

of the universe and experiences "the whole drift of life," 1
James suggested that philosophy is little more than the biographies of philosophers.
Although one might be tempted to expect that basic similarities in men's lives would result in philosophies that would
be the same in broadest outlines, such is not the case.

There

are two reasons for this: first, no two men share precisely
the same experiences, however similar their lives may be; and
secondly, most men conceive the world after the analogy of
some one particular experienced feature of it which especially
interests them or with which they feel most comfortable.

Thus,

among professional philosophers, we have materialists on the
one hand and spiritualists on the other; pluralists and monists;
p

1

William James, A Pluralistic Universe (Gloucester, Mass.:
eter Smith, 1967), pp. 20-21.
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e•Pir

icists and rationalists; indeterminists and determinists;

-

and so forth.

A man's philosophy, whether it be the profes-

sional philosopher's view of reality or the ordinary man's
sense of the meaning of life, mirrors his experience in some
way.

However, it very often reflects only one preferred part

ot that experience--one or more aspects of it standing out
clearly in the foreground, others being blurred or even lost
entirely in the background.
For James, himself, however, all of life was fascinating.
He did not, as so many other thinkers did, single out one
special facet of the experienced world and make it the model
tor his philosophical picture.

All of the details of exper-

ience were interesting, valuable, and worthy of note from
Jam.es's point of view; and in his metaphysics, he tried to
take every one of

~hem

into· account in some way.

James, himself, described his own philosophy as a radical
empiricism2--an empiricism because experience and only experi2James described radical empiricism in terms of a postulate, a statement of fact, and a generalized conclusion. The
postulate was that the only things about which philosophers
can lawfully argue are things that can be described in terms
of experience. James was careful to point out that this did
not mean that other things can not exist, ·but that it did mean
that other things are not the proper subjects for philosophical
debate. The statement of fact affirmed that the relations
among things, relations which are conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are experienced just as directly as the things themselves are. ·And the generalized conclusion was that the universe as directly experienced has a concatenated continuous
structure of its own inasmuch as the connective relations ·
among the things experienced are themselves matters of direct
a pprehension, and that, therefore, it is unnecessary to postu1ate any sort of trans-empirical support to hold the various
parts of the world together--they hold together by themselves.
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ence provided the raw material for it, radical because not
onlY did he

r~frain

from introducing elements that could

~

be described in empirical terms but furthermore he refused to
exclude anything that ~ directly experienced.3

His fondness

tor particular facts and details and the very movement of life
itself made the abstract and static systems of the rationalistic philosophers seem like empty shadows in comparison

with

the concrete flux of life; and thus James would allow nothing
of his experience to be lost sight of in his metaphysics. 4 As
we shall discover in the following

paragr~phs,

James's meta-

3The primacy of experience in James's philosophy has
prompted several contemporary writers to try to place James
within the tradition of phenomenology. Although James himself
did not describe his own work in phenomenological terms, philosophers such as Aron Gurwitsch, John Wild, and Johannes Linschoten have found significant parallels between the thought
of William James and that of contemporary phenomenology. According to James M. Edie, "Some of these can be traced to the
direct influence of James on Husserl, but for the most part
they transcend such direct historical interaction and rather
show a common spirit and temper, developing independently but
convergently toward the same goal-~namely, the establishment
of the bases for a method of radical empiricism in philosophy."
(James M. l!;die, "Necessary Truth and Perception: William James_
on the Structure of Experience," in New Essals in Phenomenol,2Sl, ed. by·James M. mie [Chicago: Quadrang e Books, 1969],
p. 233.)
4 James consid.ered himself an opponent of rationalism. But
his opposition to it did not imply that he had no use for reason and logic. On the contrary, as we already indicated, he
had a healthy respect for both of them and often pointed out
that conceptual knowledge and logical rules have an important
function in life insofar as they help a man to get around among
the parts of his experience. However, James felt that concepts
?an never exhaust reality or adequately represent it, for there
is a dynamism about reality that the static unchanging concepts
of the mind can never capture. There is something about the
flux of experience that seems to escape forever the grip of
logic. Reality and life are wider than.logic; they spill over
the limits of all of our conceptual schemes. And the concepts
that we do find useful, James said, are useful only insofar as
they lead us back to the world of experience again.

ptiysics, perhaps more than that of any other man, can be said
to mirror his life and fittingly be called a biographical metap}lysics.
According to James's biographers, from earliest childhood,

hiS experience was Of variety, novelty, movement, and activity
of many kinds.
onmental change.

As a child he lived in almost ceaseless envirBecause of his .father's inability to decide,

with any degree of resoluteness, on the.best mode of educating
his children, William James studied in schools in England,

rrance, Switzerland, Germany, and more than one city in the
united States.

From his birth in 1842 until he received his

degree in medicine from Harvard in 1869, he made .four trips to
Europe and one to Brazil and studied a variety of subjects including languages, classical and modern literature, art, science,
psychology, medicine, and philosophy..

And even after his pro-

fessional life began, he lived his life against a continually
fluctuating background provided by Europe and the United States.
His purposes in traveling included improving his health,
studying, delivering lectures, supporting peace movements, promoting mental health, and observing the progress of physical
research.

James' a activities were as varied as his surroundings.

Wherever James was, he was extremely sensitive to the richness of his environment, to the wealth of detail which made each
Place unlike any
tion.

ot~er,

and to the novelty of each new situa-

No matter how many times he visited a place, he could

always see something in it that he had not seen before; he
always had something new to report to his family and friends
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as bis letters to them reveal.
~

ve~~

But as his letters also show,

often the impression made upon him by a country or a city

vas due not so much to the physical surroundings as to the
personal characteristics of its inhabitants.

Although nature

in its varying costumes always intrigued James, it was people

with their unique points of view, their faiths (religious and
otherwise), their virtues, their foibles, and their general
unpredictableness that captivated him most of all.

They,

after all, made the world what it was--good or bad, better or
worse.

And James was one of them--acutely aware that by what-

ever he did he added something to the goodness or badness of
the situation and that his ability to act fruitfully at all
demanded faith on his part--faith in himself, in other men, and
in God.

The world, as James lived in it, then, was a multi-faceted
world--dynamic and always changing, lacking any rigidly determined order, permeated with the novel and the unexpected, bearing the impress of personality (human and divine), and of course

moralistic.

·It is not surprising that the world presumed in

his philosophy should be the same.

Indeed, like the world of

his lived experience, the world given to us in James's metaphysics is pluralistic, evolving (although not according to
any rigidly determined plan), tychistic, personal, and moral.

And just as the well-being and productiveness of James himself
required the exercise of faith on his part, so too the progress,
development, and perfection of this pluralistic and openended universe as a whole demand faith on the part of men.
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JSJJleS did not make a place for faith in his philosophy simply

because he personally felt the need for it in his own life.
On the contrary, he did so because the very

universe demanded it.

char~cter

of the

A closer examination of his metaphysics

will make this clear.
The universe for James was obviously pluralistic.

It was,

in some sense, a collection of many things some of which at

least were only externally related to each other.

The diversity

of James's own experience made it impossible for him to agree
with the rationalistic philosophers whose passion for simplic-

ity, unity, and economy of thought led them to underplay the
multiplicity in reality and to try to explain the universe in
terms of as few principles as possible--ideally in terms of
principle if that could be accomplished. James's experi-one
ence revealed to him a world more
the world of the eighlik~

teenth century British empiricists, a world of multiple data,
a changing world of particular facts.

On the other hand, James

did not agree with those empiricists who saw reality merely as
the sum of entirely separate phenomena or representations; he
disagreed with Hume, for example, who claimed that all perceptions are loose, separate and disconnected.

The various as-

pects of James's experience flowed one into the other and while
many items of it were indeed separated from others by intervening items, nevertheless, his experience as a whole had a
directly perceived continuity as well as unity.
According to James, Hume and empiricists like him failed
to see most of the conjunctive relations among things--the
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connective relations by which one thing can be said to be with
another thing, near another thing, like another, caused by
another, intended by another, or belonging to another.

Such

connections James found to be directly apprehended in experience.

Thinkers like Hume, however, readily recognized the

relations or disjunction among phenomena but rarely saw the
connections and continuity among them.

In James•s

experience~

on the other hand, the conjunctive relations were grasped as
clearly as the disjunctions and were therefore just as fully realt
While James could not accept the totally fragmented world

ot ordinary empiricism, he likewise found untenable the kind
ot unity which the rationalists presumed to be sustaining all
reality.

The modern rationalists, disturbed by the splintered

universe that they believed resulted from the empiricism of
men like Hume, tried to remedy the situation by positing some
kind of trans-empirical agents of unification such as substances
or souls.

The most complete unification was achieved by phil-

osophers such as Hegel, Royce, and Bradley, who posited an
Absolute and who, each in his own way, made the multiple phenomena of experience to be parts of this Absolute, manifestations of it, or·objects of its thought.

However their views

may have differed, Hegel, Royce, and Bradley posited the Absolute
as the only authentic reality, in relation to which the phenomena
of ·finite human experience were but transitory or even illusory
appearances.

Yb.ere Hume's

their rationalistic
essential characteristic of reality
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diversity mere semblances of the real.

James, however, could

not reconcile either ordinary empiricism or rationalism ·with
his own experience, for James's experience revealed neither
absolute unity nor absolute diversity.

No item in James's

experience ever exactly duplicated another; thus there was
always lacking the unity of exact similarity.

Furthermore,

while some items may have been with each other or

~

each

other in terms of space and time and thus spatially and temporally connected, other items were separated from each other by
space and time and were thus disjunctively related.

Moreover,

while James experienced some things as causally related, he
experienced many other things which did not appear to influence
each other actively at all.

Multiplicity and diversity were

thus obvious features of James's experience; but the multiplicity and diversity

each part of James's lived

notwiths~anding,

experience was continuous with the part which preceded it and
with the part which followed it.

Thus his experience as a

whole revealed that reality had some kind of unity,

no~,

how-

ever, the kind of unity posited by absolute monism in which
all the parts somehow interpenetrated and were in some way one
with the whole and with each other.

Rather, as the world

appeared to James, it had a 'strung-along' type of unity.
While its parts were distinct from each other, they were nevertheless joined together, figuratively speaking, by their edges.
The parts of James's world were not only next to each other,
they ran into each-· other without interruption.

tinuous.

They were con-

Of course, each and every part of the world was not
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experienced by James as continuous with each and every other
part, but every item in his experience was next to, or continuous with,

~

other items.

And these in turn were con-

tinuous with still others so that in one way or another, every
thing in the world of James's experience was linked, directly
or indirectly, with every other thing.

Because of this empir-

ically evident unity, James believed that the world held together by itself and did not require any trans-empirical Absolute to keep it from falling apart.
James rejected the monistic theory of the Absolute not
only because it was unnecessary and not corroborated by ;his
experience but also because the data provided by his experience
actually supported pluralism not monism.

The evidence found

within James's own life ran counter to monism's denial of
plurality and diversity, its denial of change, novelty and
development, and its denial of evil.

To William James it was

empirically evident that reality was multiple and diverse and
constantly changing, that it was a mixture of good and evil
{the proportions of which did not remain the same), and that
development was continually occurring.

While the rationalists

held that everything flowed so necessarily from the Absolute

that, if one could see things from its point of view, every
future event could be accurately predicted, James saw the
world as tychistic, as involving spontaneity and novelty.
Chance events in the sense of the unpredictable and the unexpected were common occurrences in his own life; no moment of
his experience ever seemed to duplicate another.

Thus, unlike
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the finished and completed world of the rationalists, James's
~orld

appeared to grow continually by the successive additions

o! novel experiences--experiences that grew out of but never
repeated the old.

And the future of his world, like the future

of James himself, could not be precisely foreseen.
James's rejection of· rationalistic monism-and his adoption of pluralism were, as we have noted, based upon the evidence of his experience; but one can hardly doubt that his
acceptance of the one and rejection of the other also received
a certain sanction from the moralistic posture of his life.
for the moral life could have no place.in a monistic universe.
Moral commitment, i.e., free commitment, would be impossible
in a fatalistic world in which all that happened was necessary;
more than that, human activity would be somehow less than real
in a scheme in which the only fully real thing was thought to
be eternal and unchanging; and whether real or not, human
activity would be, to some degree, like beating the air if the
world were essentially finished and complete and if man's
actions could not significantly change or improve it in any
way.

Furthermore, if all were necessary, experienced evil,

illusory or otherwise, could not be alleviated.

In a word,

a monistic world simply held no challenge for the powers of a
man for whom a life of creative, productive, moral action was
a cherished dream.
The world, for James, was thus a plurality--not in the
sense.that it had no unity at all, but in the sense that many
of its parts were only externally related to one another.

,.

f.
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some things, of course, may have been internally related, i.e.
related because of what they were, related by their very existence.

For example, William James and his friend, Tom Ward,

could be said to be internally related because they were both
men.

"When two terms are similar, their very natures enter

into the relation.

Being

~

they are, no matter where or

when, the likeness never can be denied."5

However, many

things in the world of James's experience were related not
because of what they were but only because of where they happened to be or when they happened to be.

For example, two

diverse events happening at the same time but in different
places may have been related only by the fact of simultaneity.
A hat and a pencil lying on a table may have been related only

insofar as they happened to be together in the same place.
Other relations, the where and t.he when, for example,
seem adventitious. The sheet of paper may be 'off'
or 'on' the table, for example; and in either case the
relation involves only the outside of its terms. Hav-.
ing an outside, both of them, they contribute by it to
the relation. It is external: the term's inner nature
is irrelevant to it.o
Thus, for James, the world was not a universe nor a multiverse
purely and simply.

The world was

~

just insofar as he

experienced it as concatenated and continuous; it was not one
just to the extent that disconnections and disjunctions were
directly felt.

The pluralism which James saw in the universe

meant that everything had an external environment of some kind
5william James, ~ssays in Radical .h:mpiricism (Gloucester,
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967), pp. 109-IO.
6 rbid., p. 110.
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and no reality could be said to encompass all others as the

rationalistic Absolute was thought to do.
However, to describe the world as a plurality is, from
one point of view at least, to characterize it negatively.
It is to describe it as devoid of complete and absolute unity.
One may well ask, then, "How did James positively characterize.
the world?

What was reality for James?"

reality is experience--lived experience.

He himself said that
For James, reality

and experience were co-extensive terms.
For the purposes of this thesis, we must determine what
there was about reality, as James encountered it, which forced
him not only to include faith in his de facto description of
it but also to posit faith as a decisive factor in its discovery and evolution.

To do this, we must consider in depth

the 'nature' of experience·in James's metaphysics and give
special attention to those relations among the various parts
of experience which are involved in the phenomena of knowledge
and action.
b.:xperience, from James's point of view, is not merely the
condition of

su~jectivity

or awareness, as it has so often

been defined by others, although certainly awareness cannot
be excluded from it.
of which we are aware.

Nor is experience exclusively the things
One might be tempted to say that exper-

ience, for James, is made up of thoughts and things, or of
things and thoughts, depending upon where one chooses to place
the priority.
correct.

And there is a sense in which one would be

But the statement would need much clarification

..

39
before it could be said to represent James's position with
any degree of accuracy, for the meanings which James gave to
•thought' and 'thing' are not immediately evident.

James did

not see thought and thing as two fundamentally different kinds
of reality, differing as body and soul, matter and spirit, differ in traditional metaphysics.

From his point of view, things

are as they are experienced--things are their appearances.
James had no experience of any special stuff out of which
thoughts are made.

He experienced no 'thought-stuff' which

differed fundamentally from the stuff out· of which things are
made.

Thus he asserted that there is no empirically discover-

able •matter• found in one and not in the other.

Thought and

thing, James said, are but two different names given in retrospect to one and the same moment in experience when it is considered in relation to different contexts.
Explicating this point further, James called a given
moment in experience, considered as immediately present, pure
experience.

He defined pure experience as the "instant field

of the present"?--as plain unqualified actuality or existence
which is only virtually thought or thing, subject or object.

or

what 'stuff' is this pure experience made?

there is no general •stuff'

or

James said that
-

which it is made.

There are as many stuffs as there are 'natures' in the
things experienced. If you ask what any one bit of
pure experience is made of, the answer is always the
same: "It is made of that, of just what appears, of
space, of intensity, ~latness, brownness, heaviness,

?~., P• 23.
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or what not." • • • Experience is only a collective
name for all these sensible natures, and saye for
time and space (and, if you like, for 'being')
there app~ars no universal element of which all things
are made.~
In this description of pure experience, the term 'thought'

is conspicuously absent.
ence does thought appear?

Yb.ere in James' s account o·f experiAnd what difference did James see

between the thought of heat and the thing, heat, for example?
James held that in the immediate experience of heat there is
only the datum--the phenomenon--simply heat.

There is in this

immediate datum no distinction between heat and the thought
of heat.

But in a second, retrosp.ecti-ve experience, the simple

•that• of the first experience can be seen to figure in different contexts.

As considered in relation to a man's other

thoughts, as continuous with them, as coming at a certain
point in his mental history, the heat figures as a thought,
feeling or sensation.

(James sometimes used the term 'thought'

broadly to signify any mental state.)

But the same datum

considered as related to other physical objects--to the flame
from which it comes, to the hearth on which the fire is, to
the logs burning, to one's body being warmed--figures as a
thing, as an object.

Thus thought and thing, the feeling of

heat and the. heat felt, are, from James's point of view, just
two designations of one and the same indivisible fact properly
called the datum, the phenomenon, or the experience.

And in

the datum per se there is no dualism of subject and object,
8

~., PP· 26-27.
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of consciousness and the content of consciousness.

The sub-

jectivity and objectivity of the experience are functional
attributes only, which, James said, are realized only when
the experience is '"taken,' i.e., talked-of, twice, considered
along with its two differing contexts respectively, by a new
retrospective experience, of which that whole past complication now forms the fresh content."9
From the point of view of James, then, reality is experience.

Experience is but a collective name for all the

sensible natures appearing in time and space--a collective
name for all phenomena.

But because of the various ways in

which phenomena are related in experience, they become classed
as thoughts and things, as mental states and objects of mental
states.

Of all the.experienced relations in which phenomena

exist, the most intimate of all relations is the one in virtue
of which a datum of experience becomes classified as a mental
state, the relationship in virtue of which it is considered
part of the mental life of one individual person.

No relation-

ship is more intimate than this relationship between two
experiences, two states of mind, the second of which is immediately conscious of continuing the first.

Some thoughts are

isolated from each other as my thoughts are isolated from
yours.
.

But other thoughts consciously continue each other,
.

.

as my present thought continues my past.

And when thoughts

are thus aware of continuing and belonging with other thoughts,
9Ibid.' p. 23.
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we

~nve

UP-

a stream of consciousness called a self.

"The organi-

zation of the Self as a system of memories, purposes, strivings,
fulfilments or disappointments, is incidental to this most
intimate of all relations, the terms of which seem in many
cases actually to compenetrate and suffuse each other's
10
being."
»npirically, a self involves a series of experiences
consciously continuing each other, a stream of conscious thought.
The nucleus of this self at any given moment, James said, is
experienced as the bodily existence warmly felt to be present
at the time and the sense of intimate activity accompanying it.
Attempting to explain the sense of continuing self-identity
which each person has, James pointed out that a present experience in the stream of thought can rememb.er those which preceded 'it and can know the

~bjects

which those experiences knew.

When a present experience looks back on past objects of thought,

it findsthat some have about them the same warmth and intimacy
which pervades the present experience.

On the other

h~nd,

others (experiences thought of as having occurred to other
people, for example) lack this warm and intimate character.
Any remembered object of thought, any remembered past experience, which brings to consciousness the same warmth and intimacy which accompanies the present experience is appropriated
.

.

by the present experience as 'mine'--as·!!·

I
\

James said that

we assimilate all such appropriated experiences to each other
lUibid., p. 45.
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and to the "warm and intimate self we now feel within us as

"e

think"ll and we separate them as a group from all those

experiences which do not have this warmth and intimacy--in
other words, we separate .the ~from the not-me. 12
The world described for us by James, then, is a pluralistic world in which reality is experience--experience involving

multiple phenomena related in diverse ways.

And in virtue·

of certain of these relations we are able to distinguish in
experience between thoughts and things, more precisely between
11 william James, The Principles of Psychology (2 vols.;
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890), I, 333.
12Empiricists, less radical than James, found it more difficult to explain man's consciousness of personal identity,
because they had overlooked the experienced transition by which
one thought flows into and is consciously continued by another
when they both belong to the same self. For James, this
"co-conscious" transition was one of those relations among
the parts of experience which he directly apprehended. "Within each of our personal histories, subject, object, interest
and purpose are continuous or may be continuous. Personal
histories are processes of change in time, and the change
itself is one of the thin s im.mediatel e erienced. 11 (William
am.es, .;.;,ssays in a ica Zmpir cism, p.
•
ume overlooked
this experience of change and transition and described the
mind in terms of such loose and separate representations, that
the rationalists felt compelled to look around for some suprasensible agent to unite the otherwise discontinuous items of
experience. Traditional scholastic metaphysics had already
employed a substantial soul as the undivided subject 0£
diverse thoughts· and feelings; but the rationalistic monists
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries solved the problem
by positing an Absolute of some kind as the repository of all
the disjointed experiences of men. According to James, if one
is a radical empiricist, no trans-empirical agency--neither
the substantial soul of traditional metaphysics nor the Absolute 0£ the monists--is necessary to hold one's experiences
together. They hold together by themselves. My thoughts flow
into one another and the continuous transition is something
felt by me. Although James's explanation of the consciousness
of personal identity may not be totally satisfying, it represents a noteworthy attempt to describe the 'I' or the 'me'
entirely in empirical terms.
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streams of consciousness and objects of consciousness.

Thus

ve find that among its realities, James's world includes
personal selves.

One may well ask, however, whether there is

a:JJY room in his uni verse for personal selves other t.han human

beings--whether human consciousness need be considered the
highest kind of consciousness.
As a matter of fact, James saw nothing in experience to
militate against the view that there are other consciousnesses
in existence--consciousnesses which are superhuman.

Further-

more, James held that there are certain types of experience
(which an empiricist who is radical enough cannot overlook)
that point to the reality of such superhuman consciousness.
The experiences of life following upon death--of new heights
of power and happiness following upon despair, for example-of joy based upon giving up one's own will and letting something higher work for him--all such experiences show us a
world in which all is well, in spite of sorrow, pain, tragedy,
and death.

They point in the direction of a world wider in

scope than the one we ordinarily see, a spiritual world of
which our visible world is just a part and "from which it
draws its chief significance." 1 3 They point to the existence
of some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to
ourselves, be co-conscious· and which we may call 'God.' if we
wish.

James assented to the reality of such a God on the

grounds that he produces real effects in the world--in the
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sense that prayer, communion with him, and obedience to what
we consider his demands seem to produce real salutary effects
upon our personal centers of energy.

We shall learn more

about the God in whom James felt inclined to believe in a
later chapter.

For now, let it suffice to say that James's

God cannot be identified with the Absolute of the rationalists. 14
Thus far, personal beings have been described primarily
in terms of consciousness and, therefore, in terms of their
runctions as knowers.

But men, the personal consciousnesses

with which we are most familiar, are not merely knowing beings;
they are desiring and acting beings as well.

And all of these

terms--knowing (sensing, feeling, thinking, reflecting),
desiring, and acting--refer to possible relations which personal beings can have to other parts of experience, i.e. to
the things in the world and to other persons.

To some extent,

all of these relations have both interested and yet baffled
philosophers for centuries.

That relation

with which phil-

osophers have been most frequently preoccupied has been the
cognitive relation.
14According to James, a God conceived after the fashion
of rationalistic monism, a God conceived to be absolute, infinite, eternal, unchanging, all-embracing and without a history,
is totally foreign to our experience and is thus totally foreign to us--a monstrosity, he suggested. There can be no common ground for communication with such a God--no basis for
sympathy, trust, love or cooperation. The only way to avoid
the foreignness, strangeness, and paradoxical character of the
monistic world of the Absolute, James said, is to be frankly
pluralistic and to assume that the superhuman consciousness,
however vast it may be, has itself an external environment and
is therefore finite. In James's opinion, theism in these terms
is a very strong probability that follows from experience
taken in the widest sense.

r
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Por centuries, philosophers· have struggled with the probiem of how to bridge the supposed gap between knower and object
known.

Subject and object being treated as discontinuous

entities, the presence of the object to the subject has always
been a very mysterious thing.

How is it possible that one

reality can be in two places at one time--in outer space and
in one's mind?

A great portion of the history of philosophy

is the story of the various theories which have been invented
to try to solve this paradox.

Representative theories posited

an image or mental representation of some sort to act as a
kind of intermediary between knower and object.

William James,

however, felt that representative theories violated the individual' a sense of life, for a person knows no intervening mental image between himself and the thing perceived but seems to
see the·object immediately as it physically exists.

At least

James himself experienced no such intervening image and he
took the evidence from his experience as primary.

Other theor-

ies, which James labeled common-sense theories, left the supposed separation between knower and object known untouched and
assumed that the mind is able to clear it by a kind of selftranscending leap.

Transcendentalist theories, characteristic

of certain rationalists, declared that the gap is impossible
to bridge by finite knowers and that the only possible explanation of knowing is in terms of an Absolute, for whom knower
and thing known are both objects.
James, however, took experience as he found it, with all
of its felt conjunctions and transitions, and saw that it was

4?
not necessary to resort to an.y artificial inventions in order
to close the gap between knower and object known.

James found

that it was possible to describe cognition intelligibly entirely in terms of his experience without calling upon any
trans-empirical powers to make it possible.

The cognitive

relation can be described adequately, he said, in terms of the
felt conjunctions in one's experience without intrQducing any
artificial intermediaries between his thoughts and things.
James gave us just such a description in "A World of Pure
Experience" in which he explained what knower and object are
empirically known as.
Either the knower and the known are:
(1) the self-same piece of experience taken twice
over in different contexts; or they are
(2) two pieces of actual experience belonging to
the same subject, with definite tracts of conjunctive
transitional experience between them; or
(3) the known is.a possible experience either of
that subject or another, to which the said conjunctive
transitions would lead, if sufficiently prolonged.15
In the first instance, we have knowledge of perception--know-

ledge in which the mind has direct acquaintance with a present
object.

The second and third cases are both instances of

conceptual knowledge in which the mind has 'knowledge about'
an object that is not present.

We alluded to perceptual

knowledge above when we discussed the difference between the
thought of heat and the thing, heat. 16 As we said, thought
and thing, subject and object, knower and object known, are
l5James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 53.
16Above, PP• 39-40.
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but two designations of one and the same indivisible fact or
item of experience.

In perceptual knowledge, as experienced,

there is no duality of subject and object to be overcome;
there is no gap between knower and thing known.

In perceptual

or intuitive knowledge, the mental content and the object are
identical; we experience no intermediaries between thought and
thing at the moment in which an object, such as
paper, is intuited by us.

thi~

piece of

"The paper is in the mind and the

mind is around the paper, because paper and mind are only two
names that are given later to the one experience, when, taken
in a larger world of which it forms a part, its connections
are traced in different directions." 1 7

The separation of a

given piece of immediate experience into consciousness and the
content of consciousness results from adding to it different
sets of experiences in connection with which it performs different functions.

The pure experience of heat, referred to

earlier, is the point of intersection of two processes which
connect it with different groups of associates.
is a man's personal biography.

One process

The datum, the pure experience,

the phenomenon, is the· last term of a series .of "sensations,
emotions, decisions, movements, classifications, expectations,
etc., ending in the present, and the first term of a series of
similar 'inner' operations extending into the future, • • •
The other process is one in which the

datum~

r~at,

i~

1 7william James, " 1.l!he Kn~,-· -eS of Things Together," ~
,!!:_5:_!;!r:i.gs ·of William Ja111P~ -r~· 156-57 •
lbJ,, ...... ~

-.;)ays

in Radical Empiricism, p. 13.
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terminus ad quem of a lot of previous physical operations--

felling trees, cutting logs, carrying wood, laying the wood,
lighting the f ire--and the terminus a quo of certain future
operations such as illuminating the room, warming the room and

all that is in it, smoldering, smoking, dying out, etc.

The

datum, the pure experience, 'heat,• is the intersection of
these two processes.

And a second retrospective experience

can consider the datum as figuring in both lines of activity.
Considered as part of the process known as one's personal
history, the experience functions as knower; considered as
part of the train of physical operations, the experience functions as known.

Thus James avoids the problem of bridging the

gap between knower and known in perceptual knowledge by recognizing that knower and known are in fact identified in the
immediate experience, i.e. at the moment of intuition.
In explaining conceptual knowledg-e, James did not Dridge

the gap between knower and known by
in the case of intuitive knowledge.

1d~ntifying

them as he.did

In conceptual

kn~wledge

knower and known are distinct; nevertheless, knowing in this
case does not involve any sort of trans-empirical leap. · On
the contrary, knower and known are distinct portions of experience, and the knowing itself is the experienced transition
from an earlier piece of experience to a later piece which the
first piece ·intends.

Conceptual knowle·dge is knowledge about

an object that is not immediately present, and it consists in
the pointing of one's thought to that object.

It is the know-

ing of absent experiences and consists in passing smoothly
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· towards them through the intermediate experiences which intervene between the present thought or concept,

conside~ed

as

}Cn.ower, and the absent experience, considered as object.

In

bis essay, "The Tigers of India," James said that conceptual

}Cn.owledge of an object such as the tigers in India amounts
to mentally pointing to them from wherever we are, assuming
that we are not in their immediate presence.
mean by 'pointing'?

as by us?

What _did he

Or rather what is this 'pointing' known

How is this pointing experienced?

The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known
simply and solely as.a procession of mental associates
and motor consequences that follow on the thought,
and that would lead harmoniously, if followed out,
into some ideal or real context, or even into the
immediate presence, of the tigers. It is known as
our rejection of a jaguar, if that beast were shown
us as a tiger; as our assent to a genuine tiger if
so shown. It is known as our ability to utter all
sorts of propositions which don't contradict other
propositions that are true of the real tigers. It
is even known, if we take the tigers very seriously,
as actions of ours which may terminate in directly
intuited tigers, as they would if we took a voyage
to India for the purpose of tiger hunting and brought
back of lot of skins of the striped rascals which we
had laid low.19
In this example, the thought of the tigers is the knower which

is joined by conjunctive transitional experience to the percep-

tual experience of the tigers (assuming that we go to India
to see them).

And the percept of the tigers is the object

known.
To take another example, if while sitting in his bedroom
a man thinks of a photograph which he believes to be hidden
l9James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of
Truth, p. 226.
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in an old Bible on his library shelf, and i f he gets up,
walks to the library, looks on the shelf, finds the Bible,
opens it, and finds the photograph, his thought of the photo
when he was sitting in his room can now be said to have been
trulY cognitive of the photograph hidden in the Bible.
percept of the photo is what his idea of it

mea~t

thought of it has passed into the percept by a
junctive experiences.

The

because his

ser~es

of con-

The felt transitions by which the con-

cept of the photo was finally corroborated is all that the
knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly mean from a
purely empirical--i.e., a radically empirical--point of view.
The percept of the photograph in this instance not only verifies the concept, but the percept's existence as the terminus
of the chain of intermediary experiences actually creates the
concept's function of knowing.
James held that conceptual knowledge is made conceptual
knowledge wholly by the existence of things that fall outside
of the knowing experience itself, i.e., by intermediary experiences and by a terminal percept into which the conceptual
experience leads and which seems to fulfill it.

But can the

knowledge be said to be present before the intermediary experiences occur and the fulfilling terminal percept is attained?
James distinguished between knowing as verified and completed
and the same knowing in transit or in process.

It is only

When our idea of an object has terminated actually in the percept of the object that we know 'for certain' that from the
beginning the idea was truly cognitive of that thing.

"Until
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established by the end of the process, its quality of knowing
that, or indeed of knowing anything, could still be doubted;
·and yet the knowing really was there, as the result now shows." 20
In other words, we were virtual .knowers of the object "long
before we were certified to have been its actual knowers, by
the percept's retroactive validating power." 21 James claimed
that the greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond
this virtual stage.

Obviously, our thinking about impercep-

tible things never gets beyond this point, because in this
case, a verifying perceptual experience is not possible.

But

even when perceptual verification is possible, we often cannot afford to wait for such verification because immediate
action may be necessary. 22 In such instances, if there is
no contradicting truth in view, we often assume our ideas to
be true and act accordingly.

But to assume our ideas to be

true without verification is an act of faith.

Since the greate!:'

part of our knowing never gets beyond this virtual stage--the

.

greater part of our 'knowing' involves faith of some kind or
other.
To continue thinking unchallenged is, ninety-nine
times out of a hundred, our practical substitute for
20James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 68.
21 Ibid.
>

22 James himself had experienced the kind of paralysis
which is attendant upon that attitude which prompts us to wait
for proof before we act. In the emotional crisis of his youth,
he had been, to some extent, paralyzed by doubts--doubts about
freedom, his creative powers, the ultimate value of his activities. And he learned by painful experience that if we insist
that the fruits of our actions be certified in advance, we may
never act at all.
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kn.owing in the completed sense. As each experience
runs
by cognitive transition into the next one, and
we nowhere feel a collision with what we elsewhere
count as truth or fact, we commit 2urselves to the
current as if the port were sure. 2 ~

Thus James succeeded in explaining knowledge, both perceptual (intuitive) and conceptual, entirely in terms of
experience as he lived it and the transitions which he felt
therein, thereby avoiding the usual epistemological problem

ot getting knower and known together.

In perceptual knowledge,

he said, there is no gap between knower and object to be overcome because knower and object are one and· the same bit of
immediate experience considered from two points of view.
And in conceptual knowledge, knower and object are two pieces
of experience, an idea and a percept, actually or potentially
joined by a series of experiences fluidly passing into each
other.

When the conjunction is actual, the percept is felt

as fulfilling the idea.
As we saw earlier, however, the cognitive relation is

only one of the possible relations which those parts of experience known as personal selves can have with other parts of
experience.

Men are not merely cognitive beings; they are

active beings as well.

In fact, for James, the most important

thing about a man is not what he knows (although that is important too) but his conduct, his actions.

According to James,

knowledge is for the sake of activity.

The purpose of knowl-

edge is to enable man to exercise his volitional powers in
23James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 69.

effective and fruitful activity in the world.

And activity,

. n the sense of desiring and willing as well as the physical
1
activities which follow upon them, is important because by
means of it man moulds his own character, creates to a large
extent his own experiences; 24 modifies his environment and
thus fashions the world in the sense of changing it, completing

it, and making it better or worse.
It is an empirical fact that men desire (wish for and
will) to feel, to do, and to have all kinds of things which
presently are not felt, done or had.

For James, the presence

of desires in the world makes it a world of good and evil.
ror the good is that which is desired by some conscious being;

it is that which is appreciated and enjoyed by such a being;
in short, it is that which is felt to be good by some one.
So tar as a person "feels

~nything

to be good, he makes it

24It is true that the flux of pure sensational experience
seems to be simply given. And it is simply given to the newly
born infant; but once the very fir~ impression has been made
upon the infant's sense, he reacts; and from then on his activ-.
ities can so modify his environment that even future given
sensations may in part owe their being to him. Furthermore,
in regard to pure sensational experience, man exercises a
certain selective activity insofar as a man's sense organs
respond to only .a comparatively few of the infinite number of
movements swarming about him. This selective activity continues when, from the flux of sensations, attention "picks out
certain ones as worthy of its notice and suppresses all the
rest." (James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 285.) Thus,
under the influence of his own active nature, a man's world
takes shape,. and the things with which his world is furnished
are products of his own selective attention. Things, said
J~es, are nothing "but special groups of sensible qualities,
whhiich happen practically or aesthetically to interest us, to
W ch we therefore give substantive names, and which we exalt
to this exclusive status or independence and dignity." (Ibid.)
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· good • .,25

It

!.! good at least for him.

Goods are, in James• s
,,ords, "objects of feeling and desire," 26 the essence of good
bej.ng"simply to satisfy demand." 2 7
Correlatively, evil is the frustration of desire; it is
tbat which is repugnant or painful to a conscious be'ing; it
is that which is felt to be bad or evil by someone.

In James's

view, if there were no beings with conscious desires in the
world, no beings to feel things to be good or evil, there
would be no good or evil.
tains both.

As it is, however, the world con-

It contains good insofar as there are things

desired, appreciated and enjoyed by men; it contains evil
insofar as there are frustrated desires, repugnances, suffering, and pain.
The presence in the world of desires and human judgments
of good and bad makes the world to be not only a world of good
and evil but an ethical world as well.

For every desire, by

the very fact that it exists, constitutes a valid claim on
the part of the person who experiences that desire.

And wherever

a claim is made by one consciousness, there is an obligation
incumbent upon another.

In James's words, "• •• every de facto

claim creates in so far forth an obligation. • • .Arry desire
-

is imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes itself
2 5Yilliam James, "'l'he Moral Philosopher and the Moral
Life," ~says on Faith and Morals, comp. by Ralph Barton Perry,
Meridian Books (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing
Company, 1962), p. lYU.
261bid., p. 1y7.
27lbid.' p. 201.
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valid by the ract that it exists at all."28

Thus, for James,

every good, insofar as it is related in one way or another to
desire (either as its object or its fulfillment) is in some
sense a moral good.
moral goods." 29

ln fact, James says, "there are no non-

The universe, for James, is thus an ethical universe-a universe of experienced desires and, therefore, a universe
of claims and corresponding obligations.

Desires and claims,

however, frequently conflict and it is not always possible to
satisfy all demands.

In the case of conrlict, how does one

decide which claim should be fulfilled?

James said that the

guiding principle of moral philosophy should be to satisfy as
many claims as possible.
Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a
good, must not the guiding principle for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all
times as many demands as we can? That act must be
the best act, accordingly, which makes for the best
whole, in the sense of awakening the least sum Ol'Ciissatisfactions.30
But it is often impossible to know in advance and with certitude. which act will make for the best whole.

Certitude in

ethical matters seems to be a practical impossibility inasmuch
as every real dilemma of this sort is unique.

And this points

up the problem involved in all human activity--a problem the
solution to which, as we shall discover, requires the recogni28~., p. 195.
29Ibid., p. 209.

30ibid., p. 205.

~~on
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o! faith as a legitimate spring-board !or action.
Action follows upon belief; it presupposes conviction.

_])Oubt and indecision mean inactivity.

~

And yet, from the point

o! view of James's radical empiricism, absolute certainty
regarding matters of fact--i.e., absolute certainty based upon
empirical evidence or rational demonstration--seems to be
practically impossible.

Except for the datum of the immediate

present, which we always without hesitation believe, it is

aiways possible to doubt our judgments, as the following considerations will show.
The ideal, of course, is to be able to act on verified
principles.

For this reason, men persistently seek the veri-

fication of their beliefs.

The scientist, for example, aims

to have his theories empirically corroborated.

He begins with

an idea,' an hypothesis, and is led by it to perform a series

ot operations and experiments which he hopes will terminate
in a perceptual experience that will be the fulfillment and

Yeri.tication of his original idea.

But even when verification

is attained," from the point of view of the empiricist, the
verified proposition is still subject to further qualification
3lJames's position on the relationship of belief to action
was undoubtedly influenced not only by James's own experience
but also by the thought of his friend and fellow member of
"The Metaphysical Club," Charles Peirce. In "How to Make Our
Ideas Clear," Peirce spoke of belief as "a rule for action."
l>hiloso hical Writin s of Peirce, ed. by Justus Buchler rNew
or : . over Pu ica ions, nc., 9551, p. 28.) And in "Tne
lixation of Belief," he wrote, "Our oeliefs guide our desires
~ shape our actions." (Ibid., pp. 9-10.) Belief "puts us
'< ~to such a condition thai'°We shall behave in some certain way
!/f;:~ en the occasion arises." (1,lli., p. 10.)

.
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and correction.

As James told us, radical empiricism consi-

ders its most assured conclusions regarding matters of fact
as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future
experience, because experienced reality is constantly changing
and what may be true of a given segment of it today may not
necessarily be true of similar instances of it tomorrow.
Furthermore, there is no absolute point of view. The world
of radical empiricism is a world of many_minds,3 2 minds which
are for practical purposes conterminous, i.e., they meet in the
same objects.33

But even though the same object may be known

by more than one person, no two persons perceive it from precisely the same posture.

No two people share identical

32 How does a radical empiricist like James know that there
are other minds in existence? In his own words--"Why do I
postulate your mind? Because I see your body acting in a certain way. Its gestures, facial movements, words and conduct
generally are 'expressive,' so I deem it actuated as my own is,
by an inner life like mine. This argument from analogy is my
reason, whether an instinctive belief runs before it or not.
But what is 'your body' here but a percept in !)! field? It is
only as animating that object, ~object, that I have any occasion to think of y~t all • • • • In that perceptual part of
st universe which I call iour body, your mind and my mind meet
and may be called conterminous. Your mind actuates that body
and mine sees it; my thoughts pass into it as into their ha~
monious cognitive fulfilment; your emotions and volitions pass
into it as causes into their effects." (James, Essays in Radical
.rlnpiricism, pp. ??-?8.)
33James held that men's ~inds meet in a w~rld of objects
which they share in common and which would still be there if
one or several of the minds were destroyed. James wrote that
if "one and the same experience can figure twice, once in a
mental and once in a physical context • • • , one does not see
why it might not figure thrice, or four times, or any number
of times, by running into as many different mental contexts,
just as the same point, lying at their intersection, can be
continued into many different lines." (James, ~ssais in Radical .l!lnpiricism, p. 80.) James claimed that abolishing any
number of mental streams would not destroy the experience
itself or its other contexts.
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perspectives or see the same object in exactly the same way;
and no one man, :from James' s point of view, perceives an object

in its entirety with all of its actual and possible relationships.

Thus no single person knows any thing completely; no

one knows all that can be said about it.

What may be true of

it from one perspective, in one particular relationship, may

not be

tru~

tionship.

of it from another perspective or in another relaFurthermore, each man sees an object in a unique

light, the unique light provided by all of his past experience
(which is never identical with any one else's) and by all of
his previously espoused convictions and beliefs; and just as
a visible object may appear differently in lights of various
wave lengths, so the same object may appear differently to
different persons in the light of their unique past experiences.
This fact was forcibly impressed upon James himself by the
many debates in which he engaged with family and friends, all
of whom were sincere and honest in their search for truth.
The fact that they did not all see reality in the same way
made.it clear to James that it is not possible to consider
the judgment of any one mind about an object as the absolutely
incorrigible truth about the -.matter.
The history of human thought is to a great extent the
history of men's disputes about what is true or not true of the
universe and about how men should act or not act in relation '
to the universe.

It is also the history of men's attempts to

settle these disputes.

The most satisfactory way of resolving

such issues, of course, is to point to the data of experience

r
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veri!ying one hypothesis rather than another.

Experience,

however, is not always obliging enough to provide the needed
data; on the other hand, it is at times too obliging, for not
infrequently experience supports both hypotheses equally and
leaves the issue thus unsettled, at least as far as empirical
proof is concern.ed.

Moreover, in regard to practical issues,

experience never tells us in advance how successful or unsuccessful a particular course of action wi_ll actually be.
William James put forth his theory of pragmatism as a
method of settling men's disputes about reality and about
their practical relations with it.

But, as a brief considera-

tion of his pragmatism will reveal, even it does not resolve
issues so completely that there is no longer any possibility
of doubt or need for faith.

Although James speaks of pragma-

tism as a method, it is obviously more than a method; for a
method of settling disputes must involve a theory of truth
as well.

As a method, pragmatism attempts to interpret each

conflicting hypothesis by tracing its respective practical
consequences.

If the consequences of one alternative are in

rio way different from ·those of another, then the alternatives
mean practically the same thing and all dispute is idle.
James's pragmatic rule states that the meaning 9f a concept
may always be found, if not in some sensible particular which
it directly designates, then in some particular difference in
the course of human experience which its being true will make.

-

"There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere--no difference in abstract truth that doesn't
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eXJ>ress itsel! in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct
. consequent upon that tact, imposed on somebody, somehow, some4 One can see in James's position not
where,· and somewhen."3
onlY bis radically empirical attitude but also the importance
which he placed upon action.

Knowledge is for the sake of

action; and if two theories involve no differences whatsoever
in the human conduct consequent upon their being accepted as

true, then for practical purposes the two theories are the same.35

Arr1 dispute about them is idle speculation and a waste of time.3 6
But let us suppose that the practical consequences of one
theory

~

different from those of another.

which of the two theories is the true one?

How does one decide
There must be some

criteria if the dispute is not to be settled arbitrarily.

In

34 Jam.es, Pragm.atism and Four Essays from The Meaning of
Truth, p. 45. .
35The influence of Charles Peirce upon Jam.es is apparent.

In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear, " _Peirce wrote, ". • • differ-

ent belief a are distinguished by the different modes of action
to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this
respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same
rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more
than playing a tune in different keys is playing different
tunes." (Philosophical Writings of Peirce, p. 29.)
36 James•s intensely active and moralistic nature forbade
him to waste time over merely academic questions, because he
!elt that it was action that ··mattered not mere speculation.
In early manhood, James was prone to such seemingly idle speculation and saw it as a fault which he resolved to overcome.
"For the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the mere
speculation and contemplative Grublei in which my nature takes
most delight, and voluntarily cUitivate the feeling of moral
freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well as by acting.
• • • For the present then remember: care little for speculation;
much for the form of my action; recollect that only when habits
ot order are formed can we advance to really interesting fields
Of action--and consequently accumulate grain on grain of willful choice like a very miser; • • • " ("Diary," The Writings of
William James, pp. 7-8.)
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oversimplified terms, the true idea is the idea that works.
In Pragmatism, James explained:
• • • ideas which themselves
ex erience
ecome true ·us in so ar as
e
e
us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts
of our experience, to summarize them and get about among
them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following
the interminable succession of particular phenomena.
A.ny idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea
that will carry us prosperously from any one part of
our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth,
true instrumentally.37
James tried to show that the pragmatic notion of truth
is not unlike that of the traditionalists who defined truth
as the agreement of our ideas with reality.

However, he

interpreted the terms, 'reality' and 'agreement,' somewhat
more broadly than the traditionalists did.

When James said

that our ideas must agree with reality in order to be true,
he recognized three kinds of reali tie·s with which ideas must
be in harmony: 1) concrete sensible facts; 2) relations among
purely mental ideas, i.e., abstract principles and definitions
and the relations_ intuitively perceived among them--truths of
logic and mathematics, for example; and 3) the whole body of
other truths which we have already made our own.
ideas agree with such realities?

How do our

In a narrow sense, an idea

can agree with a reality by copying it.
word 'agree'· had a broader meaning.

But for James, the

To. put it succinctly, an

idea will agree with the three kinds of realities mentioned
1) if it is either sensibly verifiable or at least not in

37James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of
Truth, p. 49.
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contradiction with concrete sensible facts, 2) if it is logicallY consistent and consistent with our abstract· knowledge in
general, and 3) if it is either supported by,- or at least in
harmony with, all of our other beliefs about the world.
that thus agree with reality work.

Ideas

They work in the sense

that by believing them we can get about among the parts of
our experience much more easily than if we did not believe.
If nothing else, they work in the very minimal sense of not
obstructing our progress as we move about in the empirical
world.38
For James, then, true ideas are ideas that work, ideas
that put us in good working touch with reality.

But even when,

by the pragmatic method, one has decided which of two ideas
works best, which one he will count as true, the issue is
never absolutely settled for all time.

Since reality is con-

tinually changing, what works now may not always work.

Thus

even those conclusions arrived at pragmatically are never
entirely incorrigible.

Doubt is always possible in regard to

38 James explained the agreement of an idea with reality
as follows: "To 'agree• in the widest sense with a reality can
only mean to be guided either strai~ht u~ to it or into its~
surroundings, or to be put into sue wor ing touch with it as
to handle either it or something connected with it better than
if we disagreed. Better either intellectually or practically!
And often agreement will only mean the negative fact that
nothing contradictory from the quarter of that reality comes
to interfere with the way in which our ideas guide us elsewhere • • • • The essential' thing is the process of being guided. Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or
intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings,
that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits,
in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole settiiig-;will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will hold
true of that reality." (James, Pragmatism and Four J!,;ssays from
The Meaning of Truth, p. 140.)
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The good life, however, presupposes conviction.

The

good life is the moral life, the life to which James himself
aspired and to which he resolved to dedicate himself.

It is

a life of productive hum.an activity in which one fashions the
world and himself in such a way as to minimize the evil and
the pain and to maximize the good and its accompanying joys.
James held that the very purpose of thought and reflection is
to facilitate such fruitful human conduct.

But responsible

human conduct presupposes belief--not merely opinion held as
such--but conviction, for doubt and indecision result in apathy
'and inaction.

Here James's view of knowledge seems to present

a stumbling block, because on his radically empiricist principles, absolute certainty certified by evidence is rarely, if
ever, possible in regard to matters of fact.

On

experiential

grounds, a life of responsible moral action is thus impossible
--impossible unless some other springboard for action can be
found beside the belief that is certified by proof.
two alternatives.

~ther

Ye have

we do not act at all or we act on

an assumption; either we do not act at all or we act on faith.
Faith, which is a believing attitude adopted on non-cognitive grounds, is necessary for hum.an life, James said, not
only Decause without it doubt would paralyze us most of the
time but also

becaus~

the moral life, gua moral, requires 1t.

Moral action, the opposite ot determined, instinctive action,
must be responsible and free.

To act morally is to act freely

and to be aware of one's freedom and one's consequent

r .·
r

responsibility.

~
But in James's view, free will is not some-

thing which can be demonstrated or empirically proven.

Hence,

if one accepts it, he must accept it on faith as James himself
did after reading Renouvier in 1870.

Thus the moral life,

Jl,U! moral, presupposes faith not only in the course of action

one chooses to follow but in one's own freedom as well.
In summary, we may say that the world, as experienced by

James and as interpreted in his philosophy, is such that human
.tulfillment, as well as the development and perfection of the
world as a whole, requires the exercise of faith on the part
of huinan beings.

The world, as James lived in it and under-

stood it, is a world of changing, multiple phenomena--a world
whose future is open--a world that is plastic in the hands of
men.

And men, James held, are primarily active beings.

By

their activities, not only do men create their own personalities, fashion their own lives, and shape their own destinies,
but also they make the world itself to be what it is.

The world

becomes better or worse in proportion to the quality of each
human life within it.

The good in the world can be augmented,

James believed, and the evil lessened by responsible action on
the part of human beings.
presupposes conviction.

Such responsible action, however,
-

And since the changing character of

experience and the limits of human knowledge make that conviction which is certified by proof impossible in most practical
situations, the responsible human action by which man fulfills
himself and perfects the world requires

the exercise of faith.

James· thus affirmed the need for faith in the lives of
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all men; and his affirmation was a philosophical_ one based
upon his reflections on the changing character of reality-bis reflections on man, man's active relationship to the world,
and the apparent limitations of human knowledge.
The distinctively human need for faith, however, was an
exigency which James himself personally and urgently felt.

And he allowed faith to play a prominent role in his own life
--even in his philosophical speculation.

To permit faith to

influence one's philosophical views was, of course, a cardinal
sin from rationalistic and positivistic points of view.

Hut

from James's point of view, there was no other choice.

On the

one hand, his empiricist view of knowledge made

absolu~e

proven certitude in most philosophical questions impossible.

On the other hand, his moralism forbade forever suspending
judgment--at least on matters so vital.
with no alternative except faith.

Thus James was left

It was either faith or

mental nullity and moral impotence.

And James opted for faith.

It became part and parcel of his pragmatic method insofar as
that method allowed him to accept any hypothesis and act
upon it if consequences useful to life flowed from it, even
though no empirical verification was readily available.
Furthermore, James used this pragmatic method himself in determining some of the fundamental features of his own world view
--in arguing against materialism, for example,- in fighting
determinism, and in defending theism.
Thus James's moralism, the changing character of reality,
the limits of purely empirical knowledge, and the practical

6?
necessity of dealing with the proader questions of existence
forced James to make a place for faith in his philosophical
view of life.

But even if they had not, James would have had

to take cognizance of faith at least as an empirical datum.
Rightly or wrongly, the men of his day, like the men of every
era, did believe without clinching evidence.

Human faith,

religious and otherwise, was an experienced fact then as it
is now.

And a radical empiricist who could exclude nothing

of experience from the matter of philosophy would have to
philosophize about faith--asking what it is, whence it comes,
and whether or not it is legitimate.

James asked himself these

very questions and to his own satisfaction established faith
as a valid mental attitude.

As we shall see in the following

chapters, from the viewpoint of his philosophy, which is at
once radically empiricist in its outlook and moralistic in
its aims, faith is an indispensable part of life and must be
considered as a legitimate mental attitude providing a legitimate basis for human action.
•

CHAPT.l!:R III
THE VOLITIOliAL QUALITY OF BELIEF

William James, whose radically empiricist principles forbade him to exclude anything of experience from the matter of
philosophy, could hardly avoid philosophizing about faith.
He had to deal with faith because it is a datum of experience
that people do believe when the evidence is inconclusive.
Moreover, a philosophy which is both empirical, insofar as it
denies the existence of absolute certainty unless it occurs
in the usual course of experience, and moralistic by its placing the value of life in responsible action grounded on personal conviction must provide some basis for action other
than the certitude guaranteed by the theoretical posture of
proof and demonstration.

Assuming that certainty guaranteed

by evidence.is unattainable in most practical problems, the
other possible basis for responsible action is the certainty
of faith, i.e., belief which is determined by man's volitional
nature in the absence of any ··substantiating proof. . To have
faith is to believe when it is still theoretically possible
to doubt and involves a willingness to act even though the
successful outcome of one's action is not certified in advance.

An act of faith involves believing when the evidence available
is insufficient to force the mind to assent.
68

In such a case,
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1 • 8 ., ~n a case in which there is not sufficient evidence to
force assent, if a man believes, he believes because he chooses
to do so tor reasons other than evidential.

However, his

reasons, while non-cognitive, are nevertheless empirical and
may include preference, desire,

emotion~

and need·, especially

the need to act effectively in the concrete situations of
life.

To a greater or less degree, all men live by faith and

rightly so.

It is not only a justifiable attitude of man's

mind; but it is a practical necessity for

fruitful human

existence.
The value of faith has not always been admitted by philosophers.

In James' a own time, there were those thinkers who

considered faith a type of intellectual vice.

They were men

who thought that faith was both irrational and unscientific-a vice in which a conscientious thinker, aware of his responsibility to seek truth and avoid error, would not allow himself to indulge.

Their position implied that the primary duty

ot a knower-is to avoid error; they held that believing in the
face of insufficient evidence involves the unwarranted risk of
making a mistake--a risk which a responsible thinker has no
right to incur.

The British-mathematician and philosopher,

William K. Clifford (1845-1879), wrote:
Belief is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements for the solace and private pleasure
of the believer. • • • Whoso would deserve well of his
fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his
belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest
at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and
catch a stain which can never be wiped away • • • • If
a] belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence
even though the belief be true, as Clifford on the
same page explains] the pleasure is a stolen one. • • •

E

,

?O

'
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It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance of our
duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from
such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly
master our own body and then spread to the rest of the
town • • • • It is wrong always, everywhere, and for
every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.l
The position of men like Clifford was that belief, in
order to be warranted, must rest entirely upon intellectual
grounds, i.e., that belief can be justified only when it is
supported by conclusive evidence.

These thinkers claimed

that preference, desire, and emotion may never lawfully determine a man's convictions.

Because of their insistence upon

the priority of the cognitive and the conceptual and their
·refusal to allow man's volitional nature any legitimate role
to play in establishing his beliefs, James referred to these
philosophers as Intellectualists.

His use of the word 'Intel-

lectualists, • however, needs some clarification.

Because James

did not always use the term in the same way·, its exact meaning
must be determined·· by the particular context in which we find
it.

At times, James used the word 'Intellectualists' in a

narrow sense to refer to the rationalists with their emphasis
upon the conceptual and the logical, as he did when he attacked the "vicious intellectualism" 2 of Francis H. Bradley
and Josiah Royce.

At other times, however, particularly when

he was trying to defend faith against the attacks of those who
would deny it any legitimate role in human life, James
1

James, "'l'he Will to Believe," .l!;ssays on Faith and Morals,
p. 39, quoting .William K. Clifford, "TheEthics of Belief • 11
2 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. bO.
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broadened the terms to include anyone who would refuse to
allow man's passional and volitional nature a part to play in
the determination of his beliefs.

In this sense, the Intel-

iectualists were those who insisted that conviction is solely
a matter of cognition, that a man's beliefs can lawfully be
determined only by evidence--either in the form of sensible
reality impressing itself upon the mind, or in the form of
logical demonstration coercing the mind to assent.

Using the

term 'inteliectualism' in this broadened sense, James spoke of
two types of Intellectualists--the Rationalizing Intellectualists, among whom he included Bradley and Royce, and the
Empiricist Intellectualists including such positivists as
William K. Clifford and Karl Pearson.
Among intellectualists two parties may be distinguished. Rationalizing intellectualists lay stress
on deductive and 'dialectic' arguments, making large
use of abstract concepts and pure logic (Hegel, Bradley, Taylor, Royce). .t:mpiricist intellectualists are
more 'scientific,' and think that the character of
the world must be sought in our sensible experiences,
and found in hypotheses based exclusively thereon
(Clifford, Pearson).3
·
However the Rationalizing Intellectualists and the .t:mpiricist

Intellect~alists

may have differed, their views on

human knowledge and belief bore marked similarities to each
other and were, on the other hand, strikingly different from
those of William James. 'A brief consideration of the differences between the Intellectualists' position in regard to
knowledge and belief and that of James will help us to under3Yilliam James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York:
Greenwood Press, Publishers, l9b8), p. 221.

72
. stand more fully James's defense of faith in the chapters to

follow.
A fundamental difference between James's view and that
o! the Intellectualists concerns the active character of the
human mind.

~rom

the Intellectualists' point of view, the

mind is essentially passive and

recep~ive;

it is, so to speak,

merely a kind of recording device upon·whieh reality somehow
comes and registers itself.

James, however, saw the human

mind as essentially active; in his view, man's active and volitional nattire has a vital part to play in all of man's mental
activities--in sensation, in conceptualization, in reasoning,
and above all in belief.

First of all, man's active nature

provides these processes with their very reason for being, for
mental activity occurs primarily so that man can exercise his
volitional powers in effective and fruitful action upon the
world; secondly, man's volitional ·nature has a vital role to
play in the internal mental processes themselves.
Considering the human mind as active in both of these
senses, we shall examine first of all James's position regarding the mind's relation to external action.

Unlike the Intel-

lectualists who stressed mants function as a knower, James saw
man basically as an agent--an agent whose task is not only to
survive in a relatively hostile environment but also to compiete and fulfill himself and the world by means of effective
action.

For the Intellectualists, man's glory is in knowing

for the sake of knowing; but for James, man's glory is in
Purposeful action in the world and knowing is for the sake of

?3
such action.
The differing views of the Intellectualists and James in
regard to man and the purpose of knowledge imply differing
views of the world itself.

The Intellectualists' position

implies that the world. is already finished and complete and
basically unaffected by man's life.

The world, from their

point of view, can be known by man, but he cannot change it
or make it more perfect.

"'Intellectualism' is the belief

that our mind comes upon a world complete in itself, and has
the duty of ascertaining its contents; but has no power of
re-determining its character, for that is already given." 4
James's position, on the other hand, is that the world is
plastic and open.

It is incomplete and can be completed only

by fruitful human activity.

Man by his actions can change and

perfect the universe; he can redetermine its character so that
it will become a better place in which to live--better not
only for himself but for his fellows as well.
however, man must understand the world.

To do this,

He must understand it

in order to know how to act effectively in relation to it.
It is for the sake of such effective action that man seeks
knowledge.

James would not deny that an individual man may

desire to know for knowing's sake.

But this is a special

interest and not the most basic drive behind the search for
truth.

A man seeks to know, James tells us, so that he will

feel at home in the world, but being at home in the world means

\

?4
being able to act effectively in it.
iJDpel men to search for

kno~ledge

Most of the motives which

involve goods, both private

and public, which can be attained only by action.
Granted, then, that man's volitional nature supplies the
very reason for knowledge to occur, let us examine the part
which his volitional nature plays in the mental processes themselves, i.e., in sensing, conceptualizing, reasoning, and, more
importantly, in belief.

From the Intellectualists' point of

view, the mind in these processes is basically passive; it is
acted upon in some way by the world and s·imply reflects or.
mirrors the world's contents.

For William James, however, the

human mind is internally active in all of these processes and
man's volitional nature functions in each of them insofar as
each one involves some kind of internal selective activity.
Even sensation, in which the mind is customarily thought
of as passive, involves selective activity from James's point

ot view.

True enough, the flux of sensational experience does

seem to be simply given.

But a kind of selection occurs inso-

far as the number of stimuli to which a man's sense organs
respond are quite limited when compared to the infinite number
of movements which, scientists tell us, swarm about him.

The

conformation of the organs of sense are such that they can be
said to 'select' those movements to which they will react.
To begin at the bottom, what are our very senses
themselves, • • • but organs of selection? Out of the
infinite chaos of movement, of which physics teaches
us that the outer world consists, each sense-organ
picks out those which fall within certain limits of
velocity. To these it responds, but ignores the rest
as completely as if they did not exist. Out of what
is in itself an undistinguishable, swarming continuum,

?5

devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses make
for us, by attending to this motion and ignoring that,
a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt
changes, of picturesque light and shade.~
In the view of James, however, the selective actiVity does not
stop with sensation.

Conceptualization, likewise, involves a

kind of 'choice,' insofar as attention selects from the flux
of experience those sensations, or groups of sensations, which
concretely interest a man.
If the sensations we receive from a given organ
have their causes thus picked out for us by the conformation of the organ's termination, Attention, on the
other hand, out of all the sensations yielded, picks
out certain ones as worthy of notice and suppresses
all the rest. We notice only those sensations which
are signs to us of things which happen practically
or aesthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give substantive names, and which we exalt to
this exclusive status of independence and dignity.6
This selective activity by which attention cuts the sensible
flux of experience up into 'things' is an integral part of the
conceptual process.

In James's words,

Out of this aboriginal sensible muchness attention
carves out objects, which conception then names and
identifies forever--in the sky 'constellations,' on the
earth 'beach,' 'sea,' 'cliff,' 'bushes,' 'grass.• Out
of time we cut 'days' and 'nights,' 'summers' and 'winters.' We say what each part of the sensible continuum
is, and all these abstracted whats are concepts.7
In reasoning too, the active nature of man is operative.
The Intellectualists, of course, did not consider the mind to
be passive in reasoning in the same sense in which they

5William James, Pstchology, Premier Books (New York:

Jawcett World Library,
6 Ibid.

-

963), p. 162.

7James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 50.

For

considered it to be passive in sensation and conception.

in reasoning, the mind is to some degree active, even from the
:rntellectualists' point of view, in the sense that it moves
from premise to premise to conclusion.

But in their view,

man's volitional nature has no part to play in this process,
and even in inference the mind is basically passive because
it moves insofar as it is moved by the evidence and the force
of logic.
The position of William James, of course, differs.

In

reasoning one takes a given fact, 'S,' arid analyzes it into
many attributes.

He then notices one attribute 'M' which "he

takes to be the essential part of the whole fact ['S'] before
him. 118 But since in his world, 'M' is always joined with consequence 'P,' the reasoner concludes that
joined with

•s.•

'P' must also be con-

In syllogistic form, 'M' is 'P,' 'S' is 'M,'

:. 'S' is 'P.'
Which aspect of the complex fact,

•s,•

is taken to be

essential to it, however, depends upon the interests and purposes of the one reasoning.

To use James's own example, a

piece of paper has many characteristics--whiteness, flatness,
thinness, suitability for writing, combustibility.

Which as-

pect a man attends to as essential depends upon his purpose.
If he wishes to light a.fire, its combustibility is essential
for his purpose.

If he wishes to write a letter, its character

as a writing surface is essential.9
8 James, Psychology, p. 313.
9From James's point of view, the reality of 'paper' is
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Reasoning is always to attain some particular
conclusion, or to gratify some special curiosity. It
not only breaks up the datum placed before it and conceives it abstractly; it must conceive -it ri~htly too;
and conceiving it rightly means conceiving i by that
one particular abstract character which leads to the
one sort of conclusion which it is the reasoner's temporary interest to.attain.10
·
Thus in inf'erence, as in sensation and conceptualization,
the volitional nature of man has a dual role to play.

First,

it provides the very purpose for which reasoning takes place.
Jor reasoning occurs only to satisfy the individual person's
interests, needs, and desires--to help him achieve his personal
goals, the most important of which is effective hum.an action
in the world.

"My thinking is first and last and always for

the s ake of

·
d oing,
• • • ull

'f1.ly'

Secondly, the volitional

nature of man is operative in the process of reasoning itself
insofar as internal selective activity is an integral part of
it.

Moreover, the thinker's purpose, which inevitably involves

some external action to be performed, provides the very principles of this internal selection.
far richer than a single vision or perspective can reveal, and
therefore it is not possible to point to one attribute which
is its single essence. "All ways of conceiving a concrete
fact, if they are true ways at all, are equally true ways.
There is no property ABSOLUT~Y essential to any one thing.
'he same property which figures as the essence of a thing on
one occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another."
(James, Psychology, p. 315.)
. James·i~sisted that nthe only meaning of essence is teleolo ical and that classification and conce tion are urel
eleolo~ical weapons of the mind. 11
Ibid., p. 317.
"The esse~ce o
a thing," he wrote, "is that"'O'Ile of its properties
~hich is so im ortant for m interests that in comparison with
it I may neglect the rest." (.L!._.
lOJames, PsycholoEQ", p. 318.
11 Ibid., p. 316.
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The functioning of man's volitional nature is thus apparent in all of man's mental activities--in sensation and conception, processes by which the mind

~pprehends

objects, and in

reasoning, the process by which the mind draws conclusions
about objects from the relations which it intuits between them.
sensation, conceptualization, and reasoning, however, are all
antecedent to belief.

And of these four, it is belief which

is the most important for James, inasmuch as belief is a prerequisite for responsible moral action.
Belief, like the mental activities preceding it, involves
man's active and volitional nature.

In fact, all of man's

beliefs, whether they are classed as instances of faith or not,
have a non-cognitive, but nevertheless experiential, element
in them insofar as man's emotional and volitional powers somehow enter into each one.

The Intellectualists did not deny

that these powers are in fact frequently involved in belief,
but these men did deny the legitimacy of their influence.
James, on the other hand, not only upheld the legitimacy of
their influence, but said that the nature of belief is such
that man's volitional powers cannot help being involved in
every instance of it.
Although 'faith' and 'belief' are identified by many
thinkers, James found it necessary to distinguish between the
two terms.

'Belief' was the broader term for him, faith being

considered a species of belief.

James never strictly defined

.

belief, but he did describe it in experiential terms •
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Everyone knows the difference between imagining
a.thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth. In
the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not
only appfehende~ by the mind, but is held to have
reality. ~
Belief is the act by which we posit the reality of the world
in which we live and act.

It is the mental act of recognizing

and accepting a thing as real and includes every degree of
....

assurance, even the highest possible certainty and conviction.
belief is not the mere apprehension of a thing, as perception
and conception are; rather it is an active affirmation of that
thing as real and involves a willingness to stake one's whole
person upon the item's reality. 1 3 Belief involves a readiness
and willingness to act in relation to the thing believed, to
allow it to influence the course of our active lives.

To be-

lieve in something means to allow it to play a role in the
direction of our activities, whether in a vitally significant
way or to the minimal degree that, in fashioning ourselves and
the world by our actions, we at least take it into account.
Faith is an instance of belief; it is belief which outstrips the evidence

an~

involves positing as real an object

12James,. The Principles of Psychology, II,283.
l3The items proposed to a given man's belief are many and
varied. They include not only.the objects of human sense
experience, but also complex conceptual objects such as the
truths of mathematics, the propositions of science and philosophy, and the hypotheses of religion. In affirming the
'reality' of such complex conceptual objects, a man accepts
them as true and is willing to live by them. In believing
in these objects, he holds them to be true not merely in a
tthe?retical way but he is willing to stake his person upon
heir truth by acting in accordance with them.
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whose actuality is not proven either by empirical evidence or
.~ · by rational demonstration.

"Faith means belie.t in something

concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as
the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that
faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue
of which is not certified to us in advance. 111 4

.An understanding of faith requires an understanding of
James's psychology of belief in general. ·According to James,
belief, or the "sense of reality," 1 5 is a kind of feeling
which is more akin to the emotions than to anything else.

It

is similar to what is called consent in James's psychology of
volition.
It [belief] resembles more than anything what in the
psychology of volition we know as consent. Consent
is recognized by all to be a manifestation of our
active nature. It would naturally be described by
such terms as 'willingness' or the 'turning of our disposition.' What characterizes both consent and belief
is the cessation of theoretic agitation, through the
advent of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills
the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory
ideas. When this is the case, motor effects are apt
to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief,
charact~rized by repose on the purely intellectual
side, are both intimately connected with subsequent
practical activity.16
In opposition to the Intellectualists, James claimed not only
that will is involved in belief, but that will and belief are
simply two names for the same psychological phenomenon.

Both

14James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith
and Morals, p. 90.
l5James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 283.
16
Ibid., pp. 283-84.
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"ill and belief designate a certain relationship which the

mind can have to those things upon which it focuses--a certain
manner in which the mind attends to certain ideas.

In

~he

case of will and in the case of belier, a stable idea or
object is present to the mind and commands its attention to
the exclusion of
tations.

a!~

contradictory or incompatible represen-

uAll that the mind does is in both cases [will and
1

belief] the same; it looks at the object and consents to its
existence, espouses it, says 'it shall be.my reality.•

It

turns to it, in short, in the interested active emotional
way."l?
The difference

between will and belief lies in the fact

that they deal with different classes of things.

Yill is

concerned directly with things to be done or things to be
made, and the things willed depend for their very existence
upon the willing.

"The objects, in the case of will, are

those whose existence depends on our thought, movements of
our own body· for example, or facts which such movements executed in future may make rea1.n 18

For example, one wills to

stand up; one wills to build a cabinet.

The standing up and

the bodily movements involved'in building the cabinet are the
direct outward effects of the will and depend for their reality
upon the willing.

The cabinet, which is the direct effect of

the bodily movements and the indirect effect of the willing,
l?Ibid.'
p. 320 •
18~.
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also depends for its reality as a cabinet upon the willing
insofar as the bodily movements are dependent upon .the will.
In the case of belief, however, the thing believed to be
real does not in any way change in virtue of the belief alone.
If one believes that the moon is real, the moon itself is not
altered in any way by that fact.
Objects of belief, • • • are those which do not change
according as we think regarding them. I will to get
up early to-morrow morning; I believe tha~got up
late yesterday morning; I will that my foreign bookseller in Boston shall procure me a German book and
write to him to that effect. I believe that he will
make me pay three dollars for it when it comes, etc.
Now the important thing to notice is that this difference between the objects of will and belief is entirely
immate~ial, as far as the relation of the mind to them
goes.l~

The relation of the mind to its object is the same in the case
of belief as it is in the case of will.

In both instances, the

mind gives its attention to the object before it, to the exclusion of all incompatible objects.

However, man's physiolog-

ical constitution is such that when the object occupying the
mind without competition is the representation of a bodily
movement, the bodily movement inevitably follows (unless prevented, of course, by external causes).

And the bodily move-

ment is said to have been willed--rather than believed.
One must not think of the difference between will and
belief, however, as the difference between the practical and
the theoretical.
upon both of them.

On the contrary, action follows in some way
In the case of will, the action to be

•
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performed is the thing willed and depends for its performance
upon the willing; its performance is the direct effect of the
willing.

The action which follows upon belief, however, is

not the direct effect of the belief.

It is the direct effect

of an act of will; but it can be said to follow from belief
insofar as its being willed is a consequence of the belief.
When we believe something, i.e., accept it as real, we are
willing to act in regard to it.

We are willing to vouch for

the reality in which we believe with our lives and action.

We

do, in fact, act in some way upon each of our beliefs if only
in the sense that a particular belief is one of the presupposi-

tions of our day to day living or in the sense that the thing
believed is, insofar as it is believed, a part of the world
of which we take account in the active course of our lives.
Accepting William James's

positio~

regarding the inner

nature of belief and its kinship with will, one must still
consider the conditions of its production, i.e., the circumstances under which a person thinks things to be real. ·The
things which present themselves to consciousness for acceptance as real are many and varied.

Some belong to the world

of sensible things, i.e., to the world of man's lived experience; others, such as atoms, molecules, electrons, and the
like belong to the world of science.

Although the latter world
Of '~solids ~d fluids and their 'laws ' n 20 may be. considered by
the scientist to be more real than any other, the world of
20_
. , p. 292 •
Ib1°d
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science is quite barren when compared to the life-world of
human experience.

Not only is the world of human life. full of

colors, sounds, odors, flavors, warmth, and the like for which
the scientific world has no room except insofar as it deals
with their causes; 21 but it is rich with the human felt activities of perceiving, thinking, believing, willing, and loving,
none of which are accessible as such to the measuring tools of
science.
However, the items in the sensible world and the objects
of science are not alone in their struggle to win the continual designations of 'reality.'
dates for the title.

There ·are still other candi-

Some of them belong to the world of

ideal relations--the propositions of logic, mathematics, and
metaphysics, for example; others belong to the world of what
James called "idols of the tribe."

James borrowed the term

"idols of the tribe," from Francis Bacon to refer to "illusions or prejudices common to the race"--the belief, for example, that the sky moves around the earth and other similar
cosmological ideas.
All educated people recognize these ['idols of the
tribe'] as forming one sub-universe. The motion of
the skj round the earth, for example, belongs to this
world. That motion is not a recognized item of any
of the other worlds; but as an 'idol of the tribe'
it really exists. For certain philosophers •matter'
exists only as an idol of the tribe. For science,
the 'secondary Qualities' of matter are but 'idols
of the tribe. 1 22
21 "The molecules and ether-waves of the scientific world,
• •• simply kick the object's warmth and color out, they refuse
to have any relations with thea." (Ibid., p. 293.)
221bid., p. 292.
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Also seeking recognition as real are the objects which belong
to the various supernatural worlds of the different religions
(the heaven and hell of Christian theology, for example),
those which belong to the world of individual opinion, and,
of course, the objects of sheer madness and insanity.

In a

certain sense, all of these things exist in some way.

In one

way or another, they are a part of someone's experience; they
a.re either sensed, imagined, felt, or at least thought of.
According to James, even objects of fancy, errors, hallucinations, and dreams are parts of a man's life--"undeniable features of the Universe.u 2 3 They have some kind of existence

.

insofar as they are experienced phenomena even though they do
not exist in the same way in which what James considers 'absolutely real' things exist. 24 In the case of the individual
mind to whom these phenomena appear, however, if any one of
the phenomena, no matter how fanciful or illusory it may be,
fills the mind and captures the attention to the exclusion of
all contradictory and conflicting objects, it will be believedin unhesitatingly--it will while thus attended-to be real for

that person.
2 3Ibid., p. 291.
. 24 rn using the term 'absolute,• James does not imply that
there exists some reality which is completely independent of
all.others and has no relation whatsoever to anything else.
He uses the term, however, when speaking of the fact that men
r~view the objects that come before them, compare the objects
with one another, and consider some more real than others.
Those objects in comparison with which others are considered
less real, or even unreal, James speaks of, on at least one
occasion, as absolutely real.
~
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Believing something means accepting it and giving one's
attention to it to the exclusion of all its competitors.
• • • whatever excites and stimulates our interest is
real; whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn
to it, accept it, fill our mind with it, or practically
take account of it, so far it is real for us, and we
believe it. Whenever, on the contrary, we ignore it,
fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject
it, forg~t it, so far it is unreal for us and disbelieved.2.?
The things in which we believe do not necessarily occupy the
center of our attention, however.

They may be at the fringes

of our consciousness; they may be part of the context in which
we live and act; they may be among the.many things which we
take for granted in our daily living--the necessary presuppositions for our day to day activities.

Whether the items

believed occupy the center of our attention or are only at the
.fringes of consciousness, believing nevertheless involves
attending to them in some way or other.
James pointed out that each thinker has dominant habits
of attention--habits which are strongly influenced by his
interests, needs, and desires and which "practically elect
from among the various worlds [of items mentioned abov~
some one to be for him the world of ultimate realities." 26
For most men·, the things of sense hold this special position
and constitute "the absolutely· real world's nucleus."2?
25James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 295.
26Ibid., p. 293.

27Ibid., p. 294.

But

r'

8?
Why' should the world of sense be counted more real than.

the world of

~cience,

or the world of abstract relations, or

the supernatural world, or any of the others for that matter?
According to James, this is due to the "everlasting partiality
of our nature." 28 To be real for us, to capture and hold our
attention, a thing must be a practical item, one that appears
both interesting and important to us, one that answers our
emotional needs, our aesthetic needs, and our practical needs.
And more than all the other things which present themselves
to us--more than the objects of science, for example, more
than the propositions of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics-sensible things fulfill this requirement.
Intellectualists, in their opposition to faith as having
any importance in cognition, eliminate all that is personal
from the valid motives of belief--the ideal in knowledge for
them is complete· objectivity.

But.James pointed out that the

"fons et origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or
the practical point of view, is • • • subjective, is ourselves. "29

The following paragraphs will explain what James

meant by this.
James held that the

obje~t

of belief, namely real exis-

tence or reality, is different from a:n:y other predicate applied
to a thing.

All other predicates designate attrioutes or

properties which in some way enrich the intrinsic content of
28~.

29Ibia.,
.
pp. 296-97.
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an object and enhance our idea of it.

But such is not the

case with the predicate, 'existence.'

Predicating existence

ot a thing leaves the content of the object inwardly the same,

but in some way "fixes it and stamps it in to ~·"30 To
predicate existence of something is to affirm that it is a
part of our lives, i.e., a part of the life-world in which we
are actively engaged.
As James pointed out, our own reality is the strongest
certainty we have.

Every moment of our experience is ·so per-

vaded with the sense of our own life that our own existence
is indubitable.

And it is only bY, becoming in some way related

to this existence of ours that other things come to be accepted
by us as real.

We judge things to be real to the extent that

they immediately affect our active lives or are related to
things which do.

We believe in them to the degree that they

meet our personal needs, particularly our need to fulfill ourselves by meaningful action in the world, or are related to
things which do meet these needs.31

30 Ibid., p. 296.

3lwe believe

that Alexander Graham Bell really existed,
not because he has ever been an object of our immediate sensation or because his reality has ever directly stimulated our
emotions or our volition, but because we have a 'dim sense of
continuity' between Mr. Bell and his activities and our present world in which Mr. Bell's telephone plays an important
part in our everyday affairs. The following is James's own
;x~ple: "When I believe that some prehistoric savage chipped
his flint, • • • the reality of the savage and of his act
aa.k~s no direct appeal either to my sensation, emotion, or
Volition. What I mean by my belief in it is simply my dim
se~se of a continuity between the long dead savage and his
t~hl.ngs and the present world of which the flint forms part."
· __ e Principles of Psychology, II, 320.

r
.
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• •• our own reality, that sense of our own life which
we at ever moment ossess is the ultimate of ultimates
or our e ie •
s sure as I exis ! -- is is our
Uttermost warrant for the being of all other things •
• • we all of us, feeling our own present reality
~ith absolutely coercive force, ascribe an all but
equal degree of reality,32 first to whatever things

32on more than one occasion, James, implying that there
are varying degrees of reality, spoke of some things being
judged more real than others. "As a whole, sensations • • •
are judged more real than conceptions; things met with every
hour more real than things seen once; attributes perceived when
awake, more real than attributes perceived in a dream." (The
Principles of Psycholo~, II, 300.) John Wild objects to~
'Tames's reference to ~ferent degrees of reality. In Wild's
opinion, James's use of such terms as 'more real' and 'less
real' tends to obscure the sharp difference between a real
thing and a delusion as two distinct modes of being. (John
Wild, "'William James and the Phenomenology of Belief," in ~
Essays in Phenomenolo~, p. 285.)
From James 1 s radically empirical point of view, however,
his use of such terminology in Chapter X:XI of The Principles
of Psychology (Vol. II) was completely justified. After all,
it was not James's purpose to distinguish between modes of
being on a non-empirical basis. He was not concerned with
modes of being independent of the way in which they are experienced. James' s chief conc·ern was with what the reality or
unreality of the things that come before the mind is known as
in human experience. He was interested in what the reality
of things means to us in experiential terms. And he tells us
that reality means relation to our emotional and active lives.
Things that do not affect our lives in any way are considered
by us to be simply unreal, while things that do affect· our
emotional and active lives to any degree at all are counted
as real. Things are related to our emotional and active lives
in different ways, however. The relations which items in our
experience have to our existence are more or less intimate;
things influence· our lives in varying degrees. Things which
touch our lives only at the periphery of consciousness, for
example, things which affect our actions to only a minimal
d!gree, things of which we take account in our active lives
with only a minimum of emotional involvement--these are all
re~ for us to the extent that they touch our lives at all.
Bu~ they do not have the same vibrant reality for us as do
th7ngs which occupy the center of our consciousness or things
which vitally affect our everyday existence or the persons
b1th whom we are emotionally involved. The trees in our neight or~ s yard, the pavement on which we walk, the engineer on the
rain that takes us on a vacation--these are all real for us.
But they may not be as vibrantly real as the roses we cultivate
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we lay hold on with a sense of personal need, and
second, to whatever farther things continuously
belong with these.33

Ve

unhesitatingly believe in whatever things are intim-

ately related to our own lives.

But specifically, what are

the particular intimate relations with our life which prompt
us to accept a thing as real?_

"An.y relation to our mind at

all, in the absence of a stronger relation, suffices to make
an ob,ject real, u34 James wrote. The barest appeal to our
attention is sufficient for this if there is in our consciousness no other thing with which the present item fails to harmonize or with which it is incompatible.

For example, the

newborn mind of the infant will readily accept as real the
very first impression that it encounters, for it has no basis
in our own yard, the automobile we drive to work, the men and
women we love. And of the roses, the automobile, and the
people we love, the latter may be the more vividly real still
because they exert a more profound influence upon our lives
than the others. After all, it is. to them that we are usually
willing to commit ourselves most completely.
The fact that we are willing to commit ourselves more actively and more completely to some things in our experience than
to others indicates that just as there are differing degrees
of reality, -there are also differ·ent intensities of belief.
A man's belief in the automobile which he drives is certainly
of a different quality than his belief in someone he loves.
Indeed, his automobile may elicit from him an active response;
but it does not normally elicit from him the same emotionally
charged response evoked by someone he deeply loves. He needs
his automobile, he uses it, ne takes care of it. But he is
not willing to lay down his life for it as he may be willing
to do for a friend. Indeed, he believes in both his car and
his friend; but his belief, experienced as his emotional and
active response to them, is of a different quality and intensity in each case.
33James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 297.
34Ibid., p. 299.

ii>.

for doing otherwise.

At that point, the first impression is

the infant mind's only content.

There are no other impressions

vith which the first one can conflict or with which it can be
incompatible.

It is thus spontaneously believed.

"Any object

-

which remains uncontradieted [by the reality of something incomp atible with it] is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute

-

reali t;y • "

35

In the case of an adult, however, every new item, every

possible reality, which presents itself to consciousness for
acceptance as actually real pre$ents itself to a person who
lives in a world already furnished with actual realities, i.e.,
with things which, because of their intimate relation to his
lite, have already been accepted by him as real.

If the new

candidate for actual existence is to become a part of this
real world, it must fit in with the realities already there.
If it does not harmonize with them, if it is somehow incompatible with one or more items in a man's real lived-in world,
then the man must decide between it, the possible reality, and
the things already there with which it conflicts.
'Whether the new item gains admittance to his real world
or the old ones ·remain entrenched depends upon their relative
power to hold the person's attention and especially upon their
power to elicit from him an active response.

For, as James

.tells us, to· believe something, i.e. , to accept it as ·real,
lleans to be ready

and willing to act in regard to it, or at

35Ibid., p. 289.
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least to take it into account in our active lives.

Now the

items in our experience which most easily hold our attention

and most readily stimulate us to action are those which most
excite our emotional interest.

Thus James says, "• •• reality

means simply relation to our emotional and active life."36

-But the things which have easiest access to our emotional and
active lives are those which are the most vivid, i.e., the
most sensibly pungent especially by way of arousing pleasure
or pain, and those which are the most persistent.

Sensible

things are more likely to be accepted as real than merely
conceptual things; and the world which surrounds us in our
waking hours is more likely to be believed, because of its
persistence, than the relatively fleeting world of our dreams;
and in the sensible world of our waking hours those things
which are productive of ple.asure or pain are more belief-compelling than those which are not.

Thus James asserts that

sensible vividness and persistence are the two qualities in
things which more than any

o~her

prompt us to give

the~

real-

ity and accept them as part of the world in which we are
actively engaged.
Sensible vividness or tungencf is then the vital factor
in reality when once t e conf ict between objects, and
the connecting of them together in the mind has begun.
No object which neither possesses this vividness in its
own right nor is able to borrow it from anything else
has a c~ance of making headway aga~nst vivid rivals,
or of rousing in us that reaction in which belief consists .37

36Ibid., p. 295.
37

~., p. 301.
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James indicates, however, that things which are not themselves sensed but which are merely conceived may elicit from

us an active response and in some instances be counted just as
real as sensible items.

These things may 'borrow• a certain

vividness from sensible things to which they are related and
may be accepted as real because of this relationship.

"Con-

ceived molecular vibrations, e.g., are by the physicist judged
more real than felt warmth, because so intimately related to
all those other facts of motion in the world which he has made
his special study. 11 38 On the other hand, a conceptual item
may elicit from us an active response because of its powerful
effect upon our emotions.

An idea which arouses our fears,

allays our anxieties, promises the fulfillment of our hopes,
or fills us with awe can sometimes be as belief-compelling as
a sensible item of our experience.

So powerful is the ilifluence

of emotion upon belief, an influence which is due to the bodily
sensations involved, that James wrote:
The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is
his ability to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally exciting idea. To give this power is the
highest result of education. In untutored minds the
power does not exist. Every exciting thought in the
natural man carries credence with it. To conceive
with passion is eo ipso to af!irm.39
For most men, however, sensible objects are either their
realities or the tests of their realities.
unquestionably real world the realm

39Ibid.,
-

3Sibid., pp. 300-301.
p. 308.

or

They posit as the

sense experience and

r
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demand that all our.concepts or conceptual theories be verified by, or at least lead us back to, the world of sensible
things.

"What science means by 'verification' is no more than

this, that no object of conception shall be believed which
sooner or later has not some permanent and vivid object of
sensation for its term." 40 This success with which sensible
things gain access to the world we accept as unquestionably
real is due to their stimulating effect upon our emotions and
active powers.
Our requirements in the way of reality terminate in

our own acts and emotions, our own pleasures and pains.
These are the ultimate fixities from which, • • • the
whole chain of our beliefs depends, object hanging to
object, as the bees, in swarming, hang to each other
until, de proche en proche, the supporting branch, the
Self, is reached and held.41
·
It is interesting to note that those Intellectualistsof
a positivistic bent who

in~ist

that beliefs are rendered ob-

jectively valid only when verified in terms of sense experience feel that this norm takes the subjective element out of
belief and renders it completely objective and totally untainted
by subjective interests.

James held, however, that the very

postulation of the sensible world as the real world and as
the testing ground for the truth of all beliefs is itself the
result of subjective interest.

Indeed, to take the personal

element out of belief is contradictory.
William James praised Josiah Royce·• s explanation of man• s
40 Ibid., p. 301.
41
Ibid., p. 311.
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belief in an external world in the latter's Religious Aspect
·

0

r Philosophy.

"Chapters IX and X of Prof. Royce's work,"

James wrote, "are on the whole the clearest account of the
psychology of belief with which I am acquainted." 42

Accord-

illS to Royce, if one were to ask a man what he means by the
external world, an honest answer would be: "I mean by the external world in the first place something that I accept or
demand, that I posit, postulate, actively construct on the
basis of sense-data. 1143

In the opinion of Royce, man believes

in an external world because he wants oneThe ultimate motive with the man of every-day life is
the will to have an external world. Whatever consciousness contains, reason will persist in spontaneously adding the thought: 'But there shall be something
beyond this.' • • • The popular assurance of an external
world is the fixed determination to make one, now and
hence.forth. 44
When it is a question of the reality of comparatively
simple objects--objects of perception and imagination and
relatively simple conceptual objects--man believes in whatever
has intimate and continuous practical relations with himself.
But when it ·comes to a more complex conceptual system such as
a philosophical system--a conceptual scheme designed to embrace
and in some way explain the whole universe--the motives for
.
belief at first glance may not be too obvious.
But even in
42

~., p. 318.

4
3Josiah Royce, Reli~ious Aspect of Philosophy, quoted in
James, The Principles ofsychology, lI, 317-18.
44
Ibid., p. 318.
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tbiS case, the deciding vote is cast by man's volitional nature
iJl the interest of his aesthetic, emotional and practical needs.

Not only do our needs determine which of several possible
philosophical explanations of the universe we are willing to
accept, but our very search for such a conceptual system to
exPlain the world is itself the result of need. Ye need an
overall view of things; we need to understand as much of the
world as we can in order to know how to act in it.
James suggested that it is man's craving for rationality
that prompts him to try to explain the universe philosophically.
Philosophers philosophize, he said, because they "desire to
attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the
whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which
every one by nature carries about with him under his hat." 4 5
As we shall discover in the

foll~wing

pages, however, the

demands of rationality are not merely theoretical as they are
often thought to be.

They are practical as well.

It is true

that in searching for rationality we are indeed looking for a
felicitous and comparatively easy way of mentally handling the
manifold data of sense experience.
The facts of the world in their sensible diversity
are always before us, but our theoretic need is that
they should be conceived in a way that reduces their
manifoldness to simplicity • • • • The simplified result is handled with far less mental effort than the
original data; and a philosophic conception of nature
is thus in no metaphorical sense a labor-saving contrivance. 46
45James, "The Sentiment' of Rationality," Essays on Faith
and Morals, p. 63.
46~.' p. 65.

-
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;: '1J,e rationality that we need, however, involves much more than

·.erelY ease of mental tunction.

It involves more importantly

.tJle relative ease, effectiveness, and significance of our
_,.

. 8Jr-" 8

rnal activity as well.

The rationality that we seek is

one that will not only render our conceptual handling of the
world easy and mentally satisfying but also render our active
baJldling of it felicitous and fruitful.

We seek a rationality

that will make our active relations with the world effective
and fUlfilling--fulfilling in relation to our own development
and that of the world itself.
In James's view, the need for rationality can be described

as the need to feel at home in the world. But feeling at home
in the world means more than merely understanding the world.

It also means feeling that one's life and actions have mean.. ing and relevance to the world• s fulfillment.

It means feeling

that by one's actions one can help to shape the course of the
-wniverse and contribute to its perfection.

It is this need for

rationality which prompts man to philosophize in the first

place; and when he comes to accept or reject a particular
, Philosophical explanation of the world, his acceptance or
'1'e~ection

of it will be on the basis of its rationality or

lack Of it.
The rationality of a conceptual system is generally held
to be that characteristic which more than any other ought com,aend the theory to a man's belief.

Of any two conceptual

~

~theories offered for consideration, it is usually conceded
ltbat a man will accept, or at least that he ought to accept,

,
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the one which is the more rational.

But although it is agreed

that men ought to believe what is rational in preference to
what is irrational, there is no universal agreement about what
constitutes rationality.

According to one view, a conceptual

theory is rational if it is consistent, i.e., if it contains
no contradictions, and if the reasoning which went into its
development was in accordance with the rules of formal logic.
In this view, any theory which is logically inconsistent is of
course non-rational.

Allowing for some variations, rationality:.,

in philosophical circles at least, generaily means conformity
to reason.and harmony with logical principles.

But for WilliB.1D

James, rationality involves more than mere conformity to reason.
For James, it is not simply man's reason which decides an
issue; it is not merely his intellect which believes or disbelieves.

Belief is an act of the whole man, and to be worthy

of belief, a theory must be in harmony with the whole person.
Thus ror James, rationality, considered as an attribute of a
conceptual scheme, means not merely conformity with reason but,
more importantly, conformity with man and his experience.
Whatever professional philosophers may say about rationality or about William James's notion of rationality, if one
analyzes the way in which the man on the street judges the
reasonableness of an idea, one finds that the ordinary man
considers that idea the most reasonable which best answers to
all of a man's needs and

requirements-~not

just to the require-

ments of the intellect.

In fact, the ordinary man on the

street may not even know the rules of formal logic.

Neverthe-

~
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-· iess he does not hesitate to make judgments about the reasonableness of things, because while he may lack knowledge about
the formal rules of thought, he has within himself, and in a
sense!,! himself, the standard of rationality.
William James tells us that we judge the reasonableness
of an idea or of a system of ideas by certain effects which
it has on us.

Whatever we are able to think about ·without

difficulty seems to us reasonable.

"As soon, • • • as we are

enabled from any cause whatever to think with perfect fluency,
the thing we think of seems to us pro tanto rationa1. 1147

When

our thinking about something is accompanied by strong feelings
of ease, peace, and rest, we feel that the thing we
ing about is reasonable.

ar~

think-

"This feeling of the sufficiency of

the present moment, of its absoluteness,--this absence of all
need to explain it, account for it, or justify it,--is what I
call the Sentiment of Rationality. 1148
What is the source of this feeling of rationality in our
thinking?

What characteristics must a theory itself have in

order for a man to be able to think about it with such freedom

and

ease that it will be rational?

In the view of some, the

requirements of rationality are purely theoretical.

From

James's point of view, however, the requirements of rationality,
as indicated above, are practical as well as theoretical.

In

fact, a perfect rationality that is purely theoretical is (for
p. 64.

r
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•ost people) impossible in James's opinion.
Elaborating on this point, James said that a man's philosophic attitude is determined by two intellectual cravings
and by the degree to which one balances the other.

These two

desires are l) the passion for simplicity and economy in
thought (the distinctively philosophical passion) and 2) the
passion for clearness.

The passion for clearness demands

detail, integrity of perception, and faithfulness to facts and
shuns

a.n:y

abstract way of conceiving things which, while sim-

plifying them, might obscure their differences.

James felt

that a perfect theoretical rationality demands the complete
satisfaction of the distinctively philosophical craving for
simplicity.

This urge to simplify things and to explain them

in the most parsimonious manner has driven philosophers to
posit greater and greater unity in reality.

But the unity

which they have succeeded in achieving in their conceptual
schemes has been attained in most cases by classifying things
according to their similarities and ignoring their differences.
Obviously, such classifications, being necessarily abstract,
are distasteful to those philosophers in whom the passion for
clearness predominates, for abstractness and clarity are inversely related.

Moreover, they cannot satisfy _fully even the

passion for simplicity.

In the process of classification,

those attributes which cannot be identified with the nature
considered common to the members of a given class are omitted.
However, while they are left out of consideration as far as the
classification itself is concerned, they nevertheless remain
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the scene empirically associated with the common nature but
at the same time lacking all rational relation to it.

For

this reason, James claimed that all efforts to achieve perrect

theoretical rationality, i.e., rationally to account for everything in this manner, are doomed to failure.

For there is

always something left outstanding and perfect unity is never
accomplis.hed.
In "The Sentiment of Rationality," however, James asked
his readersto suppose that such perfect unification could be
achieved.

Suppose that a single concept could be formed tinder

which all things could in some way be subsumed.

Suppose that

all things could be unified as parts, aspects, or instances of
a single datum which left nothing out.

Would not such a con-

cept, such a datum, satisfy the craving for unity completely
and be considered rational in itself?

Would not such a phil-

osophical view be characterized by a perfect theoretical
rationality?

Would it not seem that with no "otherness being
left to annoy us, we should sit down at peace"?4 9 Not according to William James, for man is so accustomed to seeing an
'other' beside every datum in his experience that if an absolute all-embracing datum were presented to him, he would persist in looking around for some 'other' with which to contrast
it.

He would begin to think or non-being itself as an 'other'

opposed to the Absolute presented to him.

He would puzzle

over how to bridge the gap between the 'two'--between being
49

-Ibid.,

P• ?l.

and non-being.
thB.Il nothing?

He would ask, "Why is there something rather
Why

this world rather than another?"

Even in

the most unified philosophical system, according to James,
the mystery o:f reality always remains.

"Absolute existence

is absolute mystery, :for its relations with the nothing remain
unmediated to our understanding. 1150 "The bottom o:f being is
left logically opaque to us, as something which we _simply come
upon and find, and about which (i:f we wish to act) we should
pause and wonder as little as possible. 11 51
For James, then, a perfect rationality achieved logically
and theoretically is impossible.
mental function.

Rati~nality

means unimpeded

But in the purely speculative realm, even if

all other impediments are successfully by-passed, man's mind
will eventually bump into the inevitable question 'Why?' when
it comes to being.

James, however, felt that impediments

inescapable in the theoretical realm might be avoided, i:f man's
mind were to leave the theoretical order and look to the practical sphere :for the final word on rationality.

A philosophi-

cal theory which might :fail to satisfy perfectly the mind's
craving for simplicity-and unity and thus fail to appear perfectly rational :from a purely theoretical point of view, may
nevertheless provide a man with a :feeling of rationality because of the theory's consonance with his active nature-because of its ability to awaken his active impulses and to
50ibid., p.

?2.

51~.' p. ?3.
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'.te.tisfY his aesthetic and emotional needs.
From James's point of view, the human mind is triadic in
.structure, being capable 1) of receiving impressions, 2) of

. c Onceptualizing, reflecting, and reasoning, and 3) of reacting •
,. .A~cordingly, James spoke, somewhat figuratively, of three
"departments" of man's nature: a

11

feeling department," a "con-

ceiving department," and a "willing department. 11 52

The "feel-

ing department" and the "conceiving department," he said, are
both subordinate to the "willing department."

Sensory impres-

sion occurs for the sake of reflection; and reflection in turn
qccurs for the sake of action.

As James expressed it, "percep-

tion and thinking are only there for behavior's sake."53

The

conceiving and reasoning powers of the human mind function for
the sake of ends which are set up for them by man's passional
and volitional powers, in the sense that the very purpose of

thought is to enable man to get along in the world and to fulfill his aesthetic, emotional, and practical needs.

Man's

nvolitional nature,".54 James said somewhat ambiguously, supplies the very motives for thinking.

But more than this, it

has the last word to say about the conclusions arrived at by

aan• s thought.
James held that in order for any theory, simple or complex,
52 James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and
Morals, p. 114. .
53 Ibid.

-

54Ibid., p. 117.
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felt as rational, it must satisfy the demands of all
aspects of man's nature.

To satisfy the "feeling depart-

t " it must be at least in harmony with all the data of
'". ••Jl
'
sense experience; to satisfy the reflective part of man, it

aust

be logically self-consistent.

But even if a theory should

pass these first two tests, if it fails to provide man's fun4aJBental active and emotional powers with adequate objects
outside of themselves on which to react, a man's "volitional
;nature" will reject it..

It will not feel rational.

Thus,

action is the final arbiter.
Let us take as an example a man's choice of a philosophi-

cal system.

Intellectualists would have us believe that only

·two factors influence a man's choice in this regard--empirical
ctata and logical consistency.

Furthermore, they would have

us believe that it is not a matter of choice at all, but that
a valid philosophical outlook is simply a question of the
··intellect's recognizing what experience and logic make evi·4ent.

.

For William James, however, adopting a philosophical

··attitude is a truly human choice in the fullest sense of the
term.

Philosophy is certainly more than the mere mental

·· reproduction of sensed data in an orderly fashion.

No mere

assemblage of concepts representing perceptual facts, however
logical and complete, deserves the name of a philosophical·
Bystem.

Genuine philosophy stri ve.s to interpret the data of

Bense in terms of causes, meanings, and values;_ and its interPretati ve function carries it far beyond the purely perceptual
-~.

;,·-1'8.nge into areas where sense and reason alone are not competent

105
to decide the issues.
It is in fact possible for two diverse philosophical systems to be equally in harmony with the sensible data supplied
bY man's perceptive faculties and equally consistent from the
point of view of logic.

In such a case, why does a man accept

one and not the other?

Certainly not because sense and reason

verify one and falsify the other.

As James clearly indicated,

a man accepts a given philosophical system because he chooses
to do so.

And how does he make his choice?

James pointed out

that a man chooses from among the alternative philosophies
presented to him that system which, because it best satisfies
the demands of his active nature, seems the most rational to
him.

But what are the demands of man's active nature--the

needs which a philosophical conception must satisfy in order
to be deemed rational?
First of all, in order to satisfy the requirements of the
"willing department" of man's nature, a philosophical theory
"must, in a general way at least, banish uncertainty from the
future."55

It must in a general way tell a man what to expect,

tor uncertainty regarding the future is a mental irritant and
breeds uneasiness.

James did not mean to suggest that a phil-

osophical theory can tell a man precisely what to expect at
every moment of his life.

On the contrary, since experience

is ever changing, since no moment in experience ever exactly
duplicates another, every moment of our existence is tinged

?

5James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith
&nd
-- Morals, p. 77.

~,ath the novel and the unexpected.
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However, while a philosophy

cannot foretell every future detail of experience, it can so
describe its ultimate principle as "to define expectancy. 11 56

If, for example, a philosophy describes its ultimate datum in
terms of goodness, perfection, or reason, "we may set our
minds at rest in a general way, • • • by the reflection that
whatever is in store for us can never at bottom be inconsistent with the character of this term."5?

In such a case, "our

attitude even toward the unexpected is in a general sense
defined• 1158
Secondly, a philosophical theory must define the future
. "congruously with our spontaneous powers."59

It need not be

a completely optimistic philosophy; but on the other hand, it
cannot be totally pessimistic in the sense of offering no
hope at all for the fulfillment of man's cherished dreams.

To be acceptable, a philosophy must present man with a world
in which he can exercise his distinctively creative powers-a world which is open and to some degree plastic in his hands,
a world upon which he can leave his mark for better or worse,
a .world in which he can. make a uniquely personal contribution.

Only a philosophy which presents man with a universe that is
incomplete, unfinished, and susceptible to change, a universe

56 Ibid., p. ?9.

5?Ibid., p. 80.
58 Ibid.

-

59~.' p. 82.
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t!18.t depends on man's commitment and active contribution for

·its fulfillment, can satisfy the practical requirements of
rationality.

A theory which describes the world as closed,

as already finished, or as completely determined independently
o! all human activity has the paralyzing effect of depriving
Jl8ll of all motives for action.

Such a philosophy renders his

active powers, indeed his very life, meaningless and absurd.
J..s

J8Jlles put it, an acceptable philosophy must give a man a

·universe for which his "emotions and active prop~nsities shall
60 and in which the ideals which he admires, loves,
be a match,"
ll'ld works to attain are at least real possibilities.

rt is true, of course, that men's active impulses differ
ll'ld that a philosophy which suits one man may not suit another.

However, there are certain active propensities which are comaon to most men--the need to use one's powers in the accomplishaent of worthwhile goals, for example, the need to feel that
one's life has meaning, significance and relevance in the whole
~cheme

of things.

dency in

But, according to James, there is one ten-

men that many philosophers overlook and others
m"to huddle out of sight." 61 And that is the tendency to
mos~

believe beyond the evidence--the aptitude for faith.

"In the

average man, • • • the power to trust, to risk a little beyond
the literal evidence, is an essential function. n 62 Just as a
GOibid., p. 84.
olill,g_., p. 90.
·;.

~'·

'"

~-,_

le

62~., p. 91.
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little risk adds relish to a man's active undertakings, so too
a touch of uncertainty in .his philosophic creed, enough to

allOW a man an opportunity to play his hunches and to indulge
. b.iS faith-tendencies, adds gusto to his speculative undertak-

ings as well.

A philosophy such as monism which posits a deterministic
universe that is finished and complete with nothing left to
be accomplished by man's efforts, wi·th no truth left to be
discovered by experimentation, trial and error, leaps in the
dark--such a philosophy takes the zest out of living.

A PAil-

osophic view of the world which leaves no room for faith or
risk, a world formula which denies to man the opportunity for
adventure of a speculative and theoretical sort, as well as of
an active kind, will never satisfy all of man's active propensities.

It will not be in harmony with the full man and will

not seem rational.
The ultimate philosophy, • • • must not be too
strait-laced in form, must not in all its parts divide
heresy from orthodoxy by too sharp a line. There must
be left over and above the propositions to be subscribed, ubi~ue, semper, et ab omnibus, another realm
into which t e stifled soul may escape from pedantic
scruples and indulge its own faith at its own risks;
and all that can here be done will be to mark out dis- 6
tinctly the questions wh_?.ch fallJWithin faith's sphere. 3
Thus, in the opinion of William James, man's volitional
nature, the Intellectualists' objections notwithstanding, has
a vital role to play in determining man's beliefs--whether the
objects of his beliefs be relatively simple or as complex as

63

.

~·' p. 110.
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·a whole philosophical system.

In James's opinion, man's

active nature will not sanction any philosophical view which
denies man the right to gamble a little, to act when the results are not guaranteed in advance, to believe beyond the
evidence.

Man's active nature will not approve a world picture

in which faith is left out because not only is it an empirical
fact that men do live by faith to a greater or

les~

degree,

but it is also a fact that faith is necessary !or human life.
A prohibition upon faith is a prohibition upon· human fulfillment, indeed a prohibition upon the fulfillment of the universe.
The perfection of human life, as well as the progress, development, and perfection of the open world in which man lives,
depends upon man's commitment and .creative action.

But action

presupposes conviction; and sense and reason alone are notoriously inept at providing a solid basis for conviction except
in very limited situations.

Thus, faith is not only a !act

which philosophy cannot overlook but it is a necessity !or that
fruitful human action which is man's only means of fulfilling
himself and the world.
Because faith--indeed all belie!--involves the will,
-

believing, generally speaking, is a moral act according to
James.

A man's beliefs are things for which he is responsible.

Since belief and will are but two names !or the same psychological phenomenon, what is true of will is, for the most part,
true of belief.

Thus if will is free, as James held, then

belief is free also or at least it can be free.
Obviously, James did not hold that every act of belief is

r
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a free responsible act anymore than he would be able to .say
that every process of volition is a deliberate and responsible
one. One apparent obstacle to considering belief a free moral
act at all is James's defining it in a manner that makes a
man's emotional reactions such influential determining factors.
Belief is an act of the whole man, not simply of his intellect
and not merely of his will in the narrow sense of the term,
but an act involving the whole person--intellect, will, emotions and so forth.
our emotions.

But some would say, "'We cannot control

How then can we believe at will, how can our

beliefs be free and responsible?"

James would reply that it

is true that a man may not be able to believe at will abruptly.
Nature sometimes produces in us instantaneous beliefs by suddenly putting us in a vitally active connection with objects
in which we

previo~sly

had ·no interes·t, objects for which we

previously had no feeling.

Such instantaneous beliefs, of

course, are not achieved by any effort of the will.

But, said

James, gradually our wills can, by dint of effort, lead us
to the same results by a very simple method:
we need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in
guestion were real, and keep acting as if it were real,
and it will infallibly end by growin~ into such a
connection with our life that it wil become real.
It will become so knit with habit and emotion that our
interests in it will be those which characterize belief. ~hose to whom 'God' and 'Duty• are now mere
names can make them much more than· that, if they make
a little sacrifice to them every day.64
~hus

we can, by an erfort of our will, freely believe.
b4

James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 321-22.
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The line between faith and the belier which is not called
·faith is not as sharp in James's philosophy as it may appear
to be.

There is a sense in which

all belier, even

~lmost

that which is said to be based upon conclusive evidence, participates in faith.
is still

James described faith as believing when it

theore~ically

possible to doubt.

But in James•s

view, except for the immediate data of the present moment and
except for those self-evident propositions which concern only
the relations

01·

abstract concepts with one another (the prin-

ciples or identity and contradiction, for· example), it is
always theoretically possible to doubt our judgments.

Now,

the evidence may be so strong that it would be foolish to do
so, but it is still possible to do so.
reason for this.

There is more than one

The changing character of reality, for one

thing, makes it always possible to question the perfect applicability of a judgment made about an object yesterday to that
same object today.

But another source of possible doubt con-

cerns not the object so much as the knower.

Every knower sees

an object from his own peculiar point of view.

And almost

every knower can recall occasions when after adopting one
posture, he found it necessary to adopt a different one.

Such

experiences make one aware of the possibility of error.
According to James, every representation per se is believed, while,it persists, to be of something absolutely !.2•
It becomes relative and dubitable only when 'reduced' in the
light of further consideration--only when one confronts it
With other data which can render it questionable.

In James's

r

,,ordB• "the reductive of most of our confident beliefs

abou~

2

Being is the reflection that they are .QB!:. beliefs; that we

are

turbid media; and that a form of being may exist uncontaminated by the touch of the fallacious knowing subject." 6 5
Thus, beyond the assurance of the immediate present,

doubt is always possible in regard to our judgments about
matters of fact. 66 Skepticism can always have the final word
because after every definition that we make of an object,
•reflection may arise, infect it with the cogito, and so discriminate it from the object in se." 67 That we do not allow

•

6 5James, "Lewes's 'Problems of Life and Mind,'" Collected
Essays and Reviews, pp. 5-6.
66Although it may not be vitally important in purely speculative matters, doubt arises as a critical issue in practical
affairs because of its paralyzing effect upon our active powers.
As James's friend, Charles Peirce, pointed out, most frequently
"doubts arise from some indecision however momentary, in our
action." ("How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 11 Philosof.hical Writings
of Peirce, p. 27.) "It is certainly best for us,' Peirce
wrote, "that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our
actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will
make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been
so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by
creating a doubt in the place of that belief." ("The Fixation
of Belief," Philosophical Writings of Peirce, p. 10.)
67James, "Lewes's ·'Problems of Life and Mind,'" Collected
.
Essays and R~views, p. 10. The term 'in se' in the above quotation is but one example of James's frequent use of terms
with a scholastic flavor. Throughout James's writings, one
finds terms such as 'essence' and 'nature' and such Latin
phrases as 'in se' and 'per se •. ' Of course in James's works,
these terms do not have precisely the same connotations which
they have in the writings of medieval philosophers and later
scholastic authors. 'Essence' and 'nature,' for example, do
not have the overtones of permanence and immutability which
they often have in scholastic texts. The reader must be careful, therefore, not to attribute to James a scholastic per~pective which would be more rationalistic than empiricist •
. ames wanted to develop a philosophy of e~-perience, and he did
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:· skepticism to have the last word is due to the fact that most
o! us, realizing the futility of searching for absolute certitude and the intellectual stagnation and moral paralysis which

are

the normal accompaniments of

un~ridled

skepticism, assume

some things for true and act upon them.
Insofar as the bare possibility of doubt is present,
every belief, from James's point of view, has an element of
taith in it.

At least every belief presupposes some previous

act of faith in the sense that even our most assured convictions presuppose our belief in the very possibility of the
human mind's ability to attain truth--a belief which can neither
be empirically verified nor logically demonstrated.

Such pre-

suppositions, accepted without proof, may rarely be in the foreground of consciousness.

But they are at the fringes of con-

sciousness, making up the context of our day to day activities
and providing the foundation for our most confident convictions.
Thus it is clear that the distinction between faith and
the rest of belief is based not so much on the possibility of
doubt as it is upon the presence or absence of conclusive evidence.

When conclusive evidence is lacking, then one's belief

.is. called faith.

not intend his language to convey more than the flux of experience could yield. Much confusion would have been avoided,
of course, had James invented a new vocabulary for his purpose. But a man can do only so much in a lifetime. Develop1:ig a new philosophy was a monumental task in itself, and the
limitations of time and the human condition made it necessary
for James to use the vocabulary already at hand and to give
new meanings to the old words.
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But whether conclusive evidence is present or not, because
o! the influence of the will upon belief, man's beliefs belong
to his moral life.

He is responsible for them.

And while it

iS possible for him to believe almost anything he would like

to believe and, on the other hand, to doubt almost anything he
wishes to doubt, a la Descartes, there are times when it is
lfiser to believe than to doubt and other times when it is
wiser to doubt than to believe.

From the point of view of

James, however, there can be no question about the fact that

man has a natural right to believe even when the evidence is
less than coercive.

There can be no doubt that faith is both

permissible and a practical necessity for meaningful human
existence.

What must be determined then, according to James,

is not the legitimacy of faith as such but rather those
spheres of belief and action in which faith is the most appropriate mental attitude to adopt.

CHAP!'ER IV

FAITH AND HUMAN LIFE
William James held that, whether men are willing to admit_
the fact or not, they all live by faith.

It is our purpose in

this chapter to consider what faith is, how it differs from
man's other beliefs, and the conditions under which it is
justified and even necessary.

We will not consider in any

detail the specific motives which may prompt a particular
individual to adopt onebelief rather than another
when the evidence is less than coercive, nor will we attempt_
to judge the relative merits of one particular faith as opposed
to •another.

However, we wi·ll attempt. to show that there are

certain areas in which faith is the most appropriate and fruitful mental attitude to adopt; that faith is a necessity for·

thought, action, and human fulfillment; and :t'urthermore that
it has a vital role to play in the destiny of' the universe as
a whole.

Although James's special concern was the justi:t'ica-

tion of religious faith, the vastness of' the topic precludes
our discussing religious belief to any extent here.

However,

we will ext;mine it in depth in Chapters V and VI.
As we saw in Chapter III, every belief', whether it can be
called faith or not, involves the whole man.

It is not merely

an intellectual apprehension of' something, but it is an active
115
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espousal of that thing as real.

It is an espousal which car-

rieS with it a willingness· to stake one's person upon the
object's reality.

Belief involves not merely man's 'head' but

aiso his 'heart.'

James felt that these work together in

determining a man's convictions, and he could not understand
the gulf which some men put between them.

"I can understand

now no more than ever," he wrote to his father, "the world
wide gulf you put between 'Head' and 'Heart'; to me they are
inextricably entangled together. • • •

As we have seen, no

act of belief occurs, according to James, that does not in some
way involve man's volitional and passional nature.

As a mat-

ter of fact, will and belief are, from a psychological point
of view, the same, insofar as in each case the relation between
the mind and its object is identical.

In will as in belief,

.

the mind gives its attention to the item before it to the
exclusion of all items incompatible with it.

Will and belief

differ, however, in their objects, in the sense that the object
of will depends for its very existence upon the willing, while
the object of belief is not directly dependent for its existence
upon the believing.
The influence of man's passional nature upon belief becomes apparent when we analyze why a person believes one hypothesis rather than another.

We find that there is no evidence

of any human belief that does not, in at least a very minimal
sense, involve preference and subjective interest of some kind.

?OS.

1 Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II,
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EVen a belief in something as seemingly indubitable as the
principle of contradiction involves personal interest.

For

one's belief in the principle of contradiction not only presupposes his believing in truth and in the human mind's
ability to attain it but also involves his believing in the
relevance of the principle itself to his future experience.
And from James's point of view, these latter beliefs are the
result of personal preference.

We believe in truth and in the

possibility of acquiring it, James said, because we want to
have a truth and want to think it accessible to us.
Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there
is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for
each other,--what is it but a passionate affirmation
of desire, in which our social system backs us up?
We want to have a truth; we want to believe that
our experiments and studies and discussions must
put us in a continually better and better position
towards it; and on this line we.agree to fight out
our thinking ·lives. But if a pyrrhonistic sceptic
asks us how we know all this, can our logic find a
reply? Nol certainly it cannot. It is just one volition against another,--we willing to go in for life ·
upon a trust or assumption which he, for his part,
does not care to make.2

Similarly, a person is inclined to believe in the universal
significance of the principle of contradiction because he
wants the

kind of stable and predictable world which the prin-

ciple of contradiction seems to guarantee.

Even in those

judgments which seem to be the most unimpassioned and objec2 James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals,
pp. 40-41.
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!_tiYe, man's entire being participates; his intellect, will,
;~

desires, and emotions cooperate to various degrees.

Contrary

~-

~:

· to the Intellectualists' view, there.fore, every belief to some
. extent involves non-cognitive elements; .for every belief is
psychologically the same as an act of will and every belief
presupposes some degree of personal interest.
The Intellectualists' disavowal o.f .faith on the grounds
that it involves non-cognitive elements is not entirely to
the point.

James suggested that man's .full and active nature

is involved in all belief; hence, the difference between faith
and the rest o.f man's convictions cannot be the presence or

absence of a non-cognitive factor.

The difference is in the

quality o.f the evidence in response to which a man accepts

an object as real.
bility involved.

The difference is in the degree of probaIn some cases, the evidence is so over-

whelmingly coercive that a man

bel~eves

without question.

Either there is no evidence which conflicts with the proposed
bn>othesis and it does not occur to a man to doubt at all; or
the evidence in favor of an hypothesis so outweighs any opposing data that he dismisses the possibility of doubting as
ridiculous.

His unhesitating belief in such instances is not

normally called faith.

However, whenever the evidence in sup-

port of an hypothesis is less than conclusive, whether it be
minimal or more or less persuasive, then the belief, i.e., the
assent to the reality or truth of the hypothesis, is considered
to be an act of .faith.

r
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In instances ·o:f this sort, however, instances in which

there is a lack o:f compelling evidence, the Intellectuaiists
counsel us not to believe.

They tell us to suspend judgment,

for to believe what has not been logically demonstrated or
empirically verified is, :from their point o:f View, irrational
and unscientific.

Intellectualists bid us avoid error at all

cost and prohibit :faith as involving an unwarranted risk--the
risk o:f making a mistake.

They enjoin us to refuse to believe

anything concerning which evidence has not yet come in and
never to allow our preferences, emotions or desires to move
us to believe anything which has not been logically or empirically verified.
William James himself, however, did not take the Intellectualists' advice too seriously.

As he pointed out. to a

greater or less degree, everyone, even the Intellectualist,
habitually lives by faith o:f one kind o:f another.

When a man

crosses a bridge, :for example, he has no proof that the bridge
will not collapse under him; but he believes that it
port him.

His belief is :faith.

a particular

ta'~k tomo~row,
I,

•

w~ll

sup-

When a man plans to accomplish

he has no guarantee that the world

will have a tomotrow, or that he himself will be here even i:f
tomorrow does come for the rest of the world.

But he believes

that the sun will rise again as usual and that he himself will
wake· again to· do the work of another

day~

His belief is faith.

The latter example points up the fact that the temporality of
our experience requires the exercise of faith in the day to
day conduct of our lives.

Human living, after all, is, to a

.. .
r

r

'
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great extent, a series of choices and actions.
of actions willed and actions performed.

It is a series

We will to do things

and then we do them; our.living thus involves a continual
projection of ourselves into the future--into a future that
is in no sense guaranteed.

We have no proof that the future

will come at all, although it always has come for us in the
past; and if it does come, we do not know in advance what its
character will be, although we have certain expectations in
this regard.

We live by continually projecting ourselves into

a future that we take on faith.
This attitude of faith, which is in some sense common to
all men, is not something merely to be tolerated as an unavoidable evil.

It is, under the proper circumstances, totally

justified and at times indispensable.

There are cases in which,

in spite of a lack of evidence, a decision must be made either

because action is required or because a valuable truth or good
may be lost if we do not decide.

For example, a young man

just graduated from school must decide what to do with his
life whether for a short period of time or for a longer one.
Although he has no absolute guarantee that one way 0£ living
will prove more happy and successful than another, in this
instance action of some kind is required and a choice must be
made.

There are other cases, of course, in which immediate

action is not required.

But in some of these instances at

least, although a decision is not a strict necessity, a suspension of judgment, a failure to decide, entails the loss of
a valuable good.

For example, it is an hypothesis of religion

~
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thllt belief in God entails tremendous benefits for the be11ever in this life as well as after death. To suspend judgment in regard to the question of God is, of course, theoreti-

cal.3Y possible.

But ta do so amounts to forfeiting the benefits

held to be consequent upon one's belief in Him.

In a case

like this, James said, man's passional nature not only may but

--or

must determine his decision, because in fact the consequences
suspending judgment are equivalent to disbelieving.
James recognized the importance of considering whatever
evidence is available in forming one's beliefs.

But realizing

the inability of intellectual considerations alone to settle
not only the practical questions of daily living but also the
larger philosophical issues about life, he saw the overriding
importance of non-cognitive factors in determining human convictions.

In James's words: "OUr passional nature not only-;

may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever
it is a genuine option that cannot by-; its nature be decided on
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances,
'Do not decide, but leave the guestion open,' is itself a passional decision,--just like deciding yes or no,--and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth."3
James was not advocating a careless attitude regarding
the truth.

He was not suggesting that a man under any and

all circumstances may believe wha teve·r he wants· to believe
without discrimination.

3

.

Ibid.' p. 42.

James was careful to spell out the
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conditions which would render faith lawful and necessary.

His

contention was that faith is lawful and indispensable when the
option to be decided is a genuine option which cannot be
decided on intellectual grounds, i.e., a genuine option with
j.n.sufficient evidence to support either of the hypotheses
involved.
option'?

What did James mean by the key phrase, 'genuine
One can describe an option as a decision to be made

between any two hypotheses, theoretical or practical, proposed
to one's belief or as a decision to believe or not to believe
a given hypothesis.

In order for an option to be genuine,

however, it must have certain characteristics; it must, James
said, be living, momentous, and forced.
An option is living, according to James, if the hypotheses

involved are alive.

To be alive, an hypothesis must be seen

as a real possibility by the person to whom the option is proposed.

It must be seen as something upon which that person

could act--something upon which he would be willing to act if
he accepted it.

It must be an hypothesis, the truth or fal-

sity of which would make a difference in his active life.

If

an hypothesis has no bearing at all on a person's way of living, then for all practical purposes, it is dead for him.
Obviously, liveliness signifies a relation which an hypothesis
may have to.an individual thinker, and _a given hypothesis may
be alive to one person but dead to another.

What has made it

alive or dead for someone in the first place, however, may
very well have been his own passional nature.

As James pointed

out in regard to hypotheses which are already dead for us,

r
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.

• • • what has made them dead for us is for the most
part a previous action of our willing nature of an
antagonistic kind. When I say 'willing nature,' I do
not mean only such deliberate volitions as may have
set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from,
--I mean all such factors of belief as fear and hope,
prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship,
the circumpressure of our caste and set.4
It is as though every new hypothesis proposed for our

belief must pass before a reviewing board constituted by all
of our past experience, feelings, desires, emotions, active
inclinations, prejudices, and opinions--opinions which may be
original with us, opinions inherited from.our ancestors, as
well as opinions espoused because of their current popularity
or prestige.

Any new hypothesis proposed to us will either

be congenial with, i.e., in harmony with, the members of this
reviewing board or not.

I f it is congenial, we will see it

as alive, i.e., as having a bearing upon our active existence.

If not, it will be dead for us and incapable of affecting our
lives in any way.

Here again we see the practical impossibil-

ity of totally extricating human convictions from all personal
influences. · As objective as one tries to be, one cannot see
reality except rrom the perspective of the particular vantage
point which he occupies in history and in the unique light of
his own experience,

education~

social involvement, and personal

inclinations.
Granted that an option is living, however, faith is necessary only if the option is also momentous and forced.
mom~ntous,

4

It is

James said, if what is at stake is vitally signifi-

lbid., pp. 39-40.
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cant, if the opportunity presented by the option is unique,
or if the decision, once made, is not reversible.

Obviously,

trom James's point of ·view, it is only the consequences which
tollOW upon an option--consequences in the way of actions and
their effects--which render an option momentous.

in

ter~s

It is only

of such consequences that we can speak of vitally

significant stakes or of an option as presenting a unique
opportunity or of a decision as being irreversible.
If believing one hypothesis rather than another were significantly to affect the way of life of the believer or to
influence in any important way the lives of others, the life
of the community, or the destiny of the universe, then surely
the option in question would involve vitally significant
stakes and could be considered momentous.

There are in fact

many options of this kind, options which are momentous to a
greater or less degree.

Some of

t~ese

options involve very

general questions--for example, whether or not this is a moral
universe in which persons can make demands which other persons
are obliged to honor; whether or not among the claimants
there is a God who makes demands of man and who is aware of
man's needs and responsive to his pleas.

Other options in-

volve more specific questions: whether or not one's involvement in a particular war is justified; whether or not a man
may be forced to fight in a war which he considers to be
immoral; whether or not civil disobedience is a justifiable
means of pointing up what one may consider to be evils in
society; whether a liberal or a conservative would make a
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better government official.

What one believes in regard to

these questions determines how one acts in particular circum. stances •

And how one acts in these circumstances can affect

. one's entire life, the lives of others, and the course of the
-orld to a greater or less degree.

In questions like these,

tbe stakes are significant and the options momentous.
As far as the uniqueness of an option and the irreversibility of a decision are concerned, these, too, have meaning
onlY in terms of the consequences of belief.

It is difficult

to think of an hypothesis which, if not believed today, cannot
be believed tomorrow or next year on the assumption that one
is still alive to believe tomorrow and next year.

It is diffi-

cult to think of a belief that one cannot reverse.

Many people

who believed in the usefulness of capital punishment ten years
ago do not believe in it today.
thing today may enable one to

However, to believe in some-

avai~

himself of a unique oppor-

tunity for action--an opportunity which may never present itself again.

For example, if one believes that surgically

transplanting an organ from one human being to the body of
another is morally justifiable, then he may avail himself of
the unique opportunity to save the life of a friend by donating to that friend an organ from his own body.

If, on the

other hand, he believes such an operation to be an unwarranted
and even evil tampering with the order of nature, he will not
avail himself of the opportunity.

True enough, he may come

to believe in the good of such surgical procedures in years to
come, but the opportunity presented by the option today--the
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,, opportunity to save the life of this particular friend in this
·particular way--will never come again; and for this reason, the
·_option is momentous.

It is momentous also because in terms

o! its consequences the decision is not reversible.
w

Whatever

the person may believe in the future about such operations,

:_.~. 1;11e consequences of today's belief or disbelief cannot be
changed.

l
It is interesting to note that in giving an example of a
'
(:. momentous option in "The Will to Believe," James himself did
~~

not give an example of an option between two hypotheses proposed to one's beli.ef, al though it is this type of option

which

he started out to explain.

Instead,. he gave us as an

example the choice between following or not following a
proposed course of action.
~·

"Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen

and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition,

your

option would be momentous; for this would probably be your only
similar opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude
1ou from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether or put
at least the chance of i t into your hands. n5

In using such an

example, James seemed to shift his discussion from one type

·· ot option, a decision between two hypotheses proposed to one's
belief, to another type of option, a decision to act or not to
act in a particular way.

Whether or not the shift was inten-

tional, it serves to emphasize a very important point in
James's philosophy.

5Ibid., p. 35.

-

And that is that a choice between
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,b1Potheses proposed to one's belief' is at bottom a choice

'

between modes of action.

For as we saw in Chapter III, be-

_lie! always involves action in some way, and thus a decision
to believe or not to believe a given hypothesis is a decision
to act or not to act in a particular manner.

The intimate

connection between belief and action becomes still more appar-

ent when we considt:r what James called a forced option.
If an option is not momentous, i.e., if the decision is

reversible or i f the stakes are trivial or if the opportunity
to decide is likely to present itself again, then, of course,
there is no urgency about making a decision--unless the option

A forced option, James said, is a "dilemma

is a forced one.

based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility
of not choosing." 6

Strictly speaking, however, there is no

such thing as a forced option in the sense of a case in which

one must either profess belief in an hypothesis or reject it.
It is always possible, theoretically at least, to suspend
·judgment.

But when one considers the consequences of accept-

ing an hypothesis, rejecting it, and suspending judgment in
the matter, one discovers that there are certain cases in
which the consequences of suspending judgment--consequences
in the way of action--are equivalent. to those of rejecting

the hypothesis.

Let us take as an example the hypothesis that
'

the~e is a G~d who cares about man, make.a demands of him, and
is responsive to his needs.
6

-Ibid.'

p. 34.

If we neither accept nor reject
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tbiS proposition but rather suspend judgment in regard to it,

our
';

~-,.

on

actions, our way of living, will not be those of a believer.
the contrary, we will live as though there were no God

even though we have not openly professed disbelief in him.
Tb,US

the failure to accept this proposition, the suspension

of judgment is, practically speaking, equivalent to rejecting

it•

From the point of view of our active lives,

accept this proposition or reject it.

w~

either

From the point of view

of action, there is no middle ground, and the option can thus
be considered a forced one.
Assuming that one is faced with a genuine option, as
described above, James held that the decision ought be made
on intellectual grounds, i.e., on the basis of evidence, if
sufficient evidence is at hand.

But if sufficient evidence

is not available (and this is often the case), then the decision can only be made on non-intellectual grounds.

If the

option is living, momentous, and forced, and if the intellect
is not coerced by evidence to assent to one horn of the
dilemma, then the choice must be determined by man's willing
nature.

In this case, faith is the only appropriate response.

There are, of course, many options presented to us which
are trivial and which are not forced.

The consequences of

the truth or falsity of the hypotheses involved are relatively
insignificant for us, the community, and the world.

In such

i_nstances, it is not necessary to choose and it is usually
Wiser to suspend judgment until all the evidence is in.

How-

ever, even here, if the evidence is lacking, we are free to
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believe at will.

Ye

are free to believe what we want to believe

in the case of any living options which the intellect by itself cannot resolve, but we do so or not at our own risk.
And at times wisdom is best served by caution.

For example,

most of us, in our efforts to get to know more about the objective nature of the world in which we live through the
study of science, are simply recorders of scientific information.

Although there may be many other cases in which we

-

make the truth to some degree, in matters of science, the
data is independent of most of us.

Thus in our efforts as

laymen to learn more about the constitution of the universe,
there is rarely an urgent need for us to believe any theory
for which there is not sufficient evidence.

Although a view

of the world may indeed be personally supportive and although
the discoveries of science Yery often.influence the way in
which we manage our everyday affairs, still there are many
scientific theories, the truth or falsity of which will not·
significantly change our lives in any way.
will follow if we do not believe them.

No dire consequences

In cases like these,

it seems wiser to suspend judgment than to risk making a mistake.

In such instances, the questions are relatively trivial,

the choice is seldom forced, and in James's words, "The attitude of sceptical balance is therefore the absolutely wise
one.if we wo~ld escape mistakes."?
But there are other questions which man cannot afford to
?Ibid., p. 51.
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approach dispassionately, questions which are most satisfactorily answered by a believing attitude in spite of the lack
of evidence.

The cases in which faith is the most appropri-

ate and fruitful mental attitude fall into two groups.
First, there are those cases in which being skeptical
would amount to losing the truth forever or in which skepticism
would be equivalent to disbelief.

Here we have those questions

.which, of their very nature, can never be answered by sense
and reason alone in the ordinary course of human life.

Moral

and religious questions are examples of issues of this type.
They are not questions concerning sensible facts which are
easily subject to empirical verification; and while men have
attempted to resolve them by reason and logic, men have not
succeeded in coming up with any universally accepted answers.
In cases of this sort, an attitude of faith is appropriate,
because sensible proofs and

ration~l

demonstrations which are

generally convincing are not readily available.

And to wait

for evidence which either cannot come or is not likely to come
would mean losing the truth forever (or at least acquiring it
too late) or else be practically equivalent to disbelief.
Inasmuch as belief entails action, there are instances in
which suspending judgment involves acting as if the proposed
hypothesis were false, as we noted above.

In such .cases,

refusing to judge until the evidence is all in is, for practical purposes, equivalent to disbelieving.
Secondly, there are those cases in which faith can bring
about its own verification.

According to James, there are

r
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· JJ.UJllerous instances (some of them involving the moral and religious questions mentioned above) in which faith can and does
verifY itself.

Frequently, for example, a desirable situation

can oe brought about only by a certain kind of action.

But

the action necessary to create the desired situation will be
successful only if one believes that the desired state of
affairs can and will be achieved.

For example, one· can become

a pianist only if he studies and practices diligently.

But

if he believes that he is not capable of attaining the goal,
he will not even try to do so.

He will not put forth the

necessary effort and will not become a pianist.

On the other

hand, if one believes that the desired goal is attainable,
then he will be inclined to put forth his best efforts, and

in all probability he will succeed.

In such a case, his faith

in the possibility of success is an indispensable factor in
achieving success.

In

an instance of this sort, faith, or

confidence, is the most prudent mental attitude to adopt.
Certainly when faith can transform a believed hypothesis into
a desired fact, it would be foolish not to believe.
One of James's favorite examples of faith verifying it· self appears in "Is Life Worth Living" and in "The Sentiment
of Rationality."

In these essays, James asked his readers to

imagine that while climbing the Alps, he found himself in a
precarious position the only escape from which involved a
terrible leap.

Having had no past experience of precisely

this kind, he had no certain knowledge of his ability _to execute the leap successfully.

Nevertheless, faith--hope and

r
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8
confidence--saved him.
• • • hope and confidence in myself make me sure I
shall not miss my aim, and nerve my feet to execute
what without those subjective emotions would perhaps
have been impossible. But suppose that, on the contrary, the emotions of fear and mistrust preponderate;
or suppose that, having just read the Ethics of Belief
rwritten by W. K. Clifford], I feel it would be sinful
to act upon an assumption unverified by previous experience ,--why, then I shall hesitate so long that at
last, exhausted and trembling, and launching myself
in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll
into the abyss. In this case (and it is one of an
immense class) th~ part of wisdom clearly is to believe
what one desires;~ for the belief is one of the indispensable preliminary conditions of the realization of
its object. There are then cases where faith creates
its own verification. Believe, and you shall be right,
for you shall save yourself; doubt, and you shall again
be right, for you shall perish. The only difference
is that to believe is greatly to your advantage.iO
8 James's example reminds one of Kierkegaard's leap of
faith--the leap into the absurd by which Abraham chose to obey
God's command to sacrifice Isaac in spite of the irrationality
of the act, and the leap of faith by which a man accepts Christianity in spite of the fac.t that it is beyond reason. Whether
James intended it to do so or not, hi·s example points up the
fact that every act of faith involves a kind of leap--a leap
by which we bridge the gap between the available evidence and
the thing to be believed. If neither empirical evidence nor
logical arguments take us right up to the object and bring us
into direct contact with it, then we can only get to the object
by a 'leap of faith.' And just as the physical leap in
James's example involved formidable dangers so too the 'leap
of faith' always involves risks.
9Technically, the word 'desires' is correctly used here.
But it is an unfortunate choice of words because at least one
meaning of the term refers to physical or sensual appetite
and even to lust. A word such as 'wants' or 'wishes' would
have been less open to misunderstanding. James's thought here
is simply that in a case such as the one described, it is
wise to believe what one wants to believe, wishes to believe,
or even needs to believe.
lOJames, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith
and Morals, pp. 96-97.
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According to William James, faith is indispensable for
both knowledge and action.

But faith always involves risks.

J.S a matter of fact, in the case of any genuine option which

cannot be resolved on the basis of evidence, there are risks
J,nvolved in not believing as well as in believing.

Whether we

choose to believe or not to believe depends upon what risks

we prefer to take.

We believe at the risk of making a mistake

or being duped, for example; on the other hand, we disbelieve
or suspend judgment at the risk of losing the truth.

But

there are more risks involved in each alternative than simply
the risk of making a mistake or the risk of losing the truth.
For, according to James, when any two hypotheses are opposed
to each other, the practical consequences of one must be different from those of the other.

Thus choosing to believe or

not to believe is more than a choice between truth and falsity;
it is also a choice between the practical consequences of the
two alternatives in question.

The risks involved include more

than the risk of losing the truth by refusing to believe or
the risk of being duped by believing a false proposition.

But

for the present, we will confine our remarks to these purely
intellectual hazards.
There are two obligations incumbent upon would-be knowers:
1) to believe truth and 2) to avoid error.

These are not sim-

ply ·two expressions or one law, but are in fact two separate
commandments.

And as potential knowers, we can give primacy

to one or to the other.

In fact, the whole tenor of our

intellectual lives will depend upon which of these two
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directives we consider primary.

For James, the search for

truth is or first importance; avoidance of error is secondary.
por an Intellectualist, however, the situation is reversed:
one's primary duty as a knower is to escape error; acquiring
truth is secondary.

The

Int~llectualists

reject faith be-

cause they are convinced that faith is not a valid grounding
for decision; it continually involves the ri.slr: or making a
mistake since it does not always infallibly put us in touch
with the +·acts.

Intellectualists believe that by resisting

faith always, they can be sure of never being wrong.

James,

on the other hand, would prefer to risk making a mistake than
to give up his chance of winning the truths which only .faith
can gain for him.
For James, faith, instead of being the enemy of truth (as
it is for the Intellectualists), is its indispensable ally.
It is in some degree necessary for all thought and is an atti-

-

tude of mind in which everyone who claims to know anything de
facto indulges.

For the existence of truth and the ability

of the human mind to attain it are not facts which can be
empirically proven or rationally demonstrated, as we have
already seen.

In fact, any attempt at empirical proof or

rational demonstration presupposes them.

Thus even those

who forbid faith and demand proof for everything, de facto,
indulge in the very faith they abhor.

Not only do they accept

on faith the very possibility of knowledge but their postulation of avoiding error as a knower's primar.J duty is a matter
of faith on. their part.

For one cannot decide which duty is
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primary--to gain truth or to avoid error--on the basis of any
evidence.

One's choice is a matter of preference and desire

and, perhaps, even a matter of fear.

As James put it, "• ••

these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in
any case only expressions of our pa~sional life. 1111 It is a
question of what one fears most--making a mistake or losing
the truth.

The Intellectualist is one who is a slave to his

private horror of being a dupe.

But James wrote: "For my own

part, I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe
that worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this
world. • • •
The Intellectualists, prizing security above all else,
prohibit faith because of the risks it entails.

But their

prohibition, if obeyed, would stifle man's intellectual faculties and paralyze his active powers.

It would stifle his

intellectual faculties by bidding him be so circumspect in
his intellectual gaze that he would never be allowed to look

up from the world certified by sense and reason.

In effect,

if obeyed, it would put forever out of reach a whole world of
possible realities simply because_ they cannot be logically or
empirically verified.

It would put forever out of reach all

those truths which cannot be known by sense and reason alone
and all of those possible realities which man's actions could
effect if he had sufficient confidence in his abilities and
11 James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals,

p. 49.
12

-Ibid.,

pp. 49-50.
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sufficient faith in the desired goal.

The necessity of faith

tor the well-being of mari was apparent to William James.
Without faith, man would be deprived of that good which is
tru.th, that good which is responsible hum.an action itself,
and all those physical and spiritual goods which, by his
actions, man can effect for himself and the world.
James believed that there are certain areas in which only
faith can get at the truth. 1 3 And if faith is forbidden, then
in regard to these questions, man must remain forever in the
dark.

These areas include morality, religion, in general

most of the larger questions about life that philosophers
ask, and, in some instances, science as well.
Moral questions cannot be answered on the basis of empirical proof or logical demonstration, for a moral question is
not a question of what

sens~bly

exists but rather of what is

good or of what would be good if it did exist.

Science cannot

tells us the value of a thing, for simply under the aspect of
its material being, a thing is neither good nor bad.

According

to James, the good is what is felt to be good--what is desired
by a sentient being.

"Science can tell us what exists; but

to compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does
not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls
. l30n thi_s point, James might be accµsed of failing to
address himself to the problem of false consciousness raised
by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. It must be noted, however,
that the problem of false consciousness was not part of
James's tradition. James was realistically inclined to take
the deliverances of experience at face value, and false consciousness was simply not a problem for.him.
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our heart • ul4
In the ethical philosophy of William James, the essence

of good is simply to satisfy demands.
80

But demands conflict

that some goods are incompatible with other goods; and if

one prevails, a good that is incompatible with it must be
given up at leasttemporarily.

The moral philosopher is one

who looks for a rule that will tell him which of all conflicting demands ought to be satisfied to the frustration of others.
In general, the guiding principJeof ethical philosophy, as

James saw it, can only be that as many demands as possible
ought be satisfied.

The best act, he said, is the one which

makes the best whole by producing the least amount of dissatisfaction.

But in the concrete, it is not possible to know in

advance and with absolute certitude all of the consequences
which a particular act will entail in terms of the total number of desires it will satisfy or frustrate.

In James's words,

"• •• the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals
disappointed which each decision creates is always a universe
without a precedent, and for which no adequate previous rule
exists. nl5
Thus, neither a moral philosopher nor an

o~dinary

man,

seeking the best course of action to follow in a particular
concrete dilemma, can expect to find any rule of action which
14James,

11
The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals~
p. 53.
l5James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,"
~says on Faith and Morals, p. 20~.
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certified in advance to be the right one. "The philosopher,
,,J.•
;then, gu~ philosopher, is not better able to determine the
best universe in the concrete emergency than other men." 16

And he, like other men, must adopt an attitude of £aith if he
18 to make a decision at all.
The solVing word, for the learned and the unlearned
man alike, lies in the last resort in the dumb willingnesses and unwillingnesses of their interior characters, and nowhere else. It is not in heaven, neither
is it beyond the sea; but the word is very nigh unto
thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest
do it.17
Religious questions are similar to

mo~al

questions in

that sense and reason alone cannot proVide the answers; at
least sense and reason cannot provide answers which are generally accepted.

Religion, in the traditional sense of the

term, posits the existence of an unseen order beyond the world
of our experience; and religion states that it is in its relation to this unseen world that our present life finds its true
significance and that our interests even now are best served
16Ibid.

-

17Ibid., p. 215. This passage, with its biblical tone,
calls our-ittention to the colorful literary style for which
William James is noted. No doubt the way in which James wrote
about reality reflects to a large extent the way in which he
experienced it. But one suspects that his style of writing
served a definite purpose as well--the purpose of giving his
readers a 'feeling' of reality rather than merely an abstract
conceptual view of it. James's colorful examples, his vivid
descriptions, his liberal use of metaphor give his philosophical writings the same kind of color, variety, and excitement
that he found in experience itself. But life is not merely
Colorful and exciting. It is serious business. And, whether
he intended it to do so or not, James's occasional use of a
biblical style serves to emphasize the grave import of the
questions under consideration and to point up the seriousness of living itself.
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by our believing in this invisible realm.

The affirmations o:f

religion are obviously not subject to empirical verification
in the ordinary co'l.lt'ai! o:f human life.

Mystical experience, not

given to most o:f us, may serve as empirical evidence :for the
mystic; but :for the rest o:f us, :faith is our only recourse.
sense experience as such does not reveal the spiritual world
to us; nor can reason, in the strict sense o:f a :faculty o:f
inference, give the religious hypothesis a solid :foundation.
For all those who think that they have used reason successfully to prove religious beliefs to be true, there are others
who :feel that reason has succeeded quite well in proving them
false.

James believed that the intellect is unable to confront

religious issues and resolve them on the basis o:f evidence
alone.

Only our passional nature can resolve such issues;

and it must do so.

The option presented to us by the reli-

gious question is a living option; if not, to discuss it would
be pointless.

It is also momentous; the stakes are certainly

not trifling.

And, James said, it is a :forced option.

In his

words:
• • • we see, :first that religion offers itself as a
momentous option. We are supposed to gain, even now,
by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain
vital good. Secondly, religion is a :forced option, so
:far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by
remaining sceptical and waiting :for more light, because,
although we do avoid error in that way i.f religion be
untrue, we lose the good, i:f it be true, just as certainly as i:f we positively chose to disbelieve.JS
18 James, "The Will to .Believe," .!!:ssays on Faith and
!!9rals, p. 57.
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The religious issue is a fine example of a case in which suspending judgment is practically equivalent to choosing not to
believe.

Religious belief is such that it gives rise to a

way of life and mode of action vastly different from that of
the non-believer; thus whether one positively disbelieves or
simply postpones judgment, he does not act as though the
religious hypothesis were true.

He acts as though it were false.

In general, the larger questions of life--the questions

which philosophers deal with specifically and which most people
ask at one time or another, if only in a vague and general
way--can rarely, if ever, be answered to everyone's satisfaction on the basis of empirical evidence or rational demonstration alone.

Philosophers often give lengtpy arguments, based

upon logic and what they consider to be empirical evidence, in
support of their positions;· but the !.act that different philosophers, apparently looking at the same !acts, come to different and even contradictory conclusions indicates that their
conclusions are not propositions to which they are forced to
assent by the weight of the evidence.

It indicates that there

is more involved in their convictions than the evidence alone;
it indicates the influence o! non-cognitive elements.
The very nature of philosophical questions is such that
empirical evidence and rational demonstration cannot give us
definitive answers to them.

Like religion, philosophy tries

to interpret the total character of.the world, to determine the
individual's place in it, to discover
a whole.

~he

meaning

or

life as

But no philosopher experiences the total character
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of the world.

Reality is so vast and diverse that each phil-

osopher experiences only his own sector of' it 1 and hence no
philosophical system can ever explain it completely and be
absolutely verified empirically.

Thus in whatever stand a

philosopher takes, faith plays an important part, his protests
to the contrary notwithstanding.

A philosopher may attempt to

maintain a purely speculative attitude in regard to- philosophical issues; he may make every effort to avoid err·or? by refusing to believe whenever the evidence is not conclusive.

And

indeed there may be a few philosophical questions that he
can afford to approach in such an impersonal way and in regard
to which he can afford not to make a decision.

But mos.t of

the questions of philosophy, like those of religion, are such
that one cannot afford to suspend judgment •. One's mode of
life even now depends upon what he believes about the universe,
the meaning of life, and his role in the whole scheme of things.
If a philosopher, or any other man, is to live and to act, he
must take a stand on these issues.
it on the basis of conclusive

And since he cannot take

evidenc~,

he is left with one

alternative--faith.
James claimed that, de facto, a man's philosophical view
is an expression of hi.s temperament; it is more 9r less a "dumb
sense of what life honestly an~ deeply means." 1 9 James agreed
with Hegel that the aim of knowledge is to make a man feel
more at home in the world.

But the world is a multi-faceted

l9James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of

~Uth, pp.

17-18.

~
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reality.

And depending upon his temperament and character,

one facet of it may be more congenial to a given man than
another.

A man will feel more at home in the world if his own

particular temperament is considered to be an essential feature
of the universe.

As James put it, "Different men find their

minds more at home in very different fragments of the world." 20
Thus all philosophers "have conceived of the whole-world after
the analogy of some particular feature of it which has particularly captivated their attention." 21
A man's temperament influences his philosophical thinking more than any strictly objective premises. "It loads the
evidence for him one way or the other • • • • 1122 A man trusts
his temperament.

He wants a universe that suits it and he

believes in a conception of the universe which does suit it.
I

"If we take the whole history of philosophy, the systems reduce
themselves to a few main types which, under all the technical
verbiage in which the ingenious intellect of man envelops them,
are just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push, and
seeing the whole drift of life, forced on one by one's total
character and experience, and on the whole preferred--there is
no other truthful word--as one's best working attitude. 1123
That faith plays a part in religious issues is fairly
20James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 11.
21
Ibid., p. 8.
22 James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of
Truth, p. 19.
2 3James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 20-21.

-
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well conceded by almost everyone.

That it enters into philos-

ophical judgments is, of course, a less acceptable.view.

But

that it comes into play in matters of science--this is the
least acceptable opinion of all.

From an Intellectualist's

point of view, such a suggestion is preposterous.

And yet it

vas James's opinion that scientists rely upon faith, not only
ill their day to day living as other men do, but also in their

work as scientists.
Like all men, scientists have faith in the capacity of
man's mind for truth, the lack of proof notwithstanding.

But

more than that, a fundamental principle of science, in fact a
principle upon which all scientific progress depends,
unquestionably a matter of faith.

~s

That principle is the

assumption that nature is intelligible and that nature always
acts in the same way.

It cannot be proven that nature tomor-

row will follow exactly the same laws that it follows today,
and yet the scientist, as well as the layman, believes and
acts upon the principle that the course of nature is uniform.
It can be said that this uniformity is congenial to both of
them.

And indeed progress in science, as well as the smooth

operation of everyday affairs, seems to owe much to the fact
that men accept this principle of uniformity and.live by it.
Furthermore, men of science have their own individual
faiths--their own pet theories (sometimes no more than hunches)
Which they work tirelessly to verify.

Sometimes experimenta-

tion proves them wrong, but often their faith, patience, and
effort lead to the discovery of a truth which otherwise would
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not be known.

Many a truth would remain undiscovered and

maDY a technological advance would not be made if men of
genius--scientists, philosophers, and others--did not follow
their hunches and cling to their beliefs in spite of the lack
of supporting evidence.

Galileo, for example, clung to his

belief in the Copernican theory that the earth is but a planet
moving around the sun, in spite of the fact that the everyday
experience of most men seemed to support the view that sun,
moon, and stars moved around the earth.

And by his investiga-

tions, Galileo contributed to the wealth of evidence in virtue
of which the theory of Copernicus is today the commonly accepted view.

In the area of technology, modern communication owes

much to the work of Alexander Graham Bell.

It was Bell's

faith in the theory that the varying sound of a person's voice
could be made to vary the intensity of an electrical current,
which varying electrical current could then be reproduced as
speech, that inspired the tireless investigation and experimentation which culminated in his perrecting the telephpne.
Science owes its progress and advancement to the desires

or individual men to get their own faiths confirmed, to

th~

determination with which men of sensitivity and imagination
hang on to their uncertified belief that the truth must lie
in one direction rather than in another.

In science, it is

not uncommon for two men, observing the same data, to espouse
contradictory theories about them.

One might well wonder how

it is that one scientist can believe a theory on the basis of
the same empirical facts which prompt another to reject it;
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but according to James, this is possible because everyone of
any mental originality is sensitive to evidence that bears

in some one direction.

The fact that two scientists, looking

at the same empirical data, espouse contradictory theories
indicates that more is at work in the game than their intellects alone.

Desire, instinct, and feeling are active too.

For the purely judging mind, i.e., for the speculative
mind, perhaps a cautious skepticism in matters of science is
better than faith.

As we pointed out earlier, this is true for

the layman in science; he can afford to wait for the evidence
without any great loss.

But for purposes of discovery, it is

better to risk making an error than to risk not finding the
truth at all.

If nothing is ventured, nothing is gained.

Thus, in scientific investigation, skepticism and faith work
together.

"The most useful investigator, because the most

sensitive observer, is always he whpse eager interest in one
side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived. 1124
It is evident, then, that there are certain kinds of
truth--moral, religious, philosophical, and scientific--that
would never be had were faith !J.Ot permitted to enter into
one's mental life.

It could even be suggested that the Intel-

lectualists' prohibition of faith is a prohibition of mental
fecundity.

But to forbid faith is not only to forbid intel-

lectual progress--to forbid faith is to forbid life.

It is

24James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals,

p. 52.
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to forbid action and all those goods which human·actions can
create.

'Without faith, action, understood in a human sense,

is impossible.

For in any complex problem, our conclusions

about what is the best course of action to follow can, from
the point of view of the conclusiveness of the evidence, never
be more than probable.

Assuming that time will continue and

that the items in our present situation will continue into
the future (beliefs for which we have no guarantee), we can
never be absolutely certain what the consequences of our proposed actions will be.

If the environment affected by our

activities were fixed or stabilized,

~f

we knew all the proper-

ties of the items in it and how these things would react in
all possible circumstances, then we could foresee all the
possible consequences of our actions.

In such a case, we

could decide which consequence we would prefer and, at least
being certain of getting a desired result, act accordingly.
But we live and act in a world which no one of us can know
completely--a world which is continually changing.

Hence we

cannot, with either absolute certitude or, in many cases, even
relative certitude, predict what effects our actions will have
on the world. F.rom an ethical point of view, that action is
best which satisfies the greatest number of desires and claims
at the least cost; but not only are we unable clearly to foresee the results of our action on the empirical world, we are
not perfectly aware of all the desires and claims of those
whom our actions may affect.

Thus in deciding which of several

alternative courses of action to follow, the most we can hope

14?
for is a high degree of probability.

But according to James,

even a degree of probability is rarely able to be proven. ·. Hence
we must let our 'feelings' and our 'good will' tell us where
the greater probability lies and act upon it as though the
iesser probabilities did not exist.

In

other words, for prac-

tical purposes, we act as though the most probable view were
the certain view.

The probability of our action having the

desired effect may be expressed in a fraction or percentage.
For example, a particular act may produce a certain effect
four times out of five, or eighty per-cent of the times.

But

we cannot translate the fractional probability of success
into a fractional action.

We cannot perform only

or eighty per-cent of the act in question.

four~fifths

We must either act

or not act; there is no middle ground which might match the
probability of the possible results.

Thus when we act we must

go all the way and in the example given incur a twenty percent risk of failure.
alternative.

We must act wholly for one or the other

ln other words, we must act on faith.

"We must

go in for the more probable alternative as if the other one
did not exist, and suffer the full penalty if the event belies

our faith. 112 5

To act only upon oeliefs certified by evidence

would in most cases be not to

~ct

at all, and of.ten not to act

on one belief is equivalent to acting as if the opposite belief
were tru1::.
The necessity of faith for action is thus apparent.
2 5James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 22?.
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action that is not merely instinctive presupposes conviction.
But, as we have seen; except for the data of the.immediate
present, doubt concerning matters of fact and the possible
outcome of proposed courses of activity is always possible.
For the most part, the beliefs which precede responsible activity cannot be certified by proof and therefore fall into the
category of faith.

Responsible action requires faith not

only in regard to the best course of activity to follow but
also in regard to our own freedom.

If action is

~o

be respon-

sible, we must be aware of our freedom not to act at all; we
must be aware of our freedom to act otherwise than we do.

But

from the point of view of James, freedom is not something which
can be empirically proven or rationally demonstrated.

It is

something which one must accept without proof--it too is a
matter of faith that must be lived daily.
Thus, to forbid faith is to render man sterile and unproductive from the point of view of both knowledge and action.
To prohibit faith is to render unattainable all of the truths
which sense and reason alone cannot discover, all of the realities which

responsibl~

human action can bring into being, and

also all the truths and realities which faith itself can help
to create in those unique instances in which it verifies itself.
The fact that faith in certain instances

~

verify itself

makes faith a formative factor in the shaping of our world.
We can to some degree make the world what we want it to be, if
we but believe it to be so and act as it it were so.

If we

believe the world to be all bad and the evil to be irremediable,

r
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for example, we will do nothing to improve things (on the assumption that the situation is hopeless) and our despair and
gloom will add to, and be part of, the world's bad character.
But if we believe that the world is to some degree good and
that it can be made better, we will. act accordingly.

We will

fight the evils and try to alleviate them, and the world will
be better for that, at least in the sense that it will contain
the manly virtue and courage that our own actions exhibit.
According to James, the Intellectualists suppose that the
world, for all practical purposes, is completely finished in
advance of our dealings with it, and that our beliefs and
actions, while somehow a part of the world, cannot change it
in any important way or contribute significantly to its meaning.

Thus, from an Intellectualist's point of view, faith has no
significant role to play

i~

determining the world's destiny.

James, however, maintained that the world is not completely
finished and that it is an empirical fact that human actions
and beliefs can shape the course of experience and

sig~ificantly

determine to some degree the very character of the universe
itself.

There are questions about the universe, questions

about reality, the answers to which can actually be created by
faith at least in part.

For example, is life worth living?

Is this a moralistic world?
better?
~a

Can the world be improved--made

Lif·e is worth living; this is a moral universe; this

melioristic world, i.e., human action can bring this

pluralistic world to greater perfection.

These are all exam-

ples of faiths which, to a degree, can verify themselves.

As
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James put it, "• •• often enough our faith beforehand in an
uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come
26
true."

----- Optimism and pessimism were topics much discussed in

James's day especially in Germany, and James was very much
interested in the debate.

From his point of view, the mental

attitude which best fits the character of the universe depends
upon the individual and upon his trust or mistrust of the universe.

If one believes that the world is all bad, and that

life is not worth living, and if he ends his life by suicide,
then he makes the world, his world at least, all bad by his
act and deprives it of whatever perfection he might have contributed to it had he continued to live.

If, on the other

hand, he believes it to be good, at least partially so, and
if, instead of despairing, he braves the evils he finds in
life, defies pain and fear, he will prove the world to have
some goodness about it.

It will be good not only to the extent

that his own moral courage, which is an integral part of it,
is good but also to the extent that the world, with whatever
evils it contains, called forth his heroic efforts in the first
place.

As James· put it, the bad character of the world was

the conditio sine qua non of the good character of the man's
actions.

A world which can produce heroic virtue cannot be

all bad.

And the exhilaration which one derives from the

battle with evil as well as the satisfaction and joy which
26 James, "Is Life Worth Living?" ..l:!;Ssays on Faith and
!'!_orals, p. 28.
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accompanies each new victory can certainly make life worth

living for a man at least on a day to day basis.
Thus, if we believe the world to be bad, our belief will
. help to make it so; but if we believe the world to be good,
it will be good.

And if we believe that life is worth living,

our faith will make it worth living.

The character of the

universe depends upon each man's personal contribution to it.
But each one's contribution depends upon what he believes the
world's character to be.

James wrote:

Wherever the facts to be formulated contain such a
contribution, we may logically, legitimately, and
inexpugnably believe what we desire. The belief creates its verification.27 The ~hought becomes literally father to the fact, as the wish was father to
the thought.~8
The moral or non-moral character of the universe is another
question the answer to which depends at least in part upon a
man's belief in one alternative or the other.

Is this a moral

27James would not have us think that, in each and every
instance of believing what we want to believe, the belief will
verify itself. There are obviously cases in which it may not.
One of James's own examples of beliefs which can verify themselves, but are not guaranteed to do so, involves human relations. Let us assume that I want a particular person to like
me, but I have no evidence that he does so. If I believe that
he likes me and, confident of a friendly response on his part,
act amiably toward him, my action may elicit from him an expression of friendship. It may elicit from him the expression
of a liking which he already felt or it may evoke the liking
itself. However, it is always possible that my strategy will
not work, that forthcoming evidence will show my trust to have
been misplaced. This is the risk involved in faith; but if I
am unwilling to take this risk, I may well lose a good that
can come, if it comes at all, only through believing.
28 James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith
!nd Morals, p. 103.
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universe?

Are judgments of right and wrong objectively valid;

or are they merely expressions of our own uniquely personal
and subjective sensibilities?
obligation?

Is there such a thing as moral

Is there incumbent upon man an obligation to act

in a certain way--an obligation that stems from the very
nature of things and the fulfillment of which is necessary for
the world's welfare?

Is there a certain kind of conduct which

is required for the well-being of the universe and its inhabitants?
From James's point of view, there is no strictly logical
demonstration which will give us an absolutely certain 'yes'
or 'no' in answer to these questions.

Nor is there any single

scientific experiment the result of which will definitively
solve the problem for us once and for all.

Rather the whole

of one's life is a kind of experiment which will contribute
its share to the total solution.

The answers can come only

if each of us assumes one position or the other and acts accordingly.

Suppose we assume that this is a moral universe

imposing obligations upon us and suppose that we act to fulfill them.

If we are right, the consequences of our actions

will serve to verify in part our belief.

Perhaps we shall see

the world, at least the small part of it affected by our acts,
visibly improved by our doing what we conceive to be our duty.
But even if the salutary effects of our good deeds are not
immediately apparent and our belief does not receive any positive verification during our lifetime, our faith may still be
partially verified in a negative way insofar as nothing in the
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·course of experience, as affected by our actions, will conflict
with our belief and force us to reverse it.
However, whatever the nature of the universe may be from
a moral point of view, our discovery of the truth in the matter
depends upon our assuming one position or the other and acting
upon it.

The verification of either alternative--the moral

character or the non-moral character of the
our believing in it in advance.

world-~depends

upon

If we are right, experience

will back us up; at least it will not force us to reverse our
position.
In a question as broad as this, of course, complete veri-

fication is not the work of one man.

Whether or not the uni-

verse in its overall character is moral cannot be empirically
known, according to James, until all races of men have contributed their actions to it.

Only the experience of the entire

human race can make the verification of either alternative.

In a question of this sort, every person must take a stand,
for· this question involves a forced option.
dle ground.

There is no mid-

To remain skeptical about the validity of moral

obligations is to act as though they were invalid.

In James's

words,
He who commands himself not to be credulous of God,
of duty, of freedom, of immortality, may again and
again be indistinguishable from him who dogmatically
denies them. Scepticism in moral matters is an active
ally of immorality. Who is not for is against. The
universe will have no neutrals in these questions.
In theory as in practice, dodge or hedge, or talk as
we like about a wise scepticism, we are really doing
volunteer military service for one side or the other. 29
2

9~., p. 109.
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In regard to the melioristic character· of the universe,
James held that the world is a pluralism of independent.powers
which by their activities can bring it to greater perfection
or reduce it to rubble.

But whatever good they succeed in

accomplishing will depend in large measure upon their antece-.
dent belief in each other.

A social organism can be a success

only if each member does his duty with a trust that the other
members will at the same time do theirs.

"Wherever a desired

result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent
persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the
precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. "30
In social action, in playing our parts in the social whole,

there is always risk involved.
may not do theirs.

And their actions or failures to act will

influence the.result.
may be wasted.

We may do our best, but others

If they do not cooperate, our efforts

According to James, we can take one of four

attitudes in regard to the other powers:
1.

We can follow the Intellectualist's advice, wait for

the evidence, and, while waiting, do nothing.
2.

We can mistrust the other powers and, sure that the

universe will fail, let it fail.

3.

We can trust them and, in any case, do our best in

spite of the.uncertainty of the
4.

30
p. 55.

outcome~

Finally, we can flounder, trusting them one day and

.
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mistrusting them the next.
According to James, "This 4th way is no systematic solution.

The 2d way spells faith in failure.

The 1st way may in

practice be indistinguishable from the 2d way.

The 3d way

seems the only wise way."3l
I f we do our best and the other powers do theirs, this

world will be perfected.

As James pointed out,

sition is not a statement of fact.
premise of a hypothetical syllogism.

th~s

propo-

But it is like the major
What is needed is a

premise of fact--the actual good will and the best efforts of
all the powers concerned.

If the premise of fact is supplied,

the perfected world will emerge as the logical conclusion.

But

the premise of fact will not be supplied unless, trusting that
our fellows will do their share of the work, we proceed to put
forth our best efforts.

If, believing in one another; we all

do our best, we shall create the direction of development; and,
James said, "only so can the making of a perfected world of
the pluralistic pattern ever take place."3 2
Thus faith is indeed a formative factor in the destiny of
the universe.

Insofar.as there is still work to be done in the

world, insofar as the character of the world's results may in
part depend upon our actions, and insofar as our actions depend
upon our beliefs, the shape or' the world depends upon our
indulging our faith-tendencies.

According to James, these

faith-tendencies are simply expressions of good will toward
31James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 230.
32 Ibid.
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certain forms of results.

They exert a powerful influence upon

man's thinking--in his attempts to answer the larger questions
of life as well as in his practical decisions.

These faith-

tendencies are very active psychological forces, which constantly outstrip evidence and lead men to conclusions which

are beyond the powers of sense and reason alone to corroborate.
As James pointed out, the logic of faith is not the logic of
reason.

James spoke of the stages through which the mind

passes in its ascent from a simple tendency to believe to a
full-blown conviction as the "faith-ladder."33

The steps in

the faith-ladder, i.e., the affirmations which the mind makes
in its ascent are as follows:
1. There is nothing absurd in a certain view of
the world being true, nothing self-contradictory;
2. It might have been true under certain conditions;
3. It ~al be true, even now;
4. It is fit to be true;
5. It ouglirto be true;
6. It must be true;
7. It sna!l be true, at any rate true for ~.34
These steps are not a chain of inferences, but, according to
James, they constitute "a slope of good-will on which in the
larger questions of life men habitually live."35
simple tendency

~o

But the

believe which impels us to climb the ladder

in the first place springs from the creative regions of the
heart--from the most secret recesses of our being where our
Willingnesse~

and unwillingnesses, our loves, desires,. hopes,

33~.' p. 224.
34 Ibid.
35~.
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and fears lie hidden.

The heart, said James in eulogistic

fashion, is our deepest organ of communication with the nature
of things.

He no doubt saw that genuine knowledge of anything

is more than a matter of purely intellectual or sensory apprehension, that it is a matter of sympathy as well--a matter of
love by which we somehow enter into the very interior of the
reality.

As Martin C. D'Arcy, S.J., has pointed out, "It

[knowledge] is galvanized and interpenetrated through and
through with love • • • • "36 James knew that the deepest knowledge that we can have of anything involves a kind of intuition
analogous to the ineffable knowledge which a lover has of his
beloved.

The heart, he said, is the source of all our outer

deeds and decisions.

And although we may not always be able

to defend our beliefs and actions with arguments that will
satisfy the scientist and the logician, the consonance of our
beliefs, or the objects of our beliefs, with our passional
nature is enough to make us cling to them and vouch for them
with our active lives.
The Intellectualists, however, discount the significance
of climbing the faith-ladder.

They claim that truth can best

be served only if we resist our faith-tendencies and believe
nothing for which we do not have conclusive evidence.

From

the Intellectualists' point of view, the heart has no place
in the determination of our beliefs.

The intellect alone,

responding to evidence, is the only legitimate determinant of

36 Martin c. D'Arcy, S.J., The Mind and Heart of Love,
Meridian Books (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1956), p. 311.

158

our convictions.

In thus forbidding us to climb the faith-

ladder, the Intellectualists, as we have seen, debar us from
ever attaining any truths which cannot be readily verified by
logic or experience.

What is more, they render inaccessible

all those truths which sense and reason could verify, if our
original belief in them was sufficient to prompt us to seek
the verification.

And, of course, the intellectualists put

forever out of reach all those truths which faith itself can
help to create, i.e., all those truths which can exist only
on the assumption that actions based on faith in a desired end
bring them about.
James believed that the Intellectualists' attitude is an
irrational one.

I, therefore, for one, cannot see my way to accepting
the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or wilfully agr~e
to keep my willing nature out of the game. 1 cannot do
so for this plain reason, that a rule of thinking which
would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain
kinds of truth if those kinds.of truth were really there,
would be an irrational rule. That for me is the long
and short of the formal logic of the situation, no matter what the kinds of truth might materially be.37
Although James succeeded in justifying a believing attitude in regard to any question for which there is not sufficient evidence to make a decision, his special concern was to
.
justify faith in religious matters. He felt that religion was
perhaps man's most important function and that defending religious belief might be his own uniquely religious act.

As we

have noted, he spoke of using faith to answer such questions
37James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals,
pp. 59-60.
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as "Is life worth living?"--"Is this a moral world?"--"Should
the definition of the world
istic ?"

be

optimistic, or at le.ast melior-

He showed how faith can answer all these questions

affirmatively and can contribute to the actualization of the
desired state of affairs.

But at bottom all of these questions

rest upon the religious question.

They lead us to the reli-

gious question, for we cannot confront them without confronting
it.

To give an unqualified affirmative answer to them, an en-

thusiastic affirmation without any reservations, one must believe in the affirmations of religion.
Whatever satisfaction may come in day to day living from
the struggle to overcome evil and to increment the good, if
there is no power which will somehow guarantee that the values
for which we fight will be eternally preserved, there is still
something left to be desired.

The effort to overcome evil and

to bring about good in the world may make life worth living
on a day to day basis; but without a God, it cannot make life
worth living_ in the long run.
If this were merely a human world without a God, it would,
according to James, still be a moral world.

It would still be

a world in which each man's needs and desires would function
as valid claims upon other men.

It would still be a world of

objective demands and obligations.

But without a God among the

claimants, the appeal to our moral nature would fall short of
its maximum stimulating power.

The claims of other men, unless

these men be persons with whom we are closely associated or to
whom we are bound by ties of love, are seldom enough to spur
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us on to heroic virtue or enthusiastic effort.

But the demands

of a Divine Claimant call forth the best that is in all of us.
"~very

sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity

for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have
religious faith."3 8 In a world without God, life, to be sure,
would still be "a genuinely ethical symphony";39 but, according
to James, it would be played "in the compass of a couple of
poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values" 40 would fail
to open up.

In regard to the question of

opti~ism

versus pessimism,

if there is no God, if the world's destiny is controlled by
the blind forces of matter, if the end of everything is the
dissolution of all that is good and beautiful (as the mechanical evolutionists say it is), then.the definition of the
universe cannot be an optimistic one.

It cannot even be meli-

oristic, because whatever improvements human actions may make
in the world will one day be reduced to nothing.

If there is

no God, the definition of the universe can only be pessimistic.

The faith that is needed to make· life really worth living
in the long run, to spark us into energetic and enthusiastic
moral action, to enable us to take an optimistic, or at least
a melioristic, view of the world must be a faith.that overarches all of these issues.

It must be a religious faith.

38 James, "'l'he Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,"
Essays on Faith and Morals, p. 213.
39Ibid., p. 212.
40 Ibid.
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J.D.d because religious faith is so needed, it is, in William
James's mind, justified.

CHAprER V
THE LIFE OF RELIGION: "MANKIND'S MOST
IMPoRTANT FUNCTION"l
Yilliam James held that the purpose of thought.and conviction is to specify, as well as partially to evoke, our active
response to the universe as we experience it.

Thought comes

to rest in belief; belief gives rise to action.

And what we

believe about the world determines the kind of activity by
which we respond to the impressions which it makes upon us.
"Beliefs, in short, are rules for action," wrote James in
agreement

wi~h

Charles Peirce, "and the whole function of

thinking is but one step in the production of active habits." 2
Though a man can react to the world in many

way~,

James felt

that the type of responses engendered by a man's belief in the
hypotheses of religion are more fruitful and salutary to himself and to the world at large than any other.

Nothing fulfills

the task of making life·worth living quite as well as religious
·conviction does.

Our purpose in this chapter will be to examine in detail
the religious response to the universe.

After briefly compar-

ing this response in a general way with other possible modes
1 Letter from James to F. R. Morse, Letters of Yilliam James,
II, 12?.
2 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 339.
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of reacting to the world, we shall give special consideration
to the nature of religious belief itself, its causes, and its
effects upon the life of the individual believer as well as
upon the world as a whole.

We shall not examine doctrines

which are peculiar to any given cult, but will confine our
attention to that general vision of reality which appears to
be common to all religions.

The question of the truth of

this religious vision, however, will be left for in depth discussion in Chapter VI.
The universe presents itself to most men at one time or
another as a place of pain.

There may be some 'congenitally'

happy individuals by whom the evils of the world pass unnoticed.3

But few men of sensitivity and perception can over-

look the presence of evil in the world.

Moreoever, every man

must decide for himself how he will respond to this world with
its evils.

After tasting the sorrows of life, he may decide

that life in this world is not worth living and try to escape
from it by committing suicide as many men have done. 4 The sui. cide of the man who feels that life is not worth living, however, is a negative response as far as this world is concerned.
3"Inmany persons," James said, "happiness is congenital
and irreclaimable." (The Varieties of Religious Experience, p.
?7.) "With many men,"· he wrot~, "the question of life's worth
is answered by a temperamental optimism which makes them incapable of believing that anything seriously evil can exist."
("Is Life Worth Living?," ~ssays on Faith and Morals, p. 2.)
411 That life is not worth living the whole army of sui-

cides declare,--an army whose roll-call, like the famous evening
gun of the British army, follows the sun round the world and
never terminates." (James, "Is Life Worth Living?," Essays on
Faith and Morals, p. 6.)

164

It provides no real remedy for the evils of life.

In fact the

act of suicide only adds to the evidence that the world is a
dark and forboding place.
If you surrender to the nightmare view and crown the
evil edifice by your own suicide, you have indeed made
a picture totally black. Pessimism, completed by your
act, is true beyond a doubt, so far as your world goes.
Your mistrust of life has removed whatever worth ~our
own enduring existence might have given it • • • • 5
From a pragmatic point of view, then, suicide in itself accomplishes nothing positive in the fight against evil6 and amounts
to forfeiting the chance of winning whatever goods might come
as a result of staying around to brave the struggle.
The man who chooses to remain in the world, however, must
somehow face the ills and misfortunes of life and overcome
them if he can.
chief concern.
happiness, is in

The search for happiness is likely to be his
"How to gain, how to keep, how to recover
f~ct

for .most men at· all times the secret

motive of all they do, and of all they are willing to endure."?
But the search for human happiness for oneself and for others
involves the effort to alleviate pain and suffering--to find
some remedy for the evils which afflict mankind.
One form of .suffering which seriously interferes with
human happiness is the sense of division which most men
5~.

t

p. 29.

· 6 It is possible, of course, that one person's suicide may
call the attention of other people to evils prevalent in the
community or in the world and prompt these people to try to
alleviate the evils. However, the act of suicide itself is
not a remedy for them.
?James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. ?6.
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experience within themselves at one time or another during
their lives--the experienced inner struggle between conflicting tendencies.

This discordancy may vary "from something so

slight as to result in a merely odd or whimsical inconsisten-

cy, to a discordancy of which the consequences may be inconvenient in the extreme."8 A small degree of inconsistency
may be relatively harmless.
This amount of inconsistency will only count as
amiable weakness; but a stronger degree of heterogeneity may make havoc of the subject's life. There are
persons whose existence is little more than a series
of zigzags, as now one tendency and now another gets
the upper hand. Their spirit wars with their flesh,
they wish for incompatibles, wayward impulses interrupt their most deliberate plans, and their lives are
one long drama of repentanQe and of effort to repair
misdemeanors and mistakes.~
A man becomes aware of his inner division in his relations
with the world that he encounters in experience.

Actively

respond to this world he must; but he sometimes experiences
simultaneous tendencies to respond to it in opposite ways.
And in choosing one response, he knows that he must lose, at
least for a

~ime,

the advantage attached to the other.

The

internal struggle itself is painful and the pain is increased
by the anticipated loss of some wished-for good.

Such discor-

dancy often makes a man hesitant and indecisive in his response
to the universe.

It results in delayed action.

In some cases,

it results in the failure to act at all and the consequent loss
of whatever good, private or public, prompt resolute action
8 Ibid., p. 141.

9Ibid., p. 142.
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]11.ight have accomplished.
The divided man is an unhappy man, not only because internal conflict is itself painful and because much good can
be lost as a result of his indecision and failure to act, but
alSO because such internal division seems to intensify those
sufferings which are foisted upon him by the external world.

Our externally inflicted wounds are more difficult to bear
insofar as we are internally torn asunder by simultaneous
tendencies to respond to them in opposite ways.

For instance,

a man injures us and we are torn between the magnanimous tendency to forgive him and the selfish inclination to take revenge.
The pain of internal torment is thus added to the externally
caused sorrow.

To take another example, society itself is in

turmoil and we as individuals, as well as the community as a
whole, suffer from it.

How do we respond?

the selfish tendency to look out

fo~

We are torn between

our own

to

in~erests,

lessen our own sufferings while letting our neighbors take
care of themselves, and the expansive desire to help the community at large even though in so doing we may not fare quite
so well as far as our own private interests are concerned.
Not only is the externally

ca~sed

suffering

aggravat~d

by the

internal conflict but the somewhat paralyzing indecision which
accompanies the conflict often renders our efforts to overcome
the evils that afflict us and our neighbors ineffective.

If

we had perfect control over ourselves, we could more easily
cope with the enemy without.
It seems, then, that if we reject suicide and elect to

16?
stay here and fight, a prerequisite to overcoming the evils
in the external universe is the unification of our own personalities.

Psychologists tell us that some persons

are born with an inner constitution which is harmonious and well balanced from the outset. Their impulses
are consistent with one another, their will follows
without trouble the guidance of their intellect, their
passions are not excessive, and their lives are little
haunted by regrets.10
'

But most of us are not so fortunate.

Not constituted by nature

with such an abnormally harmonious personality, most of us
must struggle to overcome the division witllin ourselves so that
we can focus all of our efforts upon the task of meeting the
world as whole men.
Now in all of us, however constituted, but to a
degree the greater in proportion as we are intense and
sensitive and subject ~o diversified temptations, and
to the greatest possible degree if we are decidedly
psychopathic, does the normal evolution of character
chiefly consist in the straightening out and unifying
of the inner self. The higher and the lower feelings,
the use1·u1 and the erring impu:;t.ses, begin by being a
comparative chaos within us--they must end by forming
a stable system of functions in right subordination.Il
Divisions within a man are usually the result of his
being attracted by incompatible goals, i.e. by goals which
cannot be realized simultaneously because of the limitations
of time and space.

An individual :z::i.ormally has many purposes

and ends which, together with
take turns in occupying

~he

ideas associated with them,

the center of his attention; but when

these goals are incompatible with each other and when the
Person's interest shifts rapidly from one to another, he can
lOlbid., p. 141.
111bid., p. 143.
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be said to have a divided personality.

A man may be said to

be divided also, but in a somewhat lesser sense, when one group
o! goals occupies the center of his interest and is the main
principle of his activities while another group of goals, that
cannot be realized at the same time as the first group, occupies the periphery·of his consciousness as mere pious wishes.12
A less complete way in which the self may be divided
is the simultaneous coexistence of two or more different
groups of aims, of which one practically holds the right
of way and instigates activity, whilst the others are
only pious wishes, and never practically come to anything. Saint Augustine's aspirations to a purer life
• • • were for a while an example. Another would be
the President in his full pride of office, wondering
whether it were not all vanity, and whether the life
of a woodchopper were not the wholesomer destiny. Such
fleeting aspirations are mere velleitates, whimsies.
They exist on the remoter outskirts of the mind, and
the real self of the man, the centre of his ene~gies,
is occupied with an entirely different system.L?
James pointed out that as life goes on, there may be a
more or less constant change of our interests and "a consequent
change of place in our systems of ideas, from more central to
more peripheral, and from more peripheral to more central
parts of consciousness. 11 14

James explains such changes as

follows:
What brings such changes about is the way in which
emotional excitement alters. Things hot and vital to
us today are cold to-morrow. It is as if seen from the
12James apparently presumed that words like 'goal' and
'end' were so well understood that they would present no problems for his readers. At any rate, he did not attempt to
explicate them philosophically in his writings; rather he left
this task for his fellow pragmatist, John Dewey.
13James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 160-61.
14Ibid., p. 161.
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hot parts of the field [of consciousness] that the
other parts appear to us, and from these hot parts
personal desire and volition make their sallies. They
are in short the centres of our dynamic energy, whereas
the cold parts leave us indifferent and passive in proportion to their coldness.15
James said that when there is great fluctuation .in a man's
emotional interest, the man is divided more or less seriously.
Now there may be great oscillation in the emotional
interest, and the hot places [in the field of one's
consciousness] may shift before one almost as rapidly
as the sparks that run through burnt-up paper. Then we
have the wavering and divided self • • • • 16
Such a divided self will become unified, however, if the "focus
of excitement and heat 111 7 comes to lie permanently within a
certain system of ideas.

The unified self is one whose interest

is more or less permanently centered on one group of related
goals and the ideas associated with them and who is not peripherally distracted by ideas opposed to them.

James called the

group of aims and ideas to which a man devotes himself and
from which he works "the habitual centre of his personal enerThe life of the unified self is more or less perma-

,g;r.1118

nently dominated by this one system of goals; and all of his
activities, if not directly conducive to their attainment, are
at least not detrimental to it.

All events are judged in the

light of their relation to this vital center of interest.

All

decisions are made, all problems solved, with these ends in
l5Ibid.
16

~., p. 162.

l7Ibid.
18

Ibid.

.i

l?O
view; if these aims are not always in the foreground of a
xnan's thinking, they are at least exerting their influence in
the background insofar as they form the habitual focal point
!i

of bis energies.

ij

The system of aims and ideas which comes to occupy the

ii'

j

J

,

i,I

center of a man's interest and to govern his active life may
be religious, non-religious or even irreligious.

A man's life

can be ruled by religious ideals, by ambition, by revenge, by

,11'',

'I

71!

::1'

.(:
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cupidity, by patriotism, by love for mankind, or by any number of other interests, good or bad.

In James's words:

• • • to find religion is only one out of many ways of
reaching unity; and the process of remedying inner incompleteness and reducing inner discord is a general
psychological process, which may take place with any
sort of mental material, and need not necessarily assume the religious form • • • • For example, the new
birth may be away from religion into incredulity; or it
may be from moral scrupulosity into freedom and license;
or it may be produced QY the irruption into the individual's life pf some new stimulus or passion, such as
love, ambition, cupidity, revenge, or patriotic devotion.
In all these instances we have precisely the same psychological form of event,--a firmness, stability, and
equilibrium succeeding a period of storm and stress
and inconsistency.19
Whatever the principle of unification, the unification,
once achieved, brings with it a characteristic type of relief
insofar as the internal strife is ended, even though other
evils yet remain to be faced.

James felt, however, that the

kind of unification which brings with it the greatest peace and
produces the most lasting and most salutary effects is that of
religious conversion as a result of which religious ideas,

19Ibid., pp. 146-47.

,;11,
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previously peripheral in a man's consciousness, take a central
place and "religious aims form the habitual centre of his
energy. 1120 Unification under the banner of self-gratification
and immorality only results in disintegration again; for the

desire ror pleasure always wars with the necessity for resignation to those sufferings which are unavoidable in human life.
And this disintegration which is inevitable in a life abandoned
to self-indulgence renders a man's efforts to cope with the
external world haphazard and ineffectual.

Thus it is only when

the self is unified (whether for religious or merely moral
reasons). in the service of that which is good--good not merely
for oneself but also for others--that self-unification can be
permanent and can enable one to engage in the battle against
pain and suffering with any hope of success.
Eliminating

s~icide,

then, as a negative response and

immorality as a response which is both unproductive and harmful, we are left with morality and religion as the only two·
ways of reacting to the universe which can offer us any hope
of a fruitful and relatively happy existence.
ity and

religio~,

Although moral-

as ways of responding to the world, are not

totally unlike, their differences are striking.

They have this

in common, of course, that the moral man and the religious man
are less

co~cerned

with their own private interests than they

are with the good of others and the well-being of the world as
a whole.

In speaking of morality, James wrote, "A life is

20 Ibid., p. 162.
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manly, stoical, moral, or philosophical, we say, in proportion as it is less swayed by paltry personal considerations
and more by objective ends that call for energy, even though
that energy bring personal loss and pain. 1121 The religious
man, too, manifests a deep concern for the welfare of others.
As James pointed out, a man reaches the height of religious
perfection in saintliness, one of the features of which is a
"shifting of the emotional centre towards loving and harmonious affections, towards 'yes, yes,' and away from 'no,' where
the claims of the non-ego are concerned." 22
In comparing and contrasting the moral and the religious
types of personality, James indicated that both the moral man
and the religious man accept the world with its evils as well
as their responsibilities to it.

They both shoulder their bur-

dens and undertake to perform their duties, however difficult,
without complaining.

And yet the

s~irit

with which the one

responds to the world is vastly different from the spirit of
the other.
Morality pure and simple accepts the law of the whole
which it finds reigning, so far as to acknowledge and
obey it, but it may obey it with the heaviest and
coldest heart, and never cease to feel it as a yoke.
But for religion, in its strong and fully developed
manifestations, the servic·e of the highest never is
felt as a yoke. Dull submission is left far behind,
and a mood of welcome, which may fill any place on
the scale between cheerful serenity and enthusiastic
gladness, has taken its place.23

21~., p. 52.
22~., p. 217.

23~., p. 49.
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The moral man enlists in the service of the good despite
the dangers to himself; he does not shrink from his task.
There is in the moralistic personality a kind of stoical resignation in the face of suffering and a courageous determination
to continue the fight against evil in spite of personal loss
and pain.

James had great respect for the moral man and

described the moral response to the universe in glowing terms:
And for morality life is a war, and the service of the
highest is a sort of cosmic patriotism which also
calls for volunteers. Even a sick man, unable to be
militant outwardly, can carry on the moral warfare.
He can willfully turn his attention away from his own
future, whether in this world or tne next. He can
train himself to indifference to his present drawbacks and immerse himself in whatever objective interests still remain accessible. He can follow public
news, and sympathize with other people's affairs. ·
He can cultivate cheerful manners, and be silent about
his miseries. He can contemplate whatever ideal aspects of existence his philosophy is able to present
to him, and practice whatever duties, such as patience,
resignation, trust, his ethical system requires. Such
a man lives on his loftiest, largest plane. He is a
high-hearted freeman and no pining slave.24
The religious man, like the moral man, also engages in
the struggle against evil and the service of the good without
regard for personal risks, but his attitude toward the surferings that befall him is ·not one of stoical resignation.

Rather

the attitude of the deeply religious man toward suffering .is
one of enthusiastic espousal; he is even known to.rejoice in
suffering as a form of sacrifice to God.
The differences in the attitudes of the moral man and the
religious man toward life can no douot be traced to the different
24Ib.d

--2:_·' p.

52.
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.,,ays in which the two men experience the world and themselves.
Both the moral man and the religious man experience the world
as a place of joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, good and evil.
As James wrote to Tom Ward, "• •• the fact remains empirically
certain • • • --that men suffer and enjoy. 112 5 And the experiences of both the moral man and the religious man testify to
the fact that the suffering and enjoyment of individuals depend

not only upon those individuals' own actions but upon the actions of other men as well.

Both the moral man and the reli-

; I

:·,I

gious man are empirically aware that their actions can affect
the lives of other men for better or worse.

And both assume

the responsibility of affecting them for the better.

The

moral man and the religious man alike, aware that they can
lessen the pain of others and increase their joy by effective
action, undertake the task of fighting evil and promoting good.
But the experienced world in which the religious man performs
his task has a spiritual dimension of which the moral man is
not aware.

The religious man senses that his world is but a

part of a wider, more spiritual world.

He has a conviction,
"not merely intellectual, but as it were sensible, 1126 of the

existence of a higher, more spiritual power with whom he is in
touch.

And it is also his experience that he receives help

from this higher power as a result of prayer and sacrifice.
Thus, in somewhat mythical fashion, he sees the fight with
2 5Letters of William James, I, 130.
26 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 216.

'
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evil, not as his own private battle, but as a joint venture in
which he and God cooperate in the achievement of ideals which
somehow have everlasting value.

For the religious man, the

good life is not merely a matter of fighting evil and promoting
good.

It is that, of course, as it is for the moralist.

But

for the religious man, it is at the same time the service of
"the deepest power in the universe 1127--a power who holds dear
the things which man holds dear, "the things themselves being
all good and righteous things 1128--a power who is friendly to
man and upon whose help and protection he can rely.

The reli-

gious man feels that his true destiny lies in trustful selfsurrender to God's will and in loving cooperation with the
Divine purposes.

"To co-operate with his [God's] creation by

the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us.

In

such co-opera ti on with his .purposes, • • • must lie the real
meaning of our destiny. 112 9
The vision of the moral man, on the other hand, is

con~

fined to this world; he does not experience himself or· his
world as having any relation to a higher unseen order.

He is

not aware of his fight against evil as having significance in
any world beyond this world of his day to day experience.

Nor

is he aware of the existence of any higher spiritual power who
is friendly to him and from whom he receives help in performing
2 7James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and
Morals, p. 122.
28 Ibid.
2 9Ibid., p. 141.

~s

'

task.

He is not conscious

or

receiving any

or

the

sup::~

natural assistance upon which the religious man c·ounts.

From

the point of view of his own conscious experience, then, the
moral man fights his battle alone (except for whatever help
other men may provide).

Because of this fact, the moral man's

response to the world with its strange mixture of good and
evil requires great volitional effort.

And as long as he can

maintain this effort, the moralist will indeed be a match for
the universe.

However, as James pointed out, there are times

in the life of almost everyone when this effort cannot be sustained.

Strenuous moral effort becomes increasingly more

difficult in times of illness, in old age, and in the face ~f
approaching death.

There are occasions when it becomes·vir-

tually impossible to maintain the moral attitude.

At such

times the insufficiency of morality becomes apparent •. In
James ' s words :
The moralist must hold his breath and keep his muscles
tense; and so long as this athletic attitude is possible all goes well--morality suffices. But the athletic
attitude tends ever to break down, and it inevitably
does break down even in the most stalwart when the
organism begins to decay, or when morbid fears invade
the mind. To suggest personal will and effort to one
all sicklied o'er with the sense of irremediable impotence is to suggest the most impossible of things.
What he craves is to be consoled in his very powerlessness, to feel that the spirit of the universe recognizes and secures him, all decaying and failing as he
is. Well, we are all such helpless failures in the
last resort. The sanest and best of us are of one clay
with lunatics and prison inmates, and death finally
runs the robustest of us down. And whenever we feel
this, such a sense of the vanity and provisionality of
our voluntary career comes over us that all our morality appears but as a plaster hiding a sore it can never

,j'

l??
cure, and all our well-doing as the hollowest substitute for that well-being that our lives ought to be
grounded in, but, alas! are not.30
That sense of well-being which James says "our lives ought
to be grounded in" can be had only in religion; :for it is only
the loving and sacrificial spirit o:f religion that can make a
man :find joy in suffering and peace and security in the face
of the :failure, tragedy, and death which are so much a part o:f
the human situation.
And here religion comes to our rescue and takes our
:fate into her hands. There is a state o:f mind, known
to religious men, but to no others, in which the will
to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as
nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God. In this
state of mind, what we most dreaded has become the
habi ta ti on of our safety, and the hour of our mora·1
death has turned into our spiritual birthday. The time
for tension in our soul is over, and that of happy
relaxation, of calm deep breathing, of an eternal present, with no discordant future to be anxious about,
has arrived. Fear is not held in abeyance as it is
by mere morality, it is positively expunged and washed
away.31
Thus morality alone can enable a man to get through life
only up to a point.

It can enable him to do what is necessary
i'i'

1

in a manly dignified and even admirable way; it even adds zest

1,,,1

11,111

'11

to li:fe--the zest that·accompanies victory when one conquers

1111!
1

l1

an evil, the satisfaction that comes with the achievement of
some desired good.

Morality can indeed make life worth living

on a day to day basis.

But all of man's best efforts terminate

in death, and whatever joys and satisfactions he may have in
this life are always marred by the threat of impending loss.
30James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 53.
31 rbid.

,I

i

, ,

178

I! one's attitude toward life is merely moralistic, if one

does not see himself and his world as part of a larger more
spiritual order, if one sees reality entirely from a materialistic point of view, i.e., as inevitably subject to dissolution, then he must expect that whatever good he accomplishes,
whatever ideal values he may realize, will not survive this
life any more than he will.

Thus will his victories always be

tinged with bitterness.
It was James's opinion that in order for life to be worth
living in the long run--not merely on a day to day basis--a man
needs more than simple morality, i.e., more than morality
unrelated to religion.

A man needs to feel that his ideals

and values will be cared for long after he has ceased to be
able to fight for them; he needs an everlasting moral order in
which his values will be forever preserved.

"This need of an

eternal moral order," James wrote, "is one of the deepest
needs of our breast. 11 32 And, James said, the "notion of God,
• • • however inferior it may be in clearness to those·mathe-

I.

matical notions so current in mechanical philosophy, has at
least this practical superiority over them, that it guarantees
an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved."33

In

order for man to enjoy the fullest measure of that well-being
which James believed man ought to have, man needs to believe
32 James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of
Truth, p. 77.
3 3Ibid.

-
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that there is a God who cares for, and will continue to care
for, him and the things he loves--a God who will guarantee that
goodness and righteousness and beauty will survive permanently
and will not decay along with the material universe.

"A world

with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or
freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old
ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that,
where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and ship4
wreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. 11 3
It is the conviction that the world is in the hands of
God and that, because of Him, all will be well in the long
run, no matter how difficult things may seem here and now,
that makes religious men feel that life is worth living in an
unqualified sense.
suffer any fewer

The religious man does not necessarily

misfortune~

than the non-religious man.

His

troubles, sorrows, and afflictions may be as numerous and, in
some cases, even more numerous than those of the non-religious
man.

I

But the conviction that the whole world is in friendly

divine hands35 makes him better able to support the trials and
tribulations of life than the man without religious faith and
enables him to function productively and happily in spite of
life's hardships.

The religious man's belief that the whole

34Ibid.
35"Most religious men believe (or ,·know,' if they be mystical) that not only they themselves, but the whole universe
of beings to whom God is present, are secure in his parental
hands. There is a sense, a dimension, they are sure, in which
we are all saved, in spite of the gates of hell and all adverse
terrestrial appearances." (James, The Varieties of Religious
~perience, p. 390.)
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world, himself included, is in the care of a superior benevolent power elicits from him "a willing self-surrender to its
control."3 6 And it is this surrender, which is truly a selfunification in the sense that all personal desires and concerns are subordinated to, indeed abandoned to, the will of
God, that especially distinguishes the religious man from the
merely moral man.

"This abandonment of self-responsibility

seems to be the fundamental act in specifically religious, as
distinguished from moral practice."37
In this self-surrender the religious man finds happiness
and joy even in the face of outward misfortune; indeed he
finds a kind of happiness and joy which no merely moral effort
seems able to produce.

Religion "adds to life an enchantment

which is not rationally or logically deducible from anything
else. 11 38 It is true "that the moral person shoulders his responsibilities and per±·orms his duties manfully and without
complaint; it is true that he endures pain and suffering with
courage and .resignation.

But the religious man, the saintly

man in particular, meets his responsibilities with happy enthusiasm and embraces suffering with joy.
If religion is to mean anything definite for us, it
seems to me that we ought to take it as meaning this
added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper
of espousal, in regions where morality strictly so
called can at best but bow its head and acquiesce •• • •

36 Ibid., p. 217.
37Ibid., p. 229.

38 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
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This sort of happiness in the absolute and everlasting is what we find nowhere but in religion.39
James saw the religious life not only as happier than the
moral life; he saw religion also as necessary for the general
well-being of the individual and indispensable for the welfare
of the world as a whole.

In order to understand James's

position in this regard, it behooves us to consider in somewhat greater detail what, in his view, the religious response
to the world actually entails.
James defined religion in The Varieties of Religious Exper-.
ience as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand
in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. 1140 He
pointed out, however, that there are cults which are considered
religious but which do not seem to worship a concrete personal
Deity--cults similar to the·Ema:'Sonian transcendentalism of his
own day, for example.

"Not a deity in concreto, not a super-

human person, but the immanent divinity in things, the essentially spiritual structure of the universe, is the object of
the transcendentalist cult. 1141 Because of this fact, James,
in defining religion, was careful to interpret the term 'the
divine' somewhat broadly.

For the purposes of his description

of religious phenomena, he defined the divine as whatever a man
considered to be the most primal and most enveloping
39Ibid., p. 54.
4 0ibid.,
p. 42.
41Ib"d

__3:_·'

p. 43.
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but "only such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled

to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor
42
a jest."
James recognized the difficulty involved in trying to draw
sharp lines of distinction in the area of religious phenomena.
As he pointed out,
solemnity, and gravity, and all such emotional attributes, admit of various shades; and, do what we will
with our defining, the truth must at last be confronted
that we are dealing with a field of experience where
there is not a single conception that can be sharply
drawn • • • • Things are more or less divine, states of
mind are more or less religious • • • ·.43
Realizing that where the religious state of mind is only weakly
manifested, there may be some question about its being religious at all, James chose to concern himself in The Varieties
of Religious Experience only with those phenomena which are
unquestionably religious.

Accordingly, the examples which he

gave us of religious individuals are largely persons in whom
the religious characteristics are marked and often exaggerated.
"The only cases likely to be profitable enough to repay our
attention," he wrote, "will therefore be cases where the religious spirit is unmistakable and extreme. 1144
As James's definition of religion implies, religion involves a vision of reality and a way of life consonant with
that vision.
42

James said that the religious man, whatever the

Ibid., p. 47.

4 3Ibid.

-

44 Ibid., p. 48.
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specifics of his individual creed may be, sees the visible

world as "part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws
4
its chief significance • • • • " 5 The meaning of the term
•spiritual' in this passage needs some clarification.

Although

James used the term 'spirit' differently in different texts,
the word seems to have a fundamental meaning to which his
various uses can be related in one way or another.

Basically

James used the term to distinguish the mental aspects of reality
from the non-mental or material aspects of it.

He used the

term 'spiritual' rather broadly, for example, to refer to the
mental aspect of experience, i.e., to that aspect of experience which can be called mind or consciousness--not, however,
to mind or consciousness considered merely as knowing but
to mind considered also as willing.

Thus the spiritual aspects

of reality.are the mental and moral aspects of experience.
When James wrote that the religious .man sees the visible world
as part of a more spiritual universe, he meant that for the
religious man, the actual universe is one in which mind or
consciousness exerts much more influence and control over things
than it appears to exert in the immediately visible world.
the religious man, the world is ruled, not by blind physiochemical forces but by mind and will, or specifically by
mental and moral powers superior to man's.

(Although cults

similar to the transcendentalism mentioned above 46 do not
4-5Ibid., p. 47.
46see above, p. 181.
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worship any superhuman consciousness, for the most part, James
confined his discussion in The Varieties of Religious E?Cperience
to the phenomena of more traditional religion.)

The world of

the typically religious man is thus a spiritual world--a
world in which some kind of superhuman consciousness; friendly
to man, is in control of things and has the last word.

The

religious man sees union with this higher spiritual power as
man's true end and communion with it as bringing him salvation
and happiness.
One might wonder what it is that leads a man to see reality in this way.

James believed that in most cases it is a

man's feelings of weakness, wrongness, and need that bring him
to this view of life.

In James's opinion, religious belief is

grounded in feelings of this kind, particularly in a sense of
uneasiness·, which, "reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense
that there is something wrong about us as we natura1)Jr stand. 1147
This uneasiness may be only a vague sense of disquietude--a
kind of nameless fear.

It may be a feeling of helplessness

in the face of suffering and pain; or it may be a sense of the
hollowness and "vanity.of mortal things. 1148

In more mentally

developed persons, James said, the feeling of uneasiness is the
feeling that there is something morally wrong about them--something morally wrong from which.they need to be. saved.

"In

those more developed minds which alone we are studying, the
4

7James, The Varieties of Religious .Experience, p. 383.

48 Ibid., p. 136.
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wrongness takes a moral character, and the salvation takes a
.
1 t'1nge. 1149
myst1ca

By moral wrongness, James apparently meant a wrongness
about our active lives.

I
I

This wrongness may or may not involve

a conscious failure to fulfill moral obligations.

The feeling

that there is something morally wrong about one may or may not
be a sense of sin.

For example, with no feeling of guilt, one

may simply feel an inability actively to cope with the problems
of life--an inability to make decisions perhaps or an inability to carry out decisions once made.

With no sense of sin,

he may experience a sense of failure--perhaps only the failure
to achieve the goals which he has set up for himself.

In some

cases, however, the feeling of wrongness may be the feeling
that there is something wrong about the human situation in general.

It may be a.sense of futility 1n relation to all human

goals and pursuits.

The inevitability of death, for instance,

may make all human life and activity devoid of meaning.

James

gave us a fine example of this latter kind of uneasiness in
the experience of Tolstoy.

I

"I felt," wrote Tolstoy, "that

something had broken within me on which my life had always
rested, that I had nothing left to hold on to, and that morally
my life had stopped."50

Again James quoted Tolstoy:

ttWhat-will be the outcome of what I do to-day? Of what
I shall do to-morrow? What will be the outcome of all
49 Ibid., p. 383.
50James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 130,
quoting Tolstoy, l'1y Confession.
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my life?

Why should I live? Why should I do anything?
Is there in life any purpose which the inevitable death
which awaits me does not undo and destroy? 11 51

"Tolstoy's preoccupations were largely objective," James said,
"for the purpose and meaning of life in general was what so
1152
.
trouble d h im. • • •

In many another individual cited by James., however, the
experienced moral wrongness was of a much more personal character and did involve an acute feeling of guilt or sense of sin.
such was the experience of John Bunyan as recorded in his
autobiography, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners, and
quoted by James as follows:
"But my original and inward pollution, that was
my plague and my affliction. By reason of that, I was
more loathsome in my own eyes than was a toad; and I
thought I was so in God's eyes too. Sin and corruption, I said, would as naturally bubble out of my heart
as water would bubble out of a fountain. 11 53
James did not .elaborate in any of his writings upon the
nature of the moral wrongness known as sin.

In a very general

way, of course, moral wrongness of this type can be described
as an unwholesome condition of one's personal self.

However,

it is clear that, for James, this unhealthy condition of the
self, more often·than not, implies unacceptable relations with
other persons.

The predominantly social aspect of ethics in

James's philosophy may not be obvious in The Varieties of Religious Experience, although it is frequently suggested there;

51 Ibid., p. 131.
52 ibid.' p. 133.
53 1bid.. , p. 134.
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but it is clearly indicated in James's essay, "The Moral Phil.

osopher and the Moral Life."

.

The essay stresses the fact that

ethical obligations are rooted in the demands and claims made
by conscious beings upon one another.

Morality, for James,

is primarily a social affair; and while it may surely involve
satisfying a man's own personal needs and desires, it requires
that in satisfying them, he consider

~he

desires and claims

of other persons (one or whom may well be divine) and that he
always aim at a state of affairs in which the greatest number
of goods (i.e., satisfied demands) are realized at the least
cost.54 From James's point of view, it is a man's failure,
real or fancied, to meet this requirement that usually gives
rise to his uneasy feeling that there is something morally
wrong with him in the sense that there is about him a sinfulness from·which he needs to. be delivered.
Whatever the kind of wrongness with which men feel themselves afflicted, however, it is as the means of deliverance

I
I
,

l

from this wrongness, as the remedy for their uneasines$, that
religion most frequently offers itself to them.

Religion prom-

ises men salvation--salvation for themselves and for the world
--if, by prayer and self-surrender, they make the proper connection with higher, more spiritual powers operative in the
universe.

Thus, James said, all religion (with a few excep-

tions) involves an 'uneasiness' and 'a solution'--an uneasiness
in the sense of a consciousness of evil, a consciousness of

54see above, p. 56.
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being in need--a solution in the sense that man is aware of
deliverance, salvation, or redemption coming as a result of
communion with powers higher than himself.
James wro t e,

n·is

"The solution,"

a sense tha t we are save d f rom the wrongness

by making proper connection with the higher powers."55
Before we proceed further, however, it must be pointed out
that there are some religious people for whom religion is not
at all a matter of redemption from a state of being wrong.
These are the healthy-minded people with an habitually optimistic view of life as opposed to those morbid-minded people,
described above, who have such an acute sense of evil in their
own lives and in the world that only a supernatural power can
cure them.56 Although the more common religious experience is
that of morbid-minded persons, our consideration of religious
belief would be incomplete if we did not include a description

of the religion of healthy-mindedness.

Accordingly, before

examining the experience of salvation and deliverance which
characterizes the religious life of morbid-minded individuals,
we will digress and briefly consider the healthy-minded personality and some of the characteristics of healthy-minded religion.
Healthy-minded people are optimistic people.

Their

55James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 383.
56 The difference between healthy-minded and morbid-minded
temperaments should not be understood as the difference between
non-pathological and pathological mentalities. For, as a matter of fact, both types of temperament can be either non-pathological or pathological.

.
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attention is habitually focused upon what is good in this world;
and if they are not altogether unaware of evil, they either
ignore it, deny its reality, or refuse to give it any significance in their reflections upon life.

James distinguished

between two types of healthy-mindedness--an involuntary type
and a voluntary type.

"If, then, we give the name of healthy-.

mindedness to the tendency which looks on all things and sees
that they are good, we find that we must distinguish between
a more involuntary and a more voluntary or systematic way of
being healthy-minded."57

Involuntary healthy-mindedness is a
"way of feeling happy about things immediately. 11 58 People of

this temperament are spontaneously happy; they either do not
see the evil in the world at all or the goodi appears so obviously and overwhelmingly abundant that evil seems quite insignificant to them.

Their optimistic attitude is not one that is

consciously cultivated but is the result of a natural temperamental bias.

A person of this type has "a itemperament organic-

ally weighted on the side of cheer and fataJlly forbidden to
linger, as those of opposite temperament linger, over the darker
aspects of the universe."59

Unlike the morbid-minded person

who is more or less habitually pessimistic and who is "congenitally fated to suffer 1160 from the consciousness of evil, the
57James; The Varieties of Religious :Experience, p. 83.
58Ibid.

59 Ibid.' p. 79.
60

rbid., p. 116.
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spontaneously healthy-minded person is endowed with a "temperament which has a constitutional incapacity for prolonged suffering, and in which the tendency to see things optimistically is
like a water of crystallization in which the individual's char.
t 1161
acter is se •
Systematic healthy-mindedness, on the other hand, is a
i.

deliberately adopted mental attitude.

James described systema-

tic healthy-mindedness as "an abstract way of conceiving things
as good. 1162 And just as in every abstract way of conceiving
something, one aspect of the thing is considered essential to
it, at least at that time, while other aspects are ignored, so
too systematic "healthy-mindedness, conceiving good as the
essential and universal aspect of being, deliberately excludes
evil .from its field o.f vision. 1163 James pointed out that while
a systematically healthy-minded attitude is an unrealistic way
o.f looking at li.fe, experience points to its advantages.

It

is an empirical .fact, for example, that evils often lose much
of their painfulness for us if we deliberately face up to them
and try to bear them cheerfully.
Refuse to admit their badness; despise their power;
ignore their presence; turn your attention the other
way; and so far as you yourself are concerned at any
rate, though the facts may still exist, their evil
character exists no longer. Since you make them evil
or good by your own thoughts about them, it is the ruling of your thoughts which proves to be your principal
concern.64
61 rbid., p. i12.
62 Ibid., p. 83.
6 3rbid.
64 Ibid., p. 84.
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Moreover, experience shows that an optimistic view of things
iS not only salutary for us as individuals but makes life easier for those around us and thus commends itself to us on
altruistic grounds.
The attitude of unhappiness is not only painful, it is
mean and ugly. What can be more base and unworthy than
the pining, puling, mumping mood, no matter by what
outward ills it may have been engendered? What is
more injurious to others? What less helpful as a way
out of the difficulty. It but fastens and perpetuates
the trouble which occasioned it, and increases the
total evil of the situation. At all costs, then, we
ought to reduce the sway of that mood; we ought to
scout it in ourselves and others, and never show it
tolerance.65
Although healthy-minded people are not necessarily religious, among those who are, we can distinguish two types of
religious attitudes corresponding to the two types of healthymindedness described above.

Let us take as our first example

the religion of those spontaneously happy people who are possessed of an involuntarily healthy-minded temperament.

With

them, happiness is congenital; they do not seem to need salva-

I
I

tion or deliverance.

At least they do not feel any such need.

From the beginning of their conscious lives, they are possessed of an acute sense of the goodness of God and of all
that God has made and they rejoice in the divine goodness.
"It is to be hoped," James wrote, "that we all have some friend,
perhaps more often feminine than masculine, and young than old,
whose soul is of this sky-blue tint, whose affinities are
rather with flowers and birds and all enchanting innocencies
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than with dark human passions, who can think no ill of man or
God, and in whom religious gladness, being in possession from
the outset, needs no deliverance from any antecedent burden." 66
such is the religious outlook of persons endowed with a spontaneously healthy-minded temperament.
There is another religious attitude, however, which, while
optimistic, is not naturally and spontaneously so.

Rather its

optimism is a deliberately adopted posture; it involves the
systematic cultivation of healthy-mindedness.

Such consciously

adopted optimism can be found in varying degrees among the
members of many different religious sects.

There are some

religious movements, however, in which the deliberate cultivation of healthy-mindedness plays a relatively significant role.
In fact, there are some religious cults in which it is a central
theme.

'

Although James did not consider healthy-mindedness to be
an attitude typical of traditional Christianity, he did feel
that it was making significant inroads into the Christian
religion during-his time.
The advance of liberalism, so-called, in Christianity, during the past fifty years, may fairly be called
a victory of healthy-mindedness within the church over
the morbidness with which the old hell-fire theology
was more harmoniously related. We have now whole congregations whose preachers, far from magnifying our consciousness of sin, seem devoted rather to making little
of it. They ignore, or even deny, eternal punishment,
and insist on the dignity rather than on the depravity
of man. They look at the continual preoccupation of
the old-fashioned Christian with the salvation of his

66

\i~

Ibid., p.

77.
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soul as something sickly and reprehensible rather than
admirable; and a sanguine and 'muscular' attitude, which
to our forefathers would have seemed purely heathen,
has oecome in their eyes an ideal element of Christian
character.67
The significance of systematic healthy-mindedness as a religious attitude, however, can best be seen in a religious movement which was just getting under way in James's day, a religious movement which James variously designated as the 'Mindcure Movement' or the 'New Thought.'

Although the several

sects of the movement may differ from one another in various
ways, they all agree in their optimism.

James described the

'.New Thought' as "a delioerately optimistic scheme of life,
with both a speculative and a practical side. 1168

On

the specu-

lative side, the individual creeds of the disciples of the 'New
Thought' differ in particular details, but the common thread
running thl:-ough them all is the doctrine that the sub-conscious
part of man's higher nature is really one with God and that
since all is well with God, all is well with man.

"The spiri-

tual in man appears in the mind-cure philosophy as partly conscious, but chiefly subconscious; and.through the subconscious
part of it we are already one with the Divine without any
miracle of grace, or abrupt creation 01· a new inner man. 116 9
On the practical side, the 'Mind-Cure Movement• bids its followers to think and to act, in short to live, in the light of
their belief in the oneness of their life with the life of God.
6 7Ibid.' p.
85.
68
Ibid., p. 87.
69ill£.' p. 92.
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bids them to ignore evil and generally to turn their atten-

tion away from weakness, disease, pain, and suffering and to
think thoughts of strength, health, success and well-being.
It bids them keep in.mind that just as nothing can be wrong
with God, nothing can be wrong with them since their lives
are one with God's life.

As one 'Mind-Cure' disciple wrote

to William James, "• •• how can a conscious part of Deity
be sick?--since 'Greater is he that is with us than all that
can strive against us.'"70
"The leaders in this faith," James wrote, "have had an
intuitive belief in the all-saving power of healthy-minded
attitudes as such, in the conquering efficacy of courage, hope,
and trust, and a correlative contempt for doubt, fear, worry,
and all nervously precautionary states of mind. 11 7 1 Accordingly,
they try to foster in their disciples wholesome, optimistic
mental attitudes and have developed a system of mental hygiene
which "is wholly and exclusively compacted of optimism. 11 7 2

I
I

However

the various 'Mind-Cure' sects may differ from one

another, as indicated above, they generally agree in the doctrine that human life is one with the life of God and that
since all is well with God, all must be well with man.

Their

common attitude toward evil is to ignore it, to act as though
it were not there.
70ibid., p. 93.
7libid., p. 88.
72 Ibid., p. 97.

James felt that of all the 'Mind-Cure'
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religions, Christian Science is the most radical in its attitude toward evil.

"For it evil is simply a lie, and any one

who mentions it is a liar.

The optimistic ideal of duty for-

bids us to pay it the compliment even of explicit attention."?3
Although a good many people were attracted to 'Mind-Cure'
religion in James's day and still are, as the rosters of
Christian Science and similar sects testify, the saving religion which offers itself to morbid-minded persons as the means
of deliverance from their wrongness is much more prevalent.
While James pointed out that 'Mind-Cure' must be considered
a genuine religious power and devoted almost two complete lectures to a discussion of it in The Varieties of Religious Experience, he apparently considered the experiences of morbidminded individuals as much more typical of religious persons
than the experiences of the. healthy-minded.

For, once he com-

pleted his discussion of healthy-minded religion, he proceeded
to describe religious experience almost exclusively in terms
of the experience of the morbid-minded man.
James did not presume to judge the truth or falsity of
'Mind-Cure' religion.

In fact, he pointed out that for some

people it has verified itself, at least to the extent that
they have experienced improved health and increased happiness
after espousing it.

James did indicate, however, that 'Mind-

Cure' religion is less consonant with human experience than the
'saving' religion which attracts the morbid-minded, because
?3Ibid., p. 96.
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•Mind-Cure' religion tends to disregard a major aspect of
buman life--the experience of evil.

After all, evil is, in

some way, a part of every man's existence.

As James pointed

out, the healthiest and most prosperous life contains moments
of disappointment, illness, and danger; "take the happiest man,
the one most envied by the world, and in nine cases out of ten
bis inmost consciousness is one of failure."?4 In bidding man
to ignore evil, then, 'Mind-Cure' religion is advising him to
ignore, or at least to treat as unimportant, an inescapable
portion of human experience--a portion of ·human experience
which the greater number of men cannot so easily overlook.
To return to our discussion of the religion of salvation,
the kind of religion with which most of us are more familiar,
let us look more closely at the morbid-minded personality to
whom it appeals.

Morbid-minded people, whom James also called

'sick souls,' are people who, rather than closing their eyes
to evil or minimizing its importance as healthy-minded people

I
I

do, recognize evil as a significant aspect of hum.an life and
are, to a greater or less degree, disturbed by its presence.
James spoke of two levels of morbid-mindedness--a shallower level and a level more profound and formidable.

On a

>

superficial plane, there are individuals who recognize evil
as real but who do not see it as demanding any religious or
supernatural remedy.

They see evil as merely a maladjustment

between man and things, between man and his environment.

?4 ____!_·'
Ib'd
p. 119.

"Such
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evil as this is curable, in principle at least, upon the natural
plane, for merely by modifying either the self or· the things,
or both at once, the two terms may be made to fit, and all go
JllerI'Y as a marriage bell again."75

On a deeper level, however,

one finds individuals "for whom evil is no mere rel a ti·on of the
subject to particular outer things, but something more radical
and general, a wrongness or vice in his essential nature, which
no alteration of the environment, or any superficial rearrangeJ11ent of the inner self, can cure, and which requires a supernatural remedy. 11 76 Since it is to people at this deeper level
of morbid-mindedness that religion with its offer of salvation
is most appealing, we will, in the pages that follow, use the
terms 'sick soul' and 'morbid-minded' to refer only to people
who suffer from morbid-mindedness of this more profound type.
It must be noted, however, that this more radically morbid
outlook on life also admits of degrees; and, accordingly, James
divided sick souls roughly into two groups.

In the first group

are individuals who experience both good and evil in life, both
success and failure, joy and sorrow, satisfaction and remorse.
However, their joy and _satisfaction in the happy and successful moments of life are to a greater or less degree "spoiled
and vitiated"?? by their awareness that all natural goods perish, that their successes and triumphs are only momentary,
?5Ibid., p. 117.
76 Ibid.
??Ibid., p. 120.
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and that death is inevitable.

"Back of everything is the great

spectre of universal death, the all-encompassing blackness ••
• •

,,78

In the second group, we find people whom James described

as pathologically melancholy.

The morbid-mindedness of these

individuals is deeper still than that of the first group of
sick souls, for whom the lustre of natural goods_ is simply
dulled by their transience.

Pathologically melancholy people

are the victims of "a pitch of unhappiness so great that the
goods of nature may be entirely forgotten, and all sentiment
of their existence vanish from the mental .field."79

James

pointed out an interesting similarity between the devotee of
healthy-mindedness and the pathologically melancholy person:
"As the healthy-minded enthusiast succeeds in ignoring evil's
very existence, so the subject of melancholy is forced in spite
of himself to ignore that of all good whatever: for him it may
no longer have the least reality. "~O
Whatever the degree of his morbid-mindedness, the sick
soul is, at the time of his disillusionment and unhappiness,
a divided personality, a personality characterized by some
kind of discordancy.

James spoke of him as having "an incom-

pletely unified moral and intellectual constitution. 1181

James

described the sick soul's personality as heterogeneous and
pointed out that the heterogeneity is most evident in the
7Sibid.
79Ibid., p. 124.
SOibid.
81 Ibid., p. 141.

,'j
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individual whose morbid condition has reached the pathological
ievei. 82 The sick soul's cure demands the integration of his
personality.

As we saw earlier, however, the unification of

a man's personality can be achieved in a variety of ways, the
most effective of which are morality and religion.

And of the

two, religion produces the most startling results.

Morality,

as we have seen, can enable a man to face life, its trials,
and vicissitudes with stoical resignation; it even adds a kind
of zest to life and enables a man to enjoy a moderate amount
of happiness, at least for a time.
does much more than this.

But religious unification

When it is complete, it enables man

to accept life and all of its sufferings, pains, and uncertainties with joy and enthusiasm.

It adds a degree of zest and

happiness to life which no other kind of unification can produce.

As James put it,
I,',

However it come, it [unification] brilnlgs a characteristic sort of relief; and never such extreme relief as
when it is cast into the religious mould • • • • Easily,
82 No doubt James's knowledge of hetercgeneous personality
can be traced in large measure to his work as a psychologist
and in particular to his work in abnormal J1SYChology. However,
there can be no doubt that James owed much of his knowledge on
this subject to his own Calvinistically religious background.
James was aware that the story of man's reJligious development
is largely the story of his struggle to br.img his own natural
impulses and tendencies in line with the ideals of one religious creed or another. The records of the early life of
James's father indicate that Henry James, Sr., experienced such
a painful inner struggle resulting from the conflict between
his own natural love of life and the restri<ttions imposed upon
him by his family's Calvinistic faith. Willliam James, himself,
who experienced a good deal of mental confJLtct in his own life,
was no stranger to inner discord of a relif;Lous nature. As we
saw in Chapter I, for example, he possessed a strong natural
desire to believe in God and yet was greatly disturbed by religious doubts in his youth.
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permanently, and successfully, it often transforms
the most intolerable misgry into the profoundest and
most enduring happiness. 3
rhe process, be it sudden or gradual, by which the sick

1

soul is cured through the religious unification of his personality is called conversion.

"'l'o be converted, to be regener-

ated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an
assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously
wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously
right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold
upon religious realities. 1184 The group of ideas to which a

man devotes himself and from which he works James called the
habitual center of his personal energy.

When a man is con-

verted, religious ideals, previously peripheral in his consciousness, assume a central place; religious aims absorb his attention and become his habitual

cente~

of energy.

The divine be-

comes the focal point of his interest.
The process of conversion may be either voluntary or involuntary.

Voluntary conversion is a gradual regenerative pro-

cess consisting in the deliberate building up, piece by piece,

I

of a new set of moral and

spi~itual

habits.

Involuntary con-

version, on the other hand, occurs suddenly; and the man converted, because of the lack of conscious effort on his part,
often has a sense of being influenced by powers, other than
8 3James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 146.
84
Ibid., p. 15?.
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himself, to which he surrenders.

Because of this experience

of being acted upon by something other than oneself, the sur-

I
.

'

render of self to higher powers is often spoken of as though
it were the distinguishing characteristic of sudden and involuntary conversion as opposed to gradual and voluntary conversion.

Accordingly Prof. E. D. Starbuck in his Psychology of

spoke of the two modes of conversion as the volitional
-Religion
type and the type by self-surrender. Such a classification is
misleading, however, because, as James pointed out, self-surrender is an indispensable factor in all conversion.

Even in

the most voluntary regenerative process, the personal will
seems unable to bring about the complete and perfect unification of the personality by itself.

In James's words,

Even in the most voluntarily built-up sort of regeneration there are passages of partial self-surrender interposed; and in the great majority of all cases, when the
will has done its uttermost towards bringing one close
to that complete unification aspired after, it seems
that the very last step must be left to other forces
and performed without the help of its activity. In
other words, self-surrender becomes then indispensable. 85
No matter how experiences of religious conversion may differ, whether they be voluntary or involuntary, gradual or sud-

I

den, it seems accurate to say that, in every case, the person
involved becqmes aware that while there is something wrong
about him, his wrongness is no_t irremediable, that there is at
least a germ of something better in him.

The fact that a man

can criticize himself and be unhappy about his wrongness, James
said, is evidence that there is something higher and better in
B5Ibid., p. l?O.
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The individual, so far as he suffers from his
wrongness and criticises it, is to that extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch
with something higher, if anything higher exist.
Along with the wrong part there is thus a better part
of him) even though it may be but a most helpless
germ.Bo

In the process of conversion, the individual becomes aware
that this higher and better 'part' of him, as James loosely
put it, is "conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the
same guality, 118 7 i.e., with a personal consciousness, higher
than, but not unlike, his own.

This 'More' is operative in

the universe outside of him, i.e., it is experienced as a power
other than himself; and the man converted becomes aware that
by keeping in working touch with it and by getting "on board
of 1188 it, he can save himself when his own lower being goes
to pieces.

The individual is moved to trust this Power, to

give himself up to it, to abandon himself to its care; and
this self-surrender, an indispensable aspect of all conversion,
brings with it a tranquillity and peace previously unknown.
How the ''More' is conceived may vary from man to man; but
generally, it is thought of as the highest, or deepest, power
in the universe, as having a mental and moral personality
similar to man's, as holding good and righteous things dear,
as recognizing and caring about man, his needs, and his ideals.
86 Ibid., p. 383.
8 7Ibid., p. 384.
88 Ibid.
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the divine personality and the human personality there

is thought to be this similarity and relationship: no matter
how they differ, they both have purposes for which they care
(to some extent mutually) and "each can hear the other's
call. 1189
The more specific details of the nature of the deity are
matters of individual creeds--creeds which are elaborated out
of individual, communal, and even cultural experiences by men's

I

intellects in line with their individual feelings and wants.
But however the specific characteristics of the 'More' may be
conceived, the realization in the conversion experience that
one's destiny is linked up with such a Divine reality,

~hat

"one's life as a whole is in the keeping of a power whom one
can absolutely trust"90 is accompanied by a great sense of peace
and inner security.

"Fears and anxieties go, and blissful

equanimity takes their place."9l

This peace, which is born

of the assurance that all is well with one and will be well in
spite of any unfavorable external circumstances, is but one of
the immediate effects of the conversion experience, however.
In addition, there is o·ften the perception, by the subject, of

I

truths hitherto unknown, although the newly acquired knowledge
can seldom be clearly expressed in words.

Frequently, too, the

subject f'eels that the world itself has changed; the universe
8

~James, "Reflex Action and Theism, 11 .Essays on J::l'aith and
Morals, p. 122.
90James, The Varieties of Religious .Experience, pp. 225-26.

91 Ibid., p. 217.
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takes on freshness and beauty that seemed not to be there before.

But the effect which is most characteristic of the con-

version experience is the ecstasy of happiness which accompanies it and the tranquillity which follows it.
The happiness which comes with conversion is not a joy.
that results from the elimination of all evils, nor is it a
healthy-minded kind of happiness that ignores evil.

It is a

happiness in spite of evil--a joy in spiteof pain.

The happi-

ness of the religious man is something much more complex than
the simple contentment which one who has never suffered might
experience; as a matter of fact, it includes suffering as one
of its elements.

To the converted man, natural evil is no

longer a source of anguish and terror; rather it appears to
be swallowed up in supernatural good.

As the personal biogra-

phies of religious men revealed to William James, a person
once possessed by such religious happiness no longer seeks to
escape pain.
he

Knowing all the while that in the hands of God

is safe and secure even in the most violent of storms, the

religious man enthusiastically espouses personal hardships and
misfortunes as forms of sacrifice.

I

It is this complex sacrificial attitude, typical of all
kinds of religious consciousness, which accounts for the fact
that religion can perform an essential function in our lives

Pointed out, no matter what our response to the universe may
be, the constitution of the world is such that, whether we
like it or not, we are to some degree helpless and dependent
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various ways upon realities other than ourselves.

The world

is such that our very survival demands a certain amount of
renunciation, great or small; and more than any other attitude
toward life, the religious attitude can enable us to make these
renunciations easily and even joyfully.
For when all is said and done, we are in the end
absolutely dependent on the universe; and into sacrifices and surrenders of some sort, deliberately looked
at and accepted, we are drawn and pressed as into our
only permanent positions of repose. Now in those states
of mind which fall short of religion, the surrender is
submitted to as an imposition of necessity and the sacrifice is undergone at the very best without complaint.
In the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and
sacrifice are positively espoused: even unnecessary
givings-up are added in order that the happiness may
increase. Religion thus makes easy and felicitous
what in any case is necessary; and if it be the only
agency that can accomplish this result, its vital
importance as a human faculty stands vindicated beyond
dispute. It becomes an essential organ of our life,
performing a fU.nction which no othe~ portion of our
nature can so successfully fulfill.~2
Thus, of all the possible responses which man can make
to the universe, the religious response not only promises the
most happiness, but as James indicated, it makes "easy and
felicitous" the adoption of those attitudes and the performance of those actions which in every case are necessary for
the individual's survival and the well-being of mankind as a
whole.

Indeed the feelings of peace and happiness caused by the

conversion experience itself may fluctuate from time to time-they may wax and wane alternately.

But the one effect of conver-

sion which is fairly lasting and permanent and which best testifies

WI

~'I'

~
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to 1ts genuineness is a changed attitude toward life--an atti-

tude which profoundly affects one's mode of living for the
better.
18 to

"the real witness of the spirit to the second birth
be found only in the disposition of the genuine child

o! God, the permanently patient heart, the love of self eradi-

cated. "93

I

I
t

Conversion involves a radical change in character--

a radical change in one's way of living, in one's way of act1ng.

As James pointed out,
what is attained is often an altogether new level of
spiritual vitality, a relatively heroic level, in which
impossible things have become possible, and new energies and endurances are shown. The personality is
changed, the man is born anew, • • • •sanctification'
1S the techn1cal name Of this result. • • .Y4
William James used the term 'saintliness' to describe the

most striking qualities of character and action which the conversion experience frequently causes to appear in its subjects.
"1'he collective name for the ripe fruits of religion in a character," he wrote, "is

The saintly character is

~aintliness.

the character ror which spiritual emotions are the habitual

I
I

centre of the personal energy . . . . . . 95
of James requires some explanation.

This last statement

Two things must oe made

clear: 1) the meaning of the term 'spiritual emotions,' and
2) the sense in which emotions (in this case spiritual emotions)

can De called the habitual center of a man's personal energy.
James de£ined an emotion as the feeling of bodily changes
Which immediately ro1low upon
Y3Ib1d., p. 1Y2.
Y4~., p.

194.

95Ibid., pp. 215-16.

tn~

perception of some

~xciting

20?

thing in the environment or upon the advent of some exciting
idea in the mind.

Although he did not define the term 'spiri-

tual emotions' for us, the context in which we find it indicates that by 'spiritual emotions,' he meant those emotions
which are occasioned by religious experience or by religious
ideas in the mind.

The deeply religious man, the man who

envisions himself and his world to be in the care of God,
experiences an enthusiasm, an enchantment, a kind of solemn
joy which the non-religious man does not experience.

James

referred to these feelings variously as religious feelings,
spiritual enthusiasms, and, in the quotation with which we

I

are here concerned, spiritual emotions.
To speak of such spiritual emotions as the habitual center of the saint's personal energy may seem to contradict
James's earlier statement that the group of ideas to which a
man devotes himself and from which he works is "the habitual
centre of his personal energy."96 But in fact it does not.

I
I

For the ability of an idea to capture our attention and to move
us to act is due in large measure to the emotional excitement
which it occasions in us.

Thus we may speak of the emotions

occasioned by certain ideas, as well as the ideas themselves,
as a center of personal energy.

As James pointed out, "where

the character, as something distinguished from the intellect,
is concerned, the causes of human diversity lie chiefly in our
differing susceptibilities of emotional excitement, and in the

9 6~., p. 162.

\_
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different impulses and inhibitions which these bring in their
train." 97
To say that the saint's habitual center of personal
energy is spiritual emotions is to say that the aspects of

reality upon which his emotional interest habitually centers
are the divine aspects.

It is to say that the ideas which he

finds most exciting are religious ideas.

It is to .say that

the beliefs which warm and quicken him, the beliefs by which
he habitually lives and acts are religious beliefs.
James felt that at any given time our moral posture is
the result of two sets of forces operative within us--"impulses pushing us one way and obstructions and inhibitions
holding us back.

'Yes! yes!' say the impulses; 'No! no!' say
the inhibitions. 0 98 The saintly man is one in whom the inhibitions imposed by such mean affections as selfishness, cowardli-

ness, and hard-heartedness have been swept away by the "expulsive
power of a higher affection"99 __by the power of his spiritual

I
I

or religious emotions.

"There is a pitch of intensity, though,

which, if any emotion reach it, enthrones that one as alone
effective and sweeps its antagonists and all their inhibitions
away."lOO

The spiritual emotions of the man who is converted

from his wrongness to a life of sanctity have reached that
9?Ibid., p. 208.
98Ibid.

-

99Ibid., p. 209.
lOOibid.

-

209

\
I

\

pitch, and the result is a new character decidedly different
from the old.

I

The man who lives in his religious centre of personal
energy, and is actuated by spiritual enthusiasms, differs from his previous carnal self in perfectly definite ways. The new ardor which burns in his br~ast
consumes in its glow the lower 'noes• which formerly
beset him, and keeps him immune against infection from
the entire groveling portion of his nature. Magnanimities once impossible are now easy; paltry conventionalities and mean incentives once tyrannical hold no
sway. The stone wall inside of him has fallen, the
hardness in his heart has broken down.101
The features of saintliness are similar in all religions,
no matter how different their creeds.

The inner feelings of

saintly men, for example, everywhere seem much the same.

All

such men seem to enjoy a sense of being involved in a life
that is wider and fuller than that of this world's selfish
interest.

They experience a conviction of the existence of an

Ideal Power--a conviction which is not merely intellectual
but which seems to be almost sensible.

Furthermore, the saintly

man has a "sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal
power" 102 with his own life. According to James, this "sense

I
I

of Presence of a higher and friendly Power seems to be the
fundamental fea.ture in the spiritual life. ul03

The saintly

man willingly surrenders himself to the control of this friendly
Power and unites himself to it usually through some form of
prayer.

And as the limits of his own selfhood break down, as

101

~., pp. 212-13.

102~., p. 217.
l03Ibid., p. 218.
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}lis interests extend beyond himself to include those of the
divine in reality (however he conceives it), the saint experiences a tremendous sense of elation and freedom.

There is,

furthermore, a shifting of his emotional energy away from
unfriendly, hostile affections toward loving and harmonious
feelings--"towards 'yes, yes,' and away from 'no,• where the
claims of the non-ego are concerned."l04
These inner feelings reflect and express themselves outwardly in the saintly man's way of life--a way of life characterized frequently by asceticism, strength, purity, and charity
in heroic proportions.
immolating himself.

The saint's asceticism is a way of

As James pointed out,

The self-surrender may become so passionate as to turn
into self-immolation. It may then so overrule the ordinary inhibitions of the !le.sh that the saint finds
positive pleasure in sacrifice and asceticism, measuring and expressing as they do the degree of his loyalty
to the higher power.105
Whether it takes the form of the poverty, chastity, and obedience practiced by persons in religious communities or indivi-

I
I
1

dual acts of ·mortification and sacrifice, truly religious
asceticism seems to spring from one or the other of two motives.
It may, on the one hand, be a form of expiation by which the
religious man, acutely conscious of his wrongness, seeks to
atone for his sins; on the other hand, ascetical practices may
be pure acts of love.

They "may appeal to the subject in the

light of sacrifices which he is happy in making to the Deity
l04Ibid., p. 217.
l05Ibid.
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whom he acknowledges." 106

The saintly man's strength of soul

manifests itself in equanimity under all circumstances--in
resignation, fortitude, and patience.

It is not difficult to

understand his strength and tranquillity, for certainly one
who is sensibly aware that, no matter what one's difficulties
for the moment may be, "one's life as a whole is in the keeping
of a power whom one can absolutely trust_,"lO? cannot help but
be at peace.
'A paradise of inward tranquillity• seems to be
faith's usual result; and it is easy; even without
being religious one's self, to understand this • • • •
indeed, how can it possibly fail to steady the nerves,
to cool the fever, and appease the fret, if one be
sensibly conscious that no matter what one's difficulties for the moment may appear to be, one's life as a
whole is in the keeping of a power whom one can absolutely trust? In deeply religious men the abandonment
of self to this power is passionate. Whoever not only
says, but feels, 'God's will be done,' is mailed against
every weakriess; and the whole historic array of martyrs,
missionaries, and religious reformers is there to prove
the tranquil-mindedness, under naturally agitating or
distressing circumstances, which self-surrender brings. 108
While the saint is always tranquil and at peace, however,

I
I

he is

nevert~eless

so sensitive to spiritual discords that he

works tirelessly to purify his life; "the cleansing of existence
from brutal and sensual elements becomes imperative."l09

But,

although he may be hard upon himself, purifying his own life
by mortification and asceticism, the saint is never hard on
l06Ibid., p. 234.
10?~., pp. 225-26.

-

108Ibid.
l09Ibid., p. 21?.
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others; rather he exhibits an extraordinary tenderness and
charity for all of his fellow-men--even for his enemies and

tor the most personally loathsome o! creatures.

Such are the

inner dispositions and the outward qualities of character and
conduct most typical of the man who sees this visible world as
pregnant with the divine.

Such is the religious response to

the universe in its highest form.
In summary, we can say that religion involves thought

(creed), feelings and action.

And in almost every religious

creed we can !ind the general vision of the world described
earlier in the chapter--the view that this world is but an
aspect of a more spiritual world, that in this more spiritual
world there exist divine powers who care for us and for our
ideals, that these powers are powers with whom we can communicate and keep in touch and from whom we can get help through
prayer and self-surrender.
general view of reality.

Almost all religions agree in this
Whatever the doctrinal differences

which distinguish one creed from another, they are but secondary accretions ··to this central belief.. Such secondary be-

I

liefs, James held, are elaborations by the intellect along lines
suggested by a man's feelings, needs, and desires.

It is the

feelings which are primary and essential, James said; for it
is the feelings which are relatively permanent and basically

Il

the same in all religions.
Among the religious feelings examined, one can distinguish between those from which the religious vision springs

9.nd those which accompany it and often remain as its more or
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iess permanent effects.

The feelings which give rise to reli-

gion, as already indicated, are the feelings or wrongness, need,
and want.

I

The feelings, on the other hand, which result from

the religious conversion and which accompany the religious
vision have been characterized by James as "an excitement of
the cheerful, expansive, 'dynamogenic' order which, like any
tonic, freshens our vital powers. 11110 Adopting the· phrase
used by Professor Leuba, James called this kind of excitement
the 'faith state.'

As James put it, religion adds to life,

in spite of life's hardships and sufferings, a certain "enchantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from
a?JYthing else.n111 As indicated above, James felt that if
religion means anything definite for us, it ought to mean
"this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of
espousal, in regions where morality strictly so called can at
best but bow its head and acquiesce. 11112
There is much more to religion than thought and feeling,
however, for these inevitably resolve themselves into action--

I

I
j

into a mode of living more or less saintly--a mode of living
involving devotion, asceticism, purity, patience, fortitude,
courage, charity, sacrifice, generosity, mercy, and all the
qualities which mankind has always considered most admirable.
In The Varieties of Religious .Experience, James gave us a
llOibid., p. 381.
lllfil£., p. 54.
112Ibid. See above, pp. 180-81.
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aescr1ption o! the man who possesses a sense of the divine-a vivid awareness o! the presence of God.
Whoever possesses strongly this sense comes naturally
to think that the smallest details of this world derive
infinite significance from their relation to an unseen
divine order. The thought of this order yields him a
superior denomination of happiness, and a steadfastness of soul with which no other can compare. In social
relations his serviceability is exemplary; he abounds
in impulses to help. His help is inward as well as
outward, for his sympathy reaches souls as well as bodies, and kindles unsuspected faculties therein. Instead
ot placing happiness where common men place it, in
comfort, he places it in a higher kind of inner excitement, which converts discomforts into sources of cheer
and annuls unhappiness. So he turns his back upon no
duty, however thankless; and when we are in need of
assistance, we can count upon the saint lending his
hand with more certainty than we can count upon any
other person. Finally, his humble-mindedness and his
ascetic tendencies save him from the petty personal
pretensions which so obstruct our ordinary social
intercourse, and his purity gi~es us in him a clean
man for a companion. Felicity, purity, charity, patience,
self-severity,--these are splendid excellencies, and
the saint of all men shows them in the completest possible measure.113
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Such excellencies are indispensable to the world's welfare.

11
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If all men possessed such virtues, we would have an ideal society.

Obviously all men do not possess such virtues, ·how-

ever, and our society is tar from ideal.

Nevertheless, because

some men of this calibre do exist, the world is better off than
it would otherwise be.

Not only do these men sacrifice them-

selves daily for God and their fellow-men--trying to alleviate
pain and to bring peace and harmony to the world--but by their
example, they often inspire others to live more humanJ.y and
thus contribute to the perfection of mankind as a whole.
ll3Ibid.,
.............. PP• 285-86 •

Men
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o! saintly character, by their example, function as "a leaven
o! righteousness in the world" 114 and draw it in "the direction

'

ot more prevalent habits of saintliness."ll5 William James

I

believed that because religion thus enables the individual
himself to live more happily and fruitfully (whatever personal
misfortunes befall him) and at the same time benefits the
world at large insofar as the world is made what it is by the
lives of men, the religious response to the universe is the
best response that men can make.

In James's opinion, since the

consequences for the individual and !or the world as a whole

are good, religion itself is good.
Whatever salutary effects religion may have upon individuals and upon the world at large, however, the Intellectualists
of James's day insisted that unless the truth of the religious
vision can be established beyond the shadow of a doubt by
empirical proof or rational demonstration, religious belief
cannot be justified.

For the positivists and rationalists of

James's time, the good or bad consequences of religion were
irrelevant.

The real issue was the truth or falsity of its

view of the world.

I
!

And if the truth of that view could not be

established, they said, one ought not accept it however useful
its consequences might be.
In championing religious belie!, however, William James
himself was not indifferent to the truth or falsity of reli114Ibid., p. 290.

115Ibid.
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gion's claims; James was as much concerned with discovering
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the truth as the next man--perhaps even more so.

He certainly

did not give his approval to a:n.y view of life which was patently
false simply because it had salutary effects upon society.
For James, the religious interpretation of the world is clearly
indicated by human experience.

Furthermore, as the reader

will discover in Chapter VI, the religious interpretation of
the world is, from James's point of view, the most rational
interpretation possible.

CHAPrER VI

l

THE RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL GROUNDS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
The Intellectualists, as James called those thinkers of
his time who made sense and reason the sole arbiters of truth,
insisted that man can lawfully believe only propositions which
have been empirically verified or logically demonstrated.

For-

bidding man to accept any hypothesis about which doubt is at
all possible, they enjoined him to suspend judgment until proof
can be had.

James agreed that in some areas of discourse,

such an attitude may be the wisest one to adopt.

But in others,

he felt that to wait for proof may be to wait for the impossible; for there

a~e

some hy-potheses which empirical science

and logic are powerless to prove.

Moreover, these disciplines

provide no solution to the problem a man faces when immediate
action is demanded but evidence as to the right course· of action is not forthcoming.
Our purpose. in this chapter will be to consider in detail

James's reflections upon the question of the truth of religion
and his efforts to defend and justify religious faith in the
face of the Intellectualists' prohibitions.

Special attention

will be given to James's position that the foundations of
religious belief are both rational and empirical.

James main-

tained that the religious view of the universe, although not
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susceptible to logical demonstration, is nevertheless the most
I,:1f

rational view of the universe possible.

Moreover, he held that

religion is solidly grounded in experience--not in the sense
that experience can prove the truth of religion for everyone,
but in the sense that it clearly points in that direction.
William James was well aware of the fact that neither
science nor philosophy has thus far succeeded in
the truth of any religious creed.

J
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es~ablishing

However, he believed that

religious hypotheses are of the sort for which science and
logic do not provide adequate criteria.

In fact, in his view,

religious questions in the strict sense fall outside the scope

1
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I

of their methods.
. i

t
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Science, for example, operates only in the sensible world
and recognizes only data accessible to the senses, either
directly or through the intermediary of a screening device,
as valid evidence in any issue.

It seeks to verify its hypo-

theses by experiments performed on the empirical world and
looks for corroboration in facts equally sensible.

The unseen

world of religious belief, James said, of its very nature
simply does not lend itsel£ to this kind of experimentation
or verification.

Although science operates by postulation and

guesswork, even these must be either directly verified or
indirectly so, i.e., there must be some kind of agreement
between them and other verified facts.
Similarly, James pointed out, philosophy, using logical
demonstration as its tool, can expect no more success in the
area 0£ religious belief than science.

For centuries, most

I

!
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philosophers have attempted to ground religious belief in
reason.

Some have tried to deduce religion's hypotheses from

seemingly indubitable self-evident principles in an effort to
make religion the creation of pure reason totally independent
of experience.

Others have tried to show that religion is the

product of reason drawing rigorous inference from objective
tacts.

William James, however, believed that all such attempts

have failed; for if religion's propositions were the genuine
products of pure reason, or logical reason operating upon
objective facts, then philosophy ought be able to convince
men universally of religion's truth.

But as a matter of his-

tory, it has been notoriously unsuccessful in this regard.
Furthermore, James felt that the content of the religious
hypothesis is such that logic alone is not capable of establishing its reality and ought not be expected to do so.
facts postulated by religion are put forth

2S

particular and

concrete; the divine is described as a reality which is
crete, individual, and indeed unique.

The

con~

Conceptual processes,

however, deal with things abstractly; they classify, define,
and interpret facts already given.

But theJ'"cannot produce

the concrete facts themselves or reveal them to us in the first
place, because in the concrete there is al'W'.!Gs a 'plus,' a
'thisness' which conceptual processes cannox capture or repre.

sent--"a plus, a thisness, which feeling alm.e can answer for."
For this reason, it is futile to try to dem:m:strate logically,
1 James, The Varieties of Religious Expsrience, p. 346.
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i.e., by a purely intellectual process, any particular concrete fact, let alone the concrete facts posited by religious
.

l
'
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belief.

Deductive logic seems to be impotent in this area •

For in any strictly valid syllogism of a categorical type, the
terms of the premises must be abstract, and consequently the
conclusion must be abstract also.

Indeed, in certain cases it

may be foolish not to proceed from the abstract conclusion to
a judgment regarding the concrete; but the movement of the mind
from an abstract conclusion to a concrete judgment is a movement made under the influence of man's volitional power.

The

judgment of fact is not forced upon one by the logic of the

I
I
I

abstract argument, however persuasive it may be.

Logic alone,

in the sense of purely intellectual processes dealing with
abstract concepts, cannot prove any concrete fact, religious
or otherwise, and should not attempt to do so.
However, while science and

lo~ic

cannot prove the reli-

gious hypothesis, neither can they disprove it.

Neither one

nor the other can tell us that the unseen world of religious
belief is not real; for except in the case of an idea which
is intrinsically contradictory, neither science nor logic can

l
t

tell us what does not exist.

Thus, the religious vision of

the world is not susceptible to proof or disproof at the hands
of either science or philosophy.
Nevertheless, the theistic, or religious, interpretation
of the universe is, in the opinion of William James, the most
rational interpretation possible.

Of all the ways of inter-

preting the world, James believed that theism is the most
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rational in the sense that it, above all others, is most congruous with man's nature.

It alone, he claimed, satisfies
every mental need in strictly proper measure. 2

I
l

James said that only a being defined as God is usually
defined can satisfy the mental needs of a man who is looking
for something in which to ground reality.

A God is the only

kind of being which "would form the most adequate possible
object for minds framed like our own to conceive as lying at
the root of the universe."3

Stating his position in more

emphatic terms, James wrote:

I

I

My thesis, in other words, is this: that some outward
reality of a nature defined as God's nature-niust be
defined, is the only ultimate object that is at the
same time rational and possible for the human mind's
contemplation. Anythin5 short of God is not rational,
an.ything more than God is not possible • • • • 4

To understand this last statement, one must consider what
James meant by God--how he defined the nature of the only
object that a man can rationally conceive to lie at the root
of things.

In the essay, "Reflex Action and Theism," he

described its essential features for us:
First, it is essential that God be conceived as the
deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be
conceived under the form of a mental personality. The
personality need not be determined intrinsically any

2An idea or theory is rational if it satisfies the requirements of man's three-fold mental powers--receptive, theoretic,
and volitional--and thus facilitates unimpeded mental functioning. See above, pp. 98-105.
3James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and
Morals, p. 115.
4 Ibid., pp. 115-16.
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turther than is involved in the holding of certain
things dear, and in the recognition of our dispositions
toward those things, the things themselves being all
good and righteous things. But, extrinsically considered, so to speak, God's personality is to be regarded,
like any other personality, as something lying outside
of my own and other than me, and whose existence I
simply come upon and find. A power not ourselves,
then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means
it, and which recognizes us,--such is the definition
which I think nobody will be inclined to dispute. • • •
In whatever other respects the divine personality may
differ from ours or may resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in this,--that both have purposes
for which they care, and each can hear the other's
call.5
Such are the features of the God, which, James said, is "the
normal object of the mind's belief." 6

Given· the triadic struc-

ture of the human mind, anything less than this is not rational
and anything more than this is not possible.

We shall conI'

sider first, and in some detail, the inadequacy and consequent

'

I

irrationality of a theory in which anything less than God is
considered to be the ultimate reality.at the root of the universe; secondly, we shall consider the impossibility of conceiving anything more than God as the ground of all things.
As noted in Chapter III, William James held that the
powers of the human mind are three-fold.

They consist of

1) a receptive faculty by which impressions are received from
without, 2) a theoretic or speculative faculty which defines
and interprets the nature of the impressing objects, and 3)
a volitional power, by which we actively. respond to the real-

ity received by the senses and interpreted by the theoretic
5Ibid., p. 122.
6 Ibid., p. 116.
!
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faculty.

This latter faculty, i.e., the conceptual and rea-

soning power, has as its purpose to define the direction which
our activity, immediate and remote, shall take.

But the re-

sponse of the active or volitional part of our nature is not
simply a spontaneous reaction following automatically upon
thought.

On

the contrary, our volitional faculty exercises a

certain rule over thought; it has a critical

funct~on.

It can

accept or reject the formulas proposed by our theoretical power,
and whether it accepts or rejects them depends upon whether it
finds thought's formulas consonant with itself or not.

A theory

may be in harmony with the deliverances of sense (including the
data provided by past experience) and the requirements of

,,
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reason, but it will be accepted by us only if it is also con'

gruous with our active powers--with our desires, aspirations,
and propensities--and provides them with objects upon which to
react in the most felicitous manner.

A theory can be said to

be rational only if it satisfies all three 'departments' of the
human mind, and the final word, in James's opinion, comes from
the active or willing 'department' of man's nature.

Any theory

which disappoints our active powers and gives them nothing for
which to care and act will be rejected even though it is
logically consistent and harmonizes with perceptual facts.
'When the speculative department of the human mind undertakes to interpret the character, not just of one or two sensibly perceived objects, but of the totality of such objects,
when, in other words, it undertakes to interpret the character
of the universe as a whole, various philosophical views emerge

"I
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as possible explanations and offer themselves to man's active
nature for espousal or rejection.

Theism, atheistic material-

ism, and agnosticism are but some of the results of' reason's
efforts to interpret experience.

Materialism and agnosticism,

James believed, are the least acceptable of' the three because

I'
I

they disappoint man's active powers.

Even though they are

accepted by many, these philosophical theories cannot universally prevail because they provide inadequate stimuli for man's

j

practical nature.

Man cannot feel volitionally at home in them.

As James pointed out, every man desires to be adequate
to the demands of the universe, to contribute actively to its
development, to play his part in the drama of life.

But man's

nature is such that his ability to perform is sustai.ned and
inhibited to a great extent by his emotional states.

Feel-

ings and emotions of a posi.tive and expansive nature, such as
courage, admiration, enthusiasm, hope, rapture, and the like,
have a stimulating effect upon man and enable him to act with
vigor and zest.

On the other hand, negative attitudes.and

feelings--fear, doubt, despair, sadness, and frustration, for
example--have a deadening effect upon man's active powers and
leave him apathetic, indifferent, and often powerless to do

I

what life demands of him.

The philosophies of materialism

and agnosticism occasion only such negative feelings in man.
In opposing philosophical materialism, James was careful

to point out that it does not necessarily involve a belief' in_
'matter' as a metaphysical principle.

"One may deny matter in

that sense, as strongly as Berkeley did, one may be a phenomen-

,,,,,
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a.list like Huxley, and yet one may still be a materialist in
the wider sense, of explaining higher phenomena by lower ones,
and leaving the destinies of the world at the mercy of its
blinder parts and forces."7

It is materialism in this wider

sense that is opposed to spiritualism, or theism.

Spiritual-

ism, or theism, claims that mental and moral powers, rather
than blind physio-chemical forces, run the universe and that,
ultimately, mental and moral powers superior to man's are in
control.

Materialism, on the other hand, claims that it is

the laws of physical nature which run things.

In a material-

istic world, then, all of man's efforts to fashion the world
for the better by his actions, all of his efforts to develop
it along lines suggested by his ideals, hopes, and aspirations

•

are pointless.

For no matter what man tries to accomplish,

the blind forces of
the result.

physica~

nature will finally determine

Indeed in the world of materialism, man's voli-

tional powers have no relevant function.

His active propensi-

1

1

1
I

ties--his desire to have an active part in the world's .development--his desire to contribute creatively to its perfection--

i'
I

these are all without meaning.
In his work, Pragmatism, William James was critical of the

materialism of Herbert Spencer in particular.

According to

Spencer's theory of mechanical evolution, every state of being,
both mental and physical' is subject to the same laws of evolution and dissolution.

~verything

develops from a relatively

?James, Pragmatism and Four ~ssays rrom The Meaning of
Truth, p. 69.

!"11.
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primitive stage, in which only elementary !unctions are performed, to a state in which more complicated !unctions arise.

I

But this evolutionary process of development does not result
1n any permanent state of maturity and perfection.

On the

contrary, everything that evolves, without exception, is destined to dissolve again, so that the end of everything is
destruction.

Man is born, matures, and dies.

gins, develops, and 1s finally destroyed.

A society be-

Whatever good and

beautifUl things evolve will one and all be dissolved again.
As James put it, "according to the theory.of mechanical evolution, the laws of redistribution of matter and motion, though

I
'

they are certainly to thank ror all the good hours which our
organisms have ever yielded us and for all the ideals which
our minds now frame, are yet fatally certain to undo their
work again, and to redissolve everything that they have once
evolved."ts

Thus the theory of mec~anical evolution promises

man nothing but destruction--not only his own destruction but
also the eventual dissolution of all the things he cherishes
and the complete annihilation of all the ideals which he loves
and strives for.

Such a theory renders all of man's expansive

emotions of love, hope, joy, and courage totally subjective
and without any real objects and thus leaves him little about
which to care and nothing for which to live and act.
nameless unheimlichkeit comes over us at the thought
of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes,
in the objects of those loves and aspirations which
A

8 ~., pp.

75-76.
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are our deepest energies • • • • Small as we are, minute
as is the·point by which the cosmos impinges upon each
one o:f us, each one desires to :feel that his reaction
at that point is congruous with the demands of the
vast whole,--that he balances the latter, so to speak,
and is able to do what it expects of him. But as his
abilities to do lie wholly in the line o:f his natural
propensities; as he enjoys reacting with such emotions
as fortitude, hope, rapture, admiration, earnestness,
and the like; and he very unwillingly reacts with fear,
disgust, despair, or doubt,--a philosophy which should
only legitimate emotions of the latter sort would be
sure to leave the mind a prey to discontent and craving. 9
Agnosticism, too, although it does not issue the same dogmatic denials that materialism does, inflicts man with a kind
of apathy.

Agnosticism claims that man cannot know what the

universe ultimately is or what li:fe is ultimately all about.

1

The agnostic claims that man cannot know whether or not there

I

is more at work in the world than blind physical forces, that

I
l

man cannot know whether or not there is a God who cares for
him and his ideals.

From the agnostic point o:f view, it is

not possible to know whether there· are any values which are
everlasting or whether all are subject to dissolution as the
mechanical evolutionists claim.

But to be in doubt about these

things is to be in doubt about how to act.
presupposes conviction.

Action, after all,

Not knowing what li:fe is all about

leaves one not knowing how to· live.

Not knowing what the uni-

verse is leaves one not knowing how to react to it.

Not know-

ing whether or not one's active e:f:forts can ever produce a:ny
lasting results in the way of goodness and beauty leaves one
9James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith
and Morals, pp. 83-84.

228

with no inspiration to act constructively and creatively at

I
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all and permits one to make mere escape from suffering his
rule of life.

From James's point of view, agnosticism, as

such, offers man no motives for the fruitful exercise of his
active powers; and, like materialism, it leaves him restless
and unsatisfied.
Obviously, then, however logically consistent philosophies
like materialism and agnosticism may prove to be, however they
may harmonize with perceived facts, they are, from the point
of view of William Jam.es, not rational; for they do not satisfy
the practical side of human nature.

They may indeed appeal at

certain times to certain people; but, Jam.es pointed out, no
philosophy which does not make "a direct appeal to all those
powers of our nature which we hold in highest esteem"lO will
be deemed rational by all men at all times.
Materialism and agnosticism, even were they true, could
never gain universal and popular acceptance; for they
both, alike, give a solution of things which is irrational to the practical third of our nature, and in
which we can never volitionally feel at home. Each
comes out of the second or theoretic stage of mental
functioning, with its definition of the essential nature of things, its formula of formulas prepared. The
whole array of active forces of our nature stands waiting, impatient for the word which shall tell them how
to discharge themselves most deeply and worthily upon
life. "Well!" cry they, "what shall we do?" "Ignoramus, ignorabimus!" says agnosticism. "React upon
atoms and their concussions!" says materialism. What
a collapse! The mental train misses fire, the middle
fails to ignite the end, the cycle breaks down halfway to its conclusion; and the active powers left alone,
with no proper object on which to vent their energy,
must either atrophy, sicken, and die, or else by their
10Ibid., p. 110.
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pent-up convulsions and excitement keep the whole machinery in a fever until some less incommensurable
solution, some more practically rational formula, shall
provide a normal issue for the currents of the soul.11
It was James's conviction that the only interpretation of
reality that can satisfy all three departments of the human
mind is theism.

Theism, he felt, is the most practically

rational of all world views; it offers the most reasonable
solution to the problem of how to interpret the universe.
Now, theism always stands ready with the most
practically rational solution it is possible to conceive. Not an energy of our active nature to which
it does not authoritatively appeal, no~ an emotion
of which it does not normally and naturally release
the springs.12
Theism legitimizes our higher emotions of admiration, courage,
hope, and rapture by giving us a God who cares for and works
for the same values as we--a God with whom we can cooperate in
making the world better--a God who will guarantee that the

I

cherished ideals for which we work and suffer will somehow be

I

preserved.

t
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Thus theism makes our moral life more than a. mere

day to day struggle with evil; it makes it a glorious adventure; a kind of holy war fought for divine stakes.

James felt

that a theistic interpretation of life is incompatible with
pessimism.

And indeed if divine powers are working with us to

realize that which is good and beautiful, we cannot help but
be optimistic about the ultimate outcome of life.

Whatever

evils may exist now, however bad things may appear to be at
11 James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and
Morals, pp. 126-27.
12Ibid., p. 127.
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present, we have hope that the future will be better.

I

Certainly,

knowing that however adverse our lives may be here and now, our
efforts will someday bear fruit, if not in this visible world

1

then in some unseen spiritual realm, cannot fail to make even

I

the most difficult and painful life seem worth living in an

I'

unqualified sense.
By the standards of William James, then, the theistic
interpretation of reality is indeed the most rational view
possible, satisfying the requirements of all three departments

'

of man's mind.

It satisfies the demands of our receptive

faculty insofar as it does not contradict, and is therefore
in harmony with, the data of sense experience even though it
may not be experimentally verified.

l

1

Furthermore, while it

may not be logically demonstrable, it is nevertheless logically
consistent and to this extent
theoretic power.

satisfi~s

the requirements of our

But most important of all, theism, more than

any other theory advanced to explain reality, is, as we have
seen, congruent with the active part of our nature.
other hand, any theory which posits anything

~

On the

than God as

"lying at the root of the universe"l3 stifles our active powers
and is for this reason irrational from a practical point of
view.
'While grounding reality in anything less than God is not

What James meant by a

rational, to explain the universe in terms of anything more
than God is not possible, James said.

13

ills!·'

p. 115.
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ground for reality which would be
ately evident.

~

than God is not immedi-

However, he seems to have had in mind the

In his essay, "Reflex Ac-

monistic Absolute of the Idealists.

tion and Theism,'' he used the term gnosticism to refer to the
theory that intellect is somehow the supreme reality.

Not

only is it the supreme reality in the theory of gnosticism,
but ultimately it is the only reality; for appearances notwithstanding, it is in the last analysis identical with its
objects which include all things.

For the gnostic, or the

Absolute Idealist, there is but one reality, i.e., an absolute
Mind, which is ultimately identical with all the things which
appear to be other than it--with all finite minds, for example, and with

!!1

and volitional.

merely human powers, sensory, intellectual,

In Chapter II, we saw several of the objec-

tions which James raised against gnos.ticism, there referred
to as Monism or Absolute Idealism.

But here we shall consider

an argument to which James gave special attention in "Reflex
Action and Theism"--an argument which is in some sense.related
to his argument that materialism and agnosticism are not rational.
Materialism and agnosticism are not rational, James said, because they do not satisfy all three 'departments' of man's
nature--receptive, cognitive (theoretical), and volitional;
they are not congruent with the triadic structure of man's
mind.

Gnosticism, on the other hand, in effect denies the

triadic structure of the human mind.

Gnosticism is not possi-

ble, James held, because it presupposes the identification of
powers which are obviously distinct.

By making intellect, or

232
cognitive power, the supreme reality and identifying it with
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all that it knows, gnosticism does away with the experienced
distinctions between the sensory, speculative, and volitional
powers in man.

Such an identification and such a deification

of cognition, James pointed out, is contrary to the whole
drift of ordinary human experience as well as to the findings
of physiology and psychology. 14
From its first dawn to its highest actual attainment,
we find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears
to exist at all, appears but as one element in an
organic mental whole, and as a minister to higher mental powers,--the powers of will. Such a thing as its
emancipation and absolution from these organic relations
receives no faintest color of plausibility from any fact
we can discern. Arising as a part, in a mental and
objective world which are both larger than itself, it
must, whatever its powers of growth may be (and I am
far from wishing to disparage them), remain a part to
the end. This is the character of the cognitive element in all the mental life we know, and we have no
reason to suppose that that character will ever change.
On the contrary, it is more than probable that to the
end of time our power of moral and volitional response
to the nature of things will be the deepest organ of
communication therewith we shall ever possess.15
In the thought of William James, therefore, the only interpretation of reality which is at the same time both rational

I
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and possible is theism.

And by theism, James meant that view

of life and reality which posits as the deepest power in the
universe, a mental personality distinct from, though not
14James felt that his doctrine of the triadic structure
of the mind was in perfect harmony with the physiologists'
generalization that all action is somehow reflex action, i.e.,
that every action has its origin in some impression of sense
which, after some intermediary cerebral activity, expresses
itself in action of one kind or another.
l5Ja.mes, "Reflex Action and Theism," .Essa;ys on Faith and
Morals, pp. 140-41.
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totally unlike, our own--a personality with whom we can enter
into friendly communication and with whom we can cooperate in
the attainment of mutually cherished ideals of righteousness
and beauty.
The theistic view of the world, however, is not 'only the
most practically rational interpretation of reality in the

I

view of William James; it is moreover firmly rooted in human
experience.

This does not mean that it can be verified by

~

any kind of controlled experiment which will render it evident

\

to all men.

I

experiences which, while they do not prove God's existence to

But history reveals that there have been human

.

all people, nevertheless point to theism's truth and vitiate
the prohibitions which rationalists and positivists alike have
laid upon religious belief.

I

Indeed, there are no

objective data accessible to all

men which will make the unseen world of religion evident to
everyone; there are no sensible facts which will render it an
object available for scientific testing.

But throughout the

history of man there have been a great many private facts,
private personal experiences which, for those who have had
them, have made God's existence, or the existence of unseen
powers, as unquestioned a fact as their own being.
iences can generally be called Iilystical.

Such exper-

Although we are

inclined to think of only a few renowned saints and celebrated
spiritual writers as mystics, there is evidence that there
have been many persons who have had a kind of direct awareness of the reality of the divine--an awareness which, however

r

234

vague, can be called a mystical awareness.

For these people,

belief in the unseen world is as spontaneous and unquestioning as any man's immediate belief in an object sensibly present to him.

I

I

I
I

'

I
f

The fact of such experiences inclined James to believe
that man possesses, in addition to the external senses, a
special sense whose proper object is present reality whether
that reality is accessible to the external senses or not.
This special sense, James said, must somehow be stimulated if
man is to accept anything as presently

re~l.

the fact that many-people possess non-sensible

James felt that
11

objects of

their belier, not in the form of mere conceptions which their
intellect accepts as true, but rather in the form of quasisensible realities directly apprehended 1110 points to the reality of this power.

Such phenomena, he said, suggest that the

I

!

1

awareness of present realities is the work not of the external
senses (although these are certainly involved when the realities perceived are sensible realities) but of a special realitydiscerning sense which can be stimulated obviously by sensible
objects but also by non-sensible objects, including ideas and,
for all we know, realities which are neither sensible nor the
ideal products of our minds.

'l

It is as if there were in the human consciousness a
sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a
perceation of what we may call 1 somethin~ there, 1
more eep and more general than any of t e special and
particular 'senses' by which the current psychology
16James, The Varieties of Religious .Experience, p. 65.
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supposes existent realities to be originally revealed.
If this were so, we might suppose the senses to waken
our attitudes and conduct as they so habitually do, by
first exciting this sense of reality; but anything else,
any idea, for example, that might similarly excite it,
would have that same prerogative of appearing real
which objects of sense normally possess. So f~r as
religious conceptions were able to touch this realityfeeling, they would be believed in in spite of criticism, even though they might be SQ vague and remote as
to be almost unimaginable, •• • lr
.

'
'
I
I

vividly experienced the reality of non-sensible objects, reli-

1

gious and otherwise, James said, seem to prove the existence

I

t

,,,

'i:

I

Documented cases of persons who at one time or another have
I

,,I

I
!

of this reality-discerning power.

In .James's own words, "Such

cases, • • • seem sufficiently to prove the existence in our
mental machinery of a sense of present reality more diffused
and general than that which our special senses yield." 18
James's theory that man possesses a special faculty of
this type raises the obvious question of how such a sense
fits into his theory of the human mind as triadic in structure.

Since James referred to this special reality-discerning

power as a sense, i.e., a receptive power, one is inclined to
think that he considered it an aspect of what he called the
'feeling department' of the mind.

But while it seems to be

in the same .'department' with the other senses and while it
can be stimulated by the things which stimulate the other
senses, it can apparently be activated also by ideas, which
are products of the 'conceiving department' of the mind, as
l7Ibid., pp. 61-62.

18~., p. 65.

I

I
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well as by realities which are neither sensible nor purely
ideal.

James's position on this question is not entirely

clear, however; and therefore the precise relationship of the
reality-discerning sense to the three 'departments• of the
human mind in his theory remains a matter of speculation.
Whatever the precise character of man's sense of reality
may be, any direct, quasi-sensible awareness of God's reality,

any feeling of his presence, can be called a mystical experi-

ence at least in the broad sense of the term.
in contrast with what psychologists would

It is mystical

c~nsider

the natural

ways of knowing a thing's reality--i.e., direct intuition by
the external senses and logical inference from intuited facts.
Mystical experience in the strictest sense of the term, however,
is generally thought to have certain distinguishing characteristics.

Four of them, viz., ineffability, the quality of

being noetic, transiency, and passivity, James called to our
attention in The Varieties of Religious :Experience.
'

A mystical experience is ineffable in the sense that it
defies expression; it is incommunicable.

Its quality, or its

object, so to speak, must be directly intuited just as a sensible object is intuited, for it can no more be communicated
to another person than a sensation can.
In this peculiarity mystical states are more like
states of feeling than like states· of intellect. · No
one can make clear to another who has never had a
certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of it
consists. One must have musical ears to know the
value of a symphony; one must have been in love one's
self to understand a lover's state of mind. Lacking
the heart or ear, we cannot interpret the musician
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or the lover justly, and are even likely to consider
him weak-minded or absurd. The mystic finds that most
of us accord to his experiences an equally incompetent
treatment.19
On

the other hand, although a mystical experience may re-

semble a state of feeling, it is experienced as a kind of knowing.

Genuine mystical states
are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed
by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations,
revelations, full of significance and importance, all
inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they
carry with them a curious sense of authority for aftertime.20

Thus a mystical experience is a cognitive experience, but the
knowledge acquired is such that it cannot be expressed in
words. 21
l9Ibid., p. 293.
20 Ibid.

I

l

21 James cited.the testimony of St. John of the Cross on
this point. St. John said that God compenetrates the soul, but
in such a way that the soul "finds no terms, no means, no comparison whereby to render the sublimity of the wisdom and the
delicacy of the spiritual feeling with which she is filled • • • •
'We receive this mystical knowledge of God clothed in none of
the kinds of images, in none of the sensible representations,
which our mind makes use of in other circumstances. Accordingly in this knowledge, since the senses and the imagination are
not employed, we get neither form nor impression, nor can we
give any account or furnish any likeness, although the mysterious and sweet-tasting wisdom comes home so clearly to the inmost parts of our soul. Fancy a man seeing a certain kind of
thing for the first time in his life. He can understand it,
use and enjoy it, but he cannot apply a name to it, nor communicate any idea of it, even though all the while it be a mere
thing of sense. How much greater will be his powerlessness
when it goes beyond the senses! This is the peculiarity of the
divine language. The more infused, intimate, spiritual, and
supersensible it is, the more does it exceed the senses, both
inner and outer, and impose silence upon them." (The Dark Night
of the Soul, book ii, ch. xvii, quoted in James, The Varieties
of Religious Experience, pp. 312-13.)

l

I
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In addition to being ineffable and noetic, mystical states

are usually relatively transient; they cannot as a rule be sustained for long periods of time.

However, there have been

II;\~

I~
fI'

individuals who have testified to having an enduring sense, a
comparatively permanent feeling, of the divine presence--a
feeling which, since it could not be accounted for as an
instance of external sensation, would have to be considered
mystical, at least in the broad sense of the term.
Finally, the subject of a mystical transport seems to be
relatively passive especially in states which are mystical in
the more technical sense of the word.

James conceded that the

oncoming of the experience may be facilitated by preliminary
actions which may be deliberate--actions such as fixing one's
attention, assuming a certain bodily posture, and ascetical
practices of one kind or another.

I

But "when the characteris-

tic sort of consciousness once has set in, the mystic feels
as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as
if he were grasped and held by a superior power." 22 Such a
suspension of one's own powers may be absent in those experiences which are called mystical only in the broad sense.

But

that it is typical of the experience of mystics in the narrow
sense of the term is apparent from their own testimony.
quoted Saint Teresa of Avila on this point:

James

"Thus does God,

when he raises a soul to union with himself, suspend the natural

1

I

action of all her faculties.

She neither sees, hears, nor

22 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 293.

I

I'
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understands, so long as she is united with God." 23
Of all the qualities thought to be typical of mystical

t

I'

I
I
t

transports, however, the most characteristic is its incommunicableness.

Mystical truth exists only for the person who has

the experience, not for anyone else.

And for the individuals

who have them, mystical states, "when well developed, usually
are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative." 24
On the other hand, mystical states have !!2 authority over
those who do not experience them.

They do not impose upon the

non-mystic any obligation to accept their revelations uncritically. Nevertheless, James pointed

out~

the experiences of the

mystics serve to break down the absolute authority which
positivists and rationalists claim for sense and reason.

Mys-

tical insight shows that consciousness based upon the senses
and natural understanding alone is not the only kind of consciousness.

It indicates the possibility of other realms of·

truth "in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to
them, we may freely continue to have faith." 2 5 As James aptly
put it, "the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows
the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe." 26

I

2 3The Interior Castle, Fifth Abode, ch. i, quoted in
James, The Varieties of Religi·ous Experience, p. 314.
24James, The Varieties of Religious E.Xperience, p. 323.
2 5Ibid., p. 324.
26 Ibid., p. 327.
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The mystic's experience is invulnerable as far as the attacks of the Intellectualists are concerned, for no one can
question another man's experience.

If a man claims to exper-

ience God's presence, who can say that he does not?

Further-

more, it is useless to argue him out of his conviction, for
mystical experiences are as much direct perceptions of fact
for the religious mystic as our sensations are for us.

They

are face to face presentations of what seems immediately to
exist. 2 7
James concluded that while the experiences of religious
mystics do not prove God's existence or the reality of an
unseen spiritual world for all men, they nevertheless vitiate
the denials of rationalists and positivists and permanently
undermine their pretensions to any exclusive franchise on truth.
James felt that mystical experience opens the way for those of
us not gifted with mystical revelat·ions to accept God on faith
alone if such belief presents itself to us as salutary and
advantageous.and if it is in agreement with the triadic structure of our minds.
However, it is not only the mystic's religious belief
which is empirically grounded..

l
I

On the contrary, even in the

2 7From the point of view of the mystic, what is immediately revealed to him, while unutterable, is nevertheless a
directly perceived and unquestionable fact. And from his
point of view, his belief in it cannot be called faith because
his mind is coerced by the apparent evidence. Furthermore,
although in regard to ordinary perceptual data, which at the
moment experienced is indubitable, doubt is possible later
when one reflects upon his own fallibility, mystical experience
carries with it a certain authority which uniquely leaves it
unquestioned even when it is reflected upon at a later date.

i

, ,I
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I
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religious creed of the non-mystic, there is, James said, a

..

,
I

l

I
I

I

minimum content known by experience.

This minimtim content

may be nothing more than the awareness of being wrong, of
being in need, of longing for deliverance; or it may be the
experience of help or consolation flowing in from without
following prayer or communion with some power thought to be
external.
In the view of William James, all religious belief is

grounded in experience of some kind--either in mystical transports or in the non-mystic's experience of need and desire.
And the objects which a religious person, m;istic or non-mystic,
experiences directly and thus believes are not technically matters of faith for

hi~.

The presence of God directly experi-

enced by the mystic, for example, the need for help and the
· reception of help on the part of the non-mystic--these are
empirical facts for them.

And their belief insofar as it

extends only to these items is not faith in the technical
sense of the term.
Religious belief, however, does not stop at such minimum
content.

The intellect speculates upon the nature of the divine

presence which may be directly perceived in a mystical transport or upon the nature of the power from which help comes in
the case of the non-mystic in need of deliverance.

t

I

While

experience points to the nature of the reality in question in
both cases, the nature of the divine reality is not clearly
and fully revealed by any experience, mystical or otherwise.
And thus, beliefs concerning the divine nature take on the

_j
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aspect of faith.

James calls them over-beliefs.

They are

beliefs which outstrip the empirical data; they go beyond the
evidence provided by experience but always in the direction
indicated by experience.

Their objects are the objects of

religious faith in its more technical sense.
But while these non-empirical details of one's religious

I

creed, these theological formulations, are not matters of

I

direct experience, they are somehow rooted in experienced human

I

needs.

I
I

For the intellect develops its theological formulas

along lines suggested by its own propensities.

Each man

tashions his God and builds out his religion in directions
prescribed by his own temperament and by his emotional, volitional, and intellectual wants.

Experience, as it were, pro-

vides the fundamental, but bare, outline; but the intellect
fills in the empty spaces and completes the picture along
lines suggested by the individual's needs and personal sensibilities.

Thus, the intellect produces a creed consisting of

experienced facts and over-beliefs--a creed that is consonant
with the individual's life-style. 28
It is with the religious man's over-beliefs that Intellectualists are most likely to quarrel.

If a man feels in

need of help, if he feels that there is something wrong about
him and that he needs to be delivered from his wrongness, they
28 of course, not every individual religious believer constructs the creed to which he subscribes all by himself. Indeed, it may have been handed down to him by others. But his
acceptance of that particular creed with its specific overbeliefs in preference to another is determined by that creed's
harmony with his own intellectual, emotional, and volitional
constitution.
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cannot deny his feelings.

If a man experiences help, relief

or consolation, they cannot question the fact although they
may argue about the source of the consolation or about its
significance.

As James pointed out, the fact that a religious

person is conscious of being continuous with a 'More' of the
same quality through which saving experiences come is "a positive content of religious experience which • • • is literally
and objectively true." 2 9 But the exact nature of the 'More'
and the nature of a man's relationship to it are the questions
which, when answered by various theologians, result in the
diversified creeds with which we are familiar.
James suggested that the 'More' with which the religious
man

expe~iences

himself to be in touch is the subconscious

continuation of himself, the subliminal or 'transmarginal'
area of his own consciousness; but

he also suggested that

this subliminal self is in contact with still another 'More'
that is supernatural in character.

"Let me then propose, as

an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its farther side,
the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves
connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation
.J

of our conscious life. rr30

Indeed, whether the help we receive

following prayer comes from a superhuman being or not, James
said, it enters into our consciousness through the door of our
subconscious.

Atheists and naturalists, of course, would say

2 9James, The Varieties of Religious Ex:perience, p. 388.
3 o~.,

P• 386.
j,

__

)
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that the subconscious is the highest source of this help and
that beyond the subconscious there is nothing, i.e., nothing

t

supernatural.

.

say that beyond himself, beyond his conscious and subconscious

T

'

I

The religious believer, on the other hand, would

self, there is till a

'More'~a

superhuman kind of conscious

reality with which at the outermost limits of his being he is
in contact and from which help comes.
James felt that

~hen

we ask what the 'More' is on its

remoter side, when we ask just how far our transmarginal consciousness carries us, where it terminates and what is beyond
it, we are in the area of over-beliefs.

We are asking ques-

tions which experience and logical reason cannot definitively
answer.

And whatever beliefs we accept regarding this 'More'

on its remoter side, "we do so," James said, "in the exercise
of our individual freedom, and build out our religion in the

1

way most congruous with our personal susceptibilities."3l
It is this deference to our personal susceptibilities,
needs and desires which Intellectualists find most offensive.
To interpret the 'More' on its farther side to be anything
for which science and logic cannot account, simply because one
desires or needs it to be such, indicates, from their point of
view, a grossly irresponsible attitude toward the truth.
As we saw earlier, desire and need, in the Intellectualists'
opinion, should never influence belief.

Belief should be deter-

mined only by evidence; and if evidence is lacking, judgment
3libid., p. 388.
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should be suspended, however strong be the desire or need for
the object in question.
evidence is forthcoming.

Judgment should be suspended until
Over-belief, i.e., belief that out-

strips the evidence, is, in the view of the Intellectualists,
a vice to be avoided at all cost.
William James, on the other hand, defended the right of
individuals to their over-beliefs, whatever they might be.
He went so far as to say that "the most interesting and valuable things about a man are usually his over-beliefs."3 2
From the point of view of James,

wha~ever

enables us to

assume the burdens of life enthusiastically; to devote ourselves to life's task of opposing evil and promoting good with
courage, generosity, and zest, is itself good and beneficial
to us and to the world as a whole.

And he felt that nothing

does this quite so effectively as religious emotion, the religious excitement attendant upon the belief that one is part of
a wider more spiritual world in which his ideals have everlasting value.

But, as James pointed out, very often this

excitement, so salutary to man, will be aroused in an individual only by certain intellectual ideas to which he, because
of his personal mental constitution, is particularly susceptible.

These ideas, which may indeed be over-beliefs in the

strict sense, i.e., beliefs which outstrip the evidence provided by experience and reason, will thus be essential to

I

'I,1'

Ii

that person's religion and, in James's opinion, pragmatically
3 2 Ibid.
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justified.

Over-beliefs "in various directions are absolutely

indispensable,"33 James said.

They should be treated "with

tenderness and tolerance so long as they are not intolerant
themselves,"34 not only because no one is in possession of an
absolute point of view from which he can criticize with authority the faith of someone else, but more importantly because of
their value for human life.

As indicated above, it is a man's

over-beliefs that generate in him the kind of religious excitement which enables him to shoulder the responsibilities of
life with courage, generosity, and even joy.
often the

enthusias~

which is sparked by

that makes a man a hero.

Moreover, it is

.
his religious

faith

Certainly faith which can produce

such salutary effects deserves respect.
Leaving pragmatic considerations aside, however, and considering only the possibility of verifying the truth or falsity
of religious faith, James concluded that the verification of
religious over-beliefs may indeed be possible only by means of
an antecedent belief in them--an antecedent trust in the revelatory power of our needs and desires, the very presence of
which may be an indication of the reality of their objects.
James pointed out that Intellectualists do not object to our
-

trusting our wants in other areas of human endeavor--in business, art, and science, for example.

Men of science, whom the

Intellectualists revere, need and desire a uniform law of
nature, for instance; they postulate it and act upon it; and
33Ibid.
34 Ibid.

-
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nature corroborates their faith.

Who is to say, James asked,

that the religious man, indulging his faith in the spiritual
world which he desires, will not meet with similar success?

In other cases divinations based on inner interests
have proved prophetic enough. Take science itself!
Without an imperious inner demand on our part for ideal
logical and mathematical harmonies, we should never
have attained to proving that such harmonies lie hidden
between all the chinks and interstices of the crude
natural world. Hardly a law has been established in
science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first
sought after, often with sweat and blood, to gratify
an inner need. Whence such needs come from we do not
know: we find them in us, and biological psychology
so far only classes them with Darwin's 'accidental
variations.• But the inner need of believing that
this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual and eternal than itself is just as strong and
authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need
of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head. The toil of many generations
has proved the latter need prophetic. Why may not the
former one be prophetic, too? And if needs of ours
outrun the visible universe, why ma~ not that be a sign
that an invisible universe is there.35
James pointed-out that the animal, like man, also has
needs and desires and that the animal's wants, which can all
be satisfied in this sensible world, lead it to seek and to
find satisfaction.

Man's desires, however, cannot all be sat-

isfied in the visible world; indeed, many of them can find
fulfillment only· in a world that is more spiritual.

But if

the brute, seeking the satisfaction of its needs, is ultimately led to their fulfillment, may not man's other-worldly
desires also.be fulfilled, if he but trust them enough to
look for their objects?
35James, "Is Life Worth Living?," Essays on Faith and
Morals, pp. 24-25.
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In James's opinion, a man should trust his religious desires.

This does not necessarily mean defining the unseen

world in detail, and it certainly does not mean condemning
beliefs different from one's own.

Trusting one's religious

demands, however, does mean living in the light of them; it
means acting as though the unseen world is real.

Religious

belief in this sense is not much different from the working
hypothesis of the man of science.

In attempting to verify

his theory, the scientist

;I
,ii'

acts as if it were true, and expects.the result to
disappoint him if his assumption is fal·se. The longer
disappointment is delayed, the stronger grows his faith
in his theory.
Now, in such questions as God, immortality, absolute morality, and free-will, no non-papal believer
at the present day pretends his faith to be of an
essentially different complexion; he can always doubt
his creed. But his intimate persuasion is that the
odds in its favor are strong enough to warrant h~w in
acting all along on the assumption of its truth.~6
Indeed, it may be that only by such antecedent faith, i.e.,
by our acting as if the religious hypothesis is true, will
verification of it ever come at all.

After all, the religious

hypothesis represents the divine part of reality as having
personal form.

It may very well be that telling evidence that

there is such a God whose attitude toward us is friendly may
be withheld until we make the first move, until we meet the
hypothesis half-way, until we extend our hand to God as it were;

I

for we may be dealing with the type of reality that will appear
only to the believer.

In human relations, it is very often

\,

I

36 James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith
and Morals, p. 95.

_J
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one person's trust that another will like him and his consequent willingness to be the first to offer friendship that
makes the second person's liking actually come at all.

The

situation may be analogously similar in the case of relations
between divine and human personalities.

Perhaps telling evi-

dence of divine good will in our behalf may be forever withheld from us unless we are willing to believe the religious
hypothesis in advance of such evidence.

In James's words,

just as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no
advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and believed no one's word without proof, would cut himself
off by such churlishness from all the social rewards
that a more trusting spirit would earn,--so here, one
who should shut himself up in snarling logicality and
try to make the gods extort his recognition willynilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off
forever from his only opportunity of making the gods'
acquaintance.37
'
Certainly, that evidence for God's reality which comes
under the aspect of· responses to our prayers--help in the form
of inspiration, for example, new spiritual energy, strength
in the face of formidable difficulties--will not come until

we pray.

But to pray presupposes belief in the reality of the

one to whom we pray; it presupposes faith in his love and concern for us, in his power to help, in his willingness to come
to our aid.

Furthermore, to pray presupposes

~willingness

to put our fate in his hands; and this is faith in the fullest
sense of the term.

For religious faith is more than mere

acceptance of God as real •. It involves giving ourselves up
to his will.

All belief, of course, involves some active
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response to the object accepted as a reality; but the nature
0£ the divine is such that self-surrender is the only appropriate response that we can make to it.
Thus, James pointed out, the very evidence which the
Intellectualists said must antedate belie£ will not come unless it itself is antedated by belief.

We are dealing with a

reality, the very access to which requires faith; and obedience to the admonition of the Intellectualists would put
entirely out of our reach in this life a whole realm of truth
which is indispensable for life's happy and fruitful fulfillment.
Indeed, if there is a God and if the successful outcome
of this world depends, not only upon what we as human beings
do, but also upon God's work--upon God's helping us and others
in answer to our prayers, for example,--then certainly our
prayers and the faith they presuppose are indispensable to
the world's well-being.

Indeed, if such is the case, religion,

as William James said, is man's most important function in the
universe.

But that such is the case can only be empirically

verified by our acting in advance as though it is true.

Veri-

fication will come, if it comes at all, only if we first
espouse the religious hypothesis by faith and live by it.
Certainly, then, the Intellectualists' admonition, to
suspend judgment until the evidence is all in, is an unreasonable one; for to suspend judgment in regard to the religious
hypothesis is in effect to act as though it were false.

And

in so doing, we lose the bounty to be gained by believing it

r
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just as surely as if we positively denied it.

As James indi-

cated, in an issue of such magnitude, we cannot afford to wait
for verification; to be on the winning side at the end, we
must get on it now.

Surely science and philosophy, which can

neither prove nor disprove religion's truth, can issue no prohibitions to us here.
Furthermore, from James's point of view, absolute certitude about the truth of any factual proposition is not possible
in this life, as we saw above.3 8 For although the human mind
can possess the truth about reality, it cannot be infallibly
certain that it has that truth even when it does in fact possess it.

Thus, except for the data of the present moment of

consciousness, doubt is always possible.

And for this reason,

the prescription of the Intellectualists, to wait for conclusive evidence before

believ~ng

anything, is unrealistic and

impractical.
'When I look at the religious question as it really puts
itself to concrete men, and when I think of all the
possibilities which both practically and theoretically
it involves, then this command that we shall put a
stopper on our heart, instincts, and courage, and wait-acting of course meanwhile more or less as if religiOI:i
were not true--till doomsday, or till such time as our
intellect and senses working together may have raked
in evidence enough,--this comm.and, I say, seems to me
the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic
cave. Were we scholastic absolutists, there might be
more excuse. If we had an infallible intellect with
its objective certitudes, we might feel ourselves disloyal to. such a perfect organ of knowledge in not·
trusting to it exclusively, in not waiting for its
releasing word. But if we are empiricists, if we
believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know for
113.

38 see above, Chapter II, pp. 57-63; Chapter III, pp. 111-
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certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a
piece of idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our
duty of waiting for the bell. Indeed we may wait if
we will,--I hope you do not think that I am denying
that,--but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much
as if we believed. In either case we act, taking our
life in our hands.39
In the question of God, then, as in all questions which
cannot be definitively answered by sense and reason, James
defended each man's right to believe or not to believe as he
wills.

"No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor

should we bandy words of abuse.

We ought, on the contrary,

delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental
freedom •• • •
In James's opinion, however, although it is a man's right
to believe or disbelieve as he chooses, believing is to his
advantage and that of the world at large.

As far as the indi-

vidual man is concerned, the belief that he and the things he
cherishes are in the care of a loving God enables him to bear
the sufferings and hardships of life with fortitude, equanimity,
and a happiness that transcends all merely natural joy.

More-

over, religious belief sparks him to vigorous moral action.
Believing that he and God are working together for ideals
which they both hold dear, the religious man eagerly undertakes the task of promoting good and eliminating evil and is
able to do what life demands of him with ease and enthusiasm.
39James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals,
pp. 60-61.
4 oibid., p. 61.
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The benefits of religious belief for the world are not

1

unrelated to its benefits for the individual.

Since the world

is what people by their living make it, whatever salutary
effects religion may have on individual lives also benefit the·
world as a whole.

In making a man a better person, religious

belief makes him also a better citizen of the community and of
the world.

His moral action, for example, is directed not

only toward his own good and that of his family but also toward
the good o! his neighbors, the community, and the world at
large.

And the evils which he seeks to eliminate are not

.

merely his own private ills but those that afflict others as
well.

As Jam.es pointed out, saintly men sacrifice themselves

every day for God and their fellow-men.

Moreover, the example

of the saintly man inspires others to live lives of faith also
and to emulate the saint's virtues.

Indeed religious men, acting as "a leaven of righteousness in the world, 1141 help to

bring mankind as a whole to a higher level of perfection.
As far as the objective truth or falsity of religion's
claims is concerned, William James himself looked at the question pragmatically; and from his pragmatistic point of view,
the beneficial character of religion cannot be separated from
the question of its truth.

According to his pragmatistic

principles, if an hypothesis works satisfactorily in the widest
sense, it is true.

James concluded that because of the uses

of religion to man and to the world at large there must be
41 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 290.
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truth in it.

Experience has amply shown, he said, that the

hypothesis of God works and works well.

Not only does it

work, but more than any other hypothesis proposed to man's
belief, it makes human life worth living and the world itself
a good place in which to live it.

111
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CHAprER VII
A MAN OF FAITH
No era in recorded human history has been free of pain
and suffering.

The human situation as described by-men through

the centuries has always been less than paradisiacal.

Man

has suffered a variety of indignities at the hands of the
world; in every age he has known poverty and .want, disease,
loneliness, and oppression, not to mention the horrors of war
which in every era has raged in one corner of the world or
another. History has indeed been a "bath of blood,"1 as
William James pointed out.
The world with its ever-present phenomena of human suffering has provided reflective men through the ages with inexhaustible material for speculation.

Few philosophers have

failed to be troubled by the presence of evil in the world;
and their attempts to reconcile it with some kind of reasonable
account of reality have·ranged anywhere from ushering it out
of existence under the cloak of illusion to considering it as
real but somehow a blessing in disguise.

What particular role

evil plays in the drama of life depends upon which philosopher
is describing the action.

Among the various attitudes which

1 James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," Essays on Faith and
Morals, p. 312.
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men professing wisdom had adopted toward evil, two extremes
can be found--that of extreme optimism and that of radical
pessimism.

Unmitigated optimism is inclined to see evil as

somehow less than real.

The monistic Idealists, whom William

James opposed so vigorously in his day, were of this frame of
mind.

They asserted that reality is completely one, unchang-

ing, and good--an Absolute of which experienced multiplicity,
change and evil are but appearances. 2 Their gospel was that
experienced phenomena are but manifestations of this Absolute,
which in itself is perfect in every way; thus they bade man to
rejoice because evil is not real at all.
At the opposite pole, the radically pessimistic philosopher
finds evil so all-pervasive that good seems almost non-existent.3

Evil in one form or another appears to be the only real

2The Idealist, F. H. Bradley, wrote the following in regard
to evil: "Evil and good are not illusions, but they are most
certainly appearances. They are one-sided aspects, each overruled and transmuted in the Whole • • • • As with truth and error,
so with good and bad, the opposition is not absolute. For, to
some extent and in some manner, perfection is everywhere realized • • • • The Absolute is perfect in all its detail, it is
equally true and good throughout.n (Appearance and Reality,
p. 401.) See above, Chapter I, p. l?.
.
.

I.

3In the pessimistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer,
every individual thing, which is but an appearance of the one
noumenal reality, the Will to·live, tries to assert its own
existence at the expense of other things. Hence, the phenomenal
world is one of conflict. Schopenhauer's pessimistic attitude
toward life is especially evident in the following passage: "If
life were in itself a blessing to be prized, and decidedly to
be preferred to non-existence, the exit from it would not need
to be guarded by such fearful sentinels as death and its terrors. But who would continue in life as it is if death were
less terrible? And again, who could even endure the thought
of death if life were a pleasure! But thus the former has still
always this good, that it is the end of life, and we console
ourselves with regard to the suffering of life with death, and
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force in the world, or at least the force which is destined
ultimately to triumph.

At first glance, despair seems to be

the only appropriate response to a world so conceived.

And yet

thinkers of a pessimistic frame of mind never cease to look
for some way in which to live with the inexorable gloom of
their philosophy.

They all seek some compensating factors in

life in spite of its impending doom.

Some exhort man to grasp

as much pleasure as he can, since no matter how he lives, in
their view, death is the final end of everything.

Others advo-

cate a stoical resignation in the face of pain; and still
others suggest a militant struggle against evil, the hopelessness of' the fight notwithstanding.

I

l

Although contemporary existentialism is not necessarily
pessimistic, it does give us some examples of modern man's
efforts to cope with life viewed pessimistically.

For instance,
Jean-Paul Sartre, seeing death as man's ultimate destin.y, 4
counsels man to achieve authentic existence in this life by
facing the truth of his situation and by accepting the responsibility of his freedom in the alien world in which he is abandoned.5

To fail to admit one's freedom and total responsibility,

I

j.

with regard to death with the suffering of' life." (The World as
Will and Idea, III, trans. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp [London:
Trtlbner & Co., Ludgate Hill, 1886], p. 389.)
411 • • • death haunts me at the very heart of each of my

projects as their inevitable reverse side." (Jean-Paul Sartre,
Bein~ and Nothin~ess, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes [New York:
bita el Press, 1 6], p. 523.)

5nr am responsible for everything, in fact, except for my
very responsibility, for I am not the foundation of my being.
Therefore everything takes place as if I were compelled to be
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Sartre claims, is to live inauthentically.

To expect help from

heaven or to lay the responsibility for what happens in the

1,
11

world upon God is to hide the truth from oneself and to flee
the anguish of one's situation in bad faith.
Somewhat mo.re appealing, perhaps, is the prescription of
Albert Camus.

Although he, too, suggested a rather stoical

approach to life and advocated living in the truth of the
situation, he did feel that some kind of joy is possible for

'
t

men in this world in spite of the fact that death may indeed
be the ultimate end of everything. 6 Camus !elt that men can
find at least a limited kind of happiness in loving solidarity
with each other and in their common rebellion against suffering

t

l
j
t

and evil.

He did not believe that rebelling against evil will

eliminate it altogether, however.?

But he did feel that the

responsible. I am abandoned in the world, not in the sense that
I might remain abandoned and passive in a hostile universe like
a board floating on the water, but rather in the sense that I
find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world
for which I bear the whole responsibility without being able,
whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility for
an instant." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 531-32.)
6 camus did not categorically deny.God and immortality, but
he said that he could not believe in them. Speaking at the
Dominican Monastery of Latour-Maubourg in 1948, Camus said,
"• •• I wish to declare also that, not feeling that I possess
any absolute truth or any message, I shall never start from
the supposition that Christian truth is illusory, but merely
from the fact that I could not. accept it." (Albert Camus, "The
Unbeliever and Christians " Resistance Rebellion, and Death,
trans. by Justin O'Brien LNew York: Moaern Library, 1966], p. 52.)
?"Rebellion indefatigably confronts evil, from which it
can only derive a new impetus. Man can master in himself everything that should be mastered. He should rectify in creation
everything that can be rectified. And after he has done so,
children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society.
Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to diminish

11,·
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man who revolts against suffering and oppression shares in the
struggles and destiny of all men and, in this solidarity with
all other human beings, finds a measure of joy.

"Our brothers

are breathing under the same sky as we; justice is a living

I

t

I
l
\

thing.

Now is born that strange joy which helps one live and

die. • • •
The loving revolt against human suffering which

Camus

advocated was not unlike the moralistic approach to life that
suggested itself to William James in his youth.

At that time,

as we noted above,9 James sometimes found it difficult to believe in God and for a time seemed drawn toward a materialistic
philosophy.
1

Materialism, however, promised James nothing but

the ultimate destruction of himself and all that he cherished.
Struggling to live with the illness which plagued him in those

I

years and the anticipated darkness of the future, James looked
to moralism to give meaning to his life.

He felt that in

spite of materialism's promised annihilation of himself and
all that he held dear, 10 he could still tind some satisfaction
in living by helping his fellow-men to suffer less and to
arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice
and the suffering of the world will remain and, no matter how
limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage."
(Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. by Anthony Bower, with a Foreword by Sir Herbert Read [New York: Vintage Books, 1959], p.

303.)

8

~., p. 306.

9see above, Chapter I, pp. 9-12.
10see above, Chapter I, p. 11.
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enJOY more.

11

However, just as the compensations of Sartre.' s. authentic
existence and the consolations of Camus's fraternal solidarity
with other men leave something to be desired when one considers that death is still one's ultimate destiny, so too the

t

pure moralism which attracted the youthful William James was

t

somewhat less than satisfying and indeed was incapaple of

I

completely neutralizing the effects of the pessimism to which

l

.his temporarily materialistic view of life was conducive.
As James himself came to realize, while a purely moralistic approach to life may steel one to bear life's hardships

t

and help him to survive in a world in which evil is destined

t

to have the last word, it cannot enable a person to live with
any genuine enthusiasm or real happiness.

'
!

I
f
J

~

I

A world in which

one's efforts can produce no lasting results, a world which
11 rn 1868, William James wrote the following in a letter
to his friend, Tom Ward: "All I can tell you is the thought
that with me outlasts all others, and onto which, like a rock,
I find myself washed up when the waves of doubt are weltering
over all the rest of the world; and that is the thought of my
having a will, and of my belonging to a brotherhood of men possessed of a capacity for pleasure and pain of different kinds.
For even at one's lowest ebb of belief, the fact remains empirically certain (and by our will we can, if not absolutely refrain from looking beyond that empirical fact, at least :practically and on the whole accept it and let it suffice us)-that men suffer and enjoy. And if we have to give up all hope
of seeing into the purposes of_ God, or to give up theoretically
the idea of final causes, and of God anyhow as vain and leading
to nothing for us, we can, by our will, make the enjoyment of
our brothers stand us in the stead of a final cause; and through
a knowledge of the fact that that enjoyment on the whole depends
on what individuals accomplish, lead a life so active, and so
sustained by a clean conscience as not to need to fret much."
(The Letters of William James, I, 130.) See above, Chapter I,
p. 14.

r

261
promises nothing but the ultimate decay of all the ideals to
which a man aspires seems not to be capable of calling forth
his best efforts or of tapping the depths of his personal resources.

Indeed, a world viewed pessimistically is a world

alien to man.

It is a world in which man's hopes and ideal

aspirations have no real objects.

It is a world in which

man's inclinations to create lasting goodness and beauty have
no relevance--a world in which man with his natural propensity
to fashion the universe for the better is somehow out of place.
Even moralism, whatever form it takes, canno.t compensate for
the foreignness of such a world.
Consequently, however inclined James may have been to see
life pessimistically in his youth, he could not rest content
with such a dark view of things; and he later rejected pessimism as an attitude that is useless, fruitless, and corrosive.
It is corrosive because by negating man's ideal motives for
action, pessimism tends to stifle man's active tendencies and
to render him apathetic, indolent, and even cynical.

However,

while James would not approach the world pessimistically,
neither could he look at it with unqualified optimism.

A uni-

verse in which evil has no part--a world such as the one
described by monistic Idealism, i.e., a world in which pain
and suffering are but illusory appearances of the perfect
Absolute--such a world was just as foreign to William James
as the radically evil state of affairs posited by extremely
pessimistic philosophers.

A completely optimistic picture of

reality simply did not square with William James's experience.
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He had lived through pain and suffering, both mental and physi-

cal; and he could not close his eyes to evil; he could not
blink it away.

But more than this, the seemingly cheerful

picture of reality painted by Idealism was not cheerful at all
--at least not from James's point of view; for it was totally
alien, not only to James's experience, but more importantly to.
his aspirations and to what he knew to be the aspirations of
most men.

James felt that most men shared with him the desire

to be a match for the universe and to feel that their active
powers were relevant to the world and its

n~eds.

Ye demand in it [the universe] a character for which
our emotions and active propensities shall be a match.
Small as we are, minute as is the point by which the
cosmos impinges upon each one of us, each one desires
to feel that his reaction at that point is congruous
with the demands of the vast whole,--that he balances
the latter, so to speak, and is able to do what it
expects of him.12
In James's
to

opinion~

ereate~in

man has a natural instinct to do, to make,

general to contribute to the growth, development,

and perfection of the universe by his actions.

However, if as

monistic Idealism claimed, the world is completely finished
and perfectly good and beautiful independently of all human
activity, then indeed men's aspirations to act creatively and
to contribute something lasting and worthwhile to the universe
are pointless and vain.

Paradoxically, when forced upon a

man with such active propensities as those of William James,
the extremely optimistic view of monistic Idealism could
12James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith
and Morals, p. 84.
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easily turn into pessimism and despair.
Thus, James could be neither a radical pessimist nor an
unmitigated optimist.
ity as melioristic.

He characterized his own view of real-

In James's opinion, the world indeed has

its bad points, but it has its good ones too; and_ there is
no reason why the proportions of good and evil must remain the
same.

The balance can certainly shift in either direction

depending upon how men live their lives.

Indeed it can become

worse; but what James found heartening was the fact that the
world is an open world, the fact that the world can improve
and that the amount of good in it can increase and even outweigh the evil as the result of human activities.
The world, in William James's melioristic view, is not
totally alien to men as it is when seen pessimistically or
optimistically.

There is a.proportion between the world and

man's active powers; in fact the world is in some degree plastic in man's hands.

Certainly it offers resistance, but this

fact only increases the challenge and heightens the sense of
adventure in the man who sets out to change things for the
better.

The resistance of brute facts notwithstanding, James

felt that the world has shown itself susceptible to modification by human activity.
Thus James's world can be described not only as melioristic but also as humanistic; for it is a world which in large
measure is what men have made it and which can become as good
as they want it to be.

In James's mind, human powers seem to

be singularly adapted to changing the world.

As we saw

r
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above, 1 3 man's receptive faculties present the sensible world
to him, his theoretic faculty reflects upon the sensory presentations and then defines the way in which his active powers
will react to them; finally by his active powers, man responds
to the world and affects it for better or worse.

James be-

lieved that the world was given to man to fashion and complete;
and strangely enough, it is by fashioning his own life that
man fashions the world.

Indeed what man makes of himself

determines what he makes of the universe.
builds into his own existence not only

The good that he

becom~s

part of the

world's goodness but inspires other men to be good and to do
good also.

Man's happiness and success become the worl4's

happiness and success.
In Ja.mes's opinion, however, genuinely happy successful
living is possible only to men of faith.

In fact, the suc-

cess of the world as a whole depends upon human willingness
to believe beyond the evidence when any situation calls for it.
Fruitful human existence, for example, demands that men believe
in

themselves and in their own powers.

The lack of evidence

notwithstanding, they must believe in their ability to know
truth.

Furthermore, they must believe in their ability to act

or not to act, as they choose; in other words, they must have
raith in their own freedom.
Furthermore, if they are to eliminate the causes of pain
and suffering in the world to any extent and to produce the
1 3see above, Chapter III, p. 103.
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conditions conducive to human happiness and well-being, they

'II'
'11

11,:

must believe that their powers are relevant to the universe,
that evil is exorable and that what happens in the universe 1s
not rigidly determined independently of them.

They must have

faith in unrealized ideals--at least in the possibility of
their actualization.

However, no iess important than a man's

faith in himself and in his ideals is his faith in other men.
Any man's efrective contribution to the world demands that he

believe in other men's good intentions and in their willingness and ability to do their share of the.work in fashioning
the universe.

As William James pointed out, the world will be

a success only if each person, trusting that every other man
will do his best, does his own part with vigor and courage.
James knew that

it~

the work of the world.

take courage to do one's best in

For the results of one's efforts are

not certified in advance.

The changing character of experience,

the fallibility of human knowledge, and the appearance of unforeseen consequences are such that it is not possible to know
with.absolute certitude what the best course of action in a
given case is or the exact results which a proposed plan of
activity will effect.

If a man waits for certitude in these

matters, he will probably not act at all.

Effective human
I

action thus requires faith; and because faith involves risks--

I'

the risk of error and the risk of failure, for example--faith
demands courage and daring.

In short, faith requires an

adventurous spirit.
However, it is difficult, if not impossible to act with
I.

l
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courage and daring if the goals that one seeks are, at most,
only temporary goods that will eventually pass into nothingness, if one's heroic efforts can produce no lasting results,·
it all the goodness and beauty that one strives to realize are

doomed to inevitable annihilation--as the materialists of
William James's day were wont to suggest.

The courageous and

even heroic human action which the world's salvation demands,
therefore, can best be exercised by men who see this world as
~

than mere matter in motion.

The men who are most capable

of changing the world for the better are those who see it as
but a "part of a more spiritual universe"

14.

in which superior

powers, friendly to men, hold good and righteous things dear
and guarantee the survival of the ideals which men cherish and
for which they work.

In other words, the men who can do the

most good for the world are those who have faith not only in
themselves and in other men but more importantly in God.
William James believed that if a man is to do his best in
the work of the world, he has need of religious faith.

Purely

moral effort may enable him to do what is necessary for survival in a grudging spirit of resignation.

But religious faith

is necessary to spark him to vigorous and enthusiastic moral
action.

Nothing can inspire a man to the heroic virtue of

which he is capable quite so effectively as the knowledge that
the ideals for which he fights are divinely esteemed and have
everlasting value.

Not only does religious faith bolster

14James, The Varieties of Religious Elcperience, p.

367.
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a man's

~ighting

spirit,' but the knowledge that there is a

God who helps and protects him, a God who will guarantee that
all will be well no matter what happens, gives him the equanimity and stability to fulfill his obligations in spite of all

the adversity that might otherwise undermine his effectiveness.
As James pointed out in "The Gospel of Relaxation," there is
very little that inhibits us and destroys our effective power
as much as worry; and "the sovereign cure for worry is religious .faith. 111 5

Faith is indeed the great antidote to anxiety.

As James said,
to him who has a hold on vaster and more permanent
realities the hourly vicissitudes of his personal destiny seem relatively insignificant things. The really
religious person is accordingly unshakable and full
of equanimity, and calmly ready for any duty that the
day may bring rorth.16
Yilliam James did not mean to suggest that the religious man
does not suffer, nor did he mean to suggest that the religious
man faces the trials and tribulations of life without great
feeling or emotion.

The religious man may, in fact, suffer

greatly; he may indeed be emotionally shaken by the great
tragedies of life just as other men are.

But the tragedies of
1,1

his life do not shake his resolve to pursue that which is good
and avoid that which is evil.

They do not shake his belief in

God's loving care of him or turn him aside from the fulfillment of his duties.
The importance of faith in God for the well-being of the
l5James, "The Gospel of Relaxation," Essays on Faith and
Morals, p. 255.

16Ibid., PP• 255-56.

'I
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world is made still clearer by a further consideration no less
practical than those that have gone before.

If God does exist,

James pointed out, and if the world's salvation depends upon
God's help given at the prayerful request of men, then certainly
the faith which prayer presupposes is indispensable.
In James's mind, there was no doubt that the world would
rare best if it were in the hands of men of faith--men who
believed in themselves, in other men, and above all in God.
Whether James realized it or not, he himself was such a man
of faith--a man who believed in himself

(al~hough

not without

effort), trusted other men, and believed that God actively
shared his own concern for the triumph of that which is good
and righteous.
William James's belief in himself, however, was not a
spontaneous belief; rather·it involved a deliberate act of
his will.

His belief in himself and in his powers to act

responsibly and fruitfully was an attitude which, as a young
man, he .forced himself to adopt in the face of physical and
mental difficulties which might have made a weaker man accept
permanent de.feat and resign himself to a life of passivity and
uselessness.

The inactivity which James's physical ailments

seemed to force upon him in his youth and his numerous attacks
of neurasthenia afflicted him with a kind of moral paralysis.
Moreover, his early philosophical reflections, tending, as
they sometimes did, toward materialistic determinism, suggested
to him that a life of moral impotence and futility was his
inescapable fate.

Inspired by his reading of Renouvier,
§
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however, Jam.es eventually came to see that determinism was no
more a proven fact than freedom was and that whether one was
a determinist or an indeterminist depended upon one's choice.
And William James, himself, chose to believe in freedom, particularly in his own freedom and in his ability to affect the
world for the better by the consequences of his free choices.
As his diary reveals, James chose to believe in his. own individual worth and creative power. 1 ?
Determinism was not the only philosophical attitude which
could stifle activity, however.

The skepticism to which re-

flection upon man's fallibility often led could be just as
paralyzing as philosophical determinism, for action presupposes
conviction.

But James would not allow either determinism or

skepticism to relegate him to a life of moral or intellectual

l?nr think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the rirst part of Renouvier's second ·~ssais' and see no
reason why his definition of Free Will--'the sustaining of a
thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts'
--need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will
assume for the present--until next year--that it is no illusion. ~.tY first act of free will shall be to believe in free
will. For the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the
mere speculation and contemplative Grublei in which my nature
takes most delight, and voluntarily cUltivate the feeling of
moral freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well as by
acting • • • • Hitherto, when I have felt like ~aking a free 1nitiative, like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to determine all
for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring
into; now, I will go a step further with my will, not only act
wi~h it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality
and creative power. My belief, to be sure, can't be optimistic--but I will posit 11fe (the r~al, the good) in the selfgovernin~ resis~ance of the ego to the world.
Life shall [be
built inj doing and suffering and creating." ("Diary," The
Writings of William James, pp. ?-8.) See above, Chapter-I,
pp. 20-21.
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stagnation.

He assumed, without the· proo.f that rationalists

demanded, that it is possible .for man to know truth.

Realiz-

ing, however, that man cannot be sure that he has truth even
when he does in fact possess it and that, except for the data
of the present moment, doubt is always possible regarding
matters of fact, James was willing to espouse a life o.f action
based upon probabilities assumed as true--in short, a life of
action based upon .faith. 18
This .faith which William James exercised, however, was not
a blind faith; it was not arbitrary and irresponsible.

\.Jhen

evidence was available he heeded it; when evidence was lacking
and the issues wer·e insigni.ficant, he was inclined to suspend
judgment and to maintain a 'wise skepticism.•

But when the

issues were vital, when action was required, or when suspending
judgment was equivalent to disbelief, then James, like the
practical man that he was, believed what it was necessary to
believe in order to act effectively and felicitously in spite
of the lack of evidence.
belief was not arbitrary.

~'Ven

in this case, however, his

The facts had to be such that what

he chose to believe was at least a real possibility.
I.f ever William James's .faith could be considered
1811 Skepticism, or unrest, in short, can always have the

last word. After every definition o.f an object, reflection
may arise, in.feet it with the cogito, and so discriminate it
.from the object in se. This is possible ad infinitum. That
we do not all do it is because at a certain point most of us
get tired of the play, resolve to stop, and assuming something
.for true, pass on to a li.fe o.f action based on that." (James,
"Lewes's 'Problems o.f Life and Mind,'" Collected Essays and
Reviews, p. 10.)
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prodigal, it would have to be in regard to other people.

In

spite of the blindness from which James claimed all men suffer
relative to the lives of others, he himself believed fervently
in the individual worth of every human being, in the significance of every human life.
Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant • • • • wherever it [eagerness] is
found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement
of reality; and there is 'importance' in the only real
and positive sense in Wliich importance ever anywhere
can be.19
But, James said, we may easily miss this importance, this significance, in the life of another; for we feel the importance
of our own lives so intensely that we are easily blinded to
the presence of this same feeling in others.

Thus we often

find it difficult, if not impossible, to judge accurately and
properly to assess the value of other people's lives.
James felt that if we could look at each person through
the eyes of love, we would see that every human being's "lifethrobs ~ among the wonders of creation. " 20 Indeed, .the
shadows of intolerance, prejudice, and cruelty would soon disappear in the brightness of such a vision.
Every Jack sees in his own particular Jill charms
and perfections to the enchantment of which we stolid
onlookers are stone-cold. And which has the superior
view of the absolute truth, he or we? Which has the
more vital insight into the nature of Jill's existence,
l9James, "On a Certain Blindness in Hu.man Beings," .r.:ssays
on Faith and Morals, pp. 262-63.
20 James, "What Makes a Life Significant?," Essays on Faith
and Morals, p. 28b.
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as a fact? Is he in excess, being in this matter a
maniac? or are we in defect, being victims of a pathological anaesthesia as regards Jill's magical importance? Surely the latter; surely to Jack are the profounder truths revealed; surely poor Jill's palpitating
little life-throos ~ among the wonders of creation,
are worthy of this sympathetic interest; and it is to
phame that the rest of us cannot feel like Jack.
For Jack realizes Jill concretely, and we do not. He
struggles toward a union with her inner life, divining
her feelings, anticipating her desires, understanding
her limits as manfully as he can, and yet inadequately,
too; for he is also afflicted with some blindness, even
here. Whilst we, dead clods that we are, do not even
seek after these things, but are contented that that
portion of eternal fact named Jill should be for us as
if it were not. Jill, who knows her inner life, knows
that Jack's way of taking it--so importantly--is the
true and serious way; and she responds to the truth in
him by taking him truly and seriously too. May the
ancient blindness never wrap its clouds about either
of them again! Where would any of us be, were there no
one willing to know us as we really-are or ready to
repay us for our insight by making recognizant return?
We ought, all-of us, to realize each other in this intense, pathetic, and important way.21

our

William James knew that genuine knowledge involves sympathy and
love.

He knew that love enables one somehow to enter into the

very interior of the reality to be known, and that the result
is an intuition of that reality which the non-lover can never
possess.

As James indicated in "Is Life Worth Living?," the

heart is "our deepest organ of communication with the nature
of things. 1122
For the most part, however, our blindness is such that we
cannot view each and every human being with the same sympathetic interest.with which a lover views his beloved.

Because

21 Ibid., pp. 285-86.
22 James, "Is Life worth Living?," Essays on Faith and
Morals, p. 31.
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most of us do not love enough, we seldom penetrate into the
inner lives of others and rarely do we discern even dimly the
significance of their lives as they experience it.

Neverthe-

less, the knowledge of our blindness, James said, ought make
us beware of intolerance, indifference, and cruelty.
James, himself, was a man of great tenderness and sympathy
for others.

Indeed, he may have vigorously opposed a philo-

sophical position with which he disagreed, but the person of
the philosopher whose views he could not accept he held in
reverent esteem.

And he defended the man's right to believe

whatever made his life more livable and happy, however divergent his beliefs might have been from those of James himself.
No doubt James did not realize that he was in fact describing himself when he spoke of certain individuals being blessed
with an extraordinary talent for friendship.

Such persons,

he said, take a singular delight in the lives of others and
"know more of truth than if their hearts were not so big. 1123
That James himself was such a person is evident; his published
correspondence reveals the multitude of his friends and the
very tender reverence and affection with which he regarded them.
He truly delighted in the lives of his fellow-men and seemed
gifted with a singularly vivid realization of the beauty and
significance of each one.

James exhorted all men to be ever

on the alert for the richness that surrounds them in the lives

23

James, "What Makes a Life Significant?," .l!;ssays on Faith
and Morals, p. 286.
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of other people •
• • • no outward changes of condition in life can keep
the nightingale of its eternal meaning rrom singing in
all sorts of different men's hearts. That is the main
fact to remember. If we could not only admit it with
our lips, but really and truly believe it, how our convulsive insistencies, how our antipathies and dreads
of each other, would soften down! If the poor and the
rich could look at each other in this way, sub s¥ecie
aeternatis, how gentle would grow their disputes: what
tolerance and good humor, what willi~gness to .live and
let live, would come into the world!24
Although William James did not subscribe to any particular
creed and was not at all attracted toward institutionalized
religion, he was unquestionably a man of religious raith •. He
pro.fessed a belief in God, i.e., he believed in the reality or
some kind of superhuman consciousness with which man is in contact and .from whom man can receive help and support.

James

·

1
1
..

·1·

111:

, I

pointed out that it is literally true that men feel themselves
to

be

. .'
i.1'
'Ii

ii

in touch with a 'More' or the same quality from which

help, strength, and consolation come as though rrom outside of
themselves.

As we saw in the last chapter, James felt that the

'More' on its hither side is probably nothing other than the
subconscious continuation or a man's conscious life.

But what

the 'More' is on its i:·arther side, James said, is a matter of
individual over-·belief, i.e. , a matter of .f"ai th.
According to Jaines's own private over-belief, the .further
limits of man's being plunge into a dimension of existence
totally other than the sensible and merely understandable world.
James £elt that whether we call this region mystical or super24

Ibid., p. 310.
I

1
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natural, we belong to this region in a very intimate way, because our ideal impulses originate there. 2 5 They~ originate
there, he said, because they possess us in a manner for which
we cannot account.

The fact that this mystical region pro-

duces real effects in the empirical world indicates that it is
real itself and not merely idea1. 26
When we commune with it, work is actually done upon
our finite personality, for we are turned into new
men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow
in the natural world upon our regenerative change.
But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if
we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen
or mystical world unreal.27
.
·
James called this higher part of the universe 'God.'

"God is

the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the
supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name of God. 1128
Although James conceived God as the "higher part of the
universe," indeed the highest part, he did not think of him
as being totally unlike man.

From James's point of view, both

God and man are personal beings--personal beings who are exist2 5rt is not always clear what William James meant by the

word 'ideal.' He used the word variously in different contexts. In general, the term seems to refer in one way or
another to the conceptual order. However, in the term, 'ideal
impulses,' 'ideal' seems to be roughly equivalent to 'noble.'
An ideal impulse would seem to be an impulse to conduct oneself according to the highest standards of excellence conceived
by the mind.
26Here the term 'ideal' means 'conceptual.'

2?James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 389.
28 Ibid.

-
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ing in time and working out a history.

Thus, James did not

conceive of God as eternal and immutable.
God to be infinite.

Nor did he conceive

From James's point of view, to say that

God is infinite, or without limit, suggests that there is nothing outside of him, that his being somehow includes all
other beings as parts or aspects of himself.

In James's mind,

such an infinite, eterrlal, and immutable God would be identical with the Absolute posited by the Idealists, and James felt
that the postulation of the Absolute was in no way warranted
by experience.

Furthermore, in James's

opin~on,

the Absolute

was totally foreign to human life and could have no appeal
for the common man.

As awesome and admirable as an infi.ni te,

eternal, and immutable Absolute might seem to be, James could
not see how it could elicit sympathy, love or friendly cooperation from ordinary people, for friendship implies some common
ground, some similarity or likeness, however imperfect. 2 9
Hence, the God of William James is a finite, temporal God,
who, like man, is working for the salvation and perfection of
the world.

In James's view, man and God share at least some

common ideals; they both· have their work to do; they both have
their problems.

Thus there is basis for sympathy and friendly

cooperation; in fact, James was inclined to feel tbat God and
man need each other.
We and God have business with each other; and in opening
ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The universe, at those parts of it which our
2 9see above, Chapter II, pp. 33-3?, for fuller treatment
of James's objections to the Absolute.
l
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personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely
for the worse or for the better in proportion as each
one of us fulfills or evades God's demands.30
Although James did not clearly delineate the features of
his God, certain characteristics are easily discernible.

As

we have already noted, James conceived the divine part of the
universe to be more than merely an impersonal force.

He con-

ceived God to be a personal being capable of knowledge, love,
and action: "He must be cognizant and responsive in some way."3l
And, James wrote, "He must do."32 For James, God was the
powerful ally of his own ideals.
in the early 1880's, James said:

Writing· to Thomas Davidson

..

find myself less and less able to do without
him [Godl. He need not be an all-including "subjective U..."lity 3 3 of the uni verse. "7. . All I mean is that
there must be some subjective unity in the universe
which has purposes commensurable with my own, and which
is at the same time large enough to be, among all the
powers that may be there, the strongest • • • • In saying
"God exists" all I imply is that my purposes are cared
for by a mind so powerful as on the whole to control
the drift of the universe.34 ·
• • • I

James believed in God not because he had any direct mystical experience of the divine reality, but rather because he
30James, The Varieties of Religious .l:!Xperience, p. 389.
31 James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William
James, II, 213.

32 Ibid.
33The word 'subjective,' as it is used here, is not contraposed to the word 'objective.' It seems to suggest inwardness,
and the term, 'subjective unity,' seems to refer to a personal
consciousness of some kind.
34 Perry, The ThoE)ght and Character of William James,
Briefer Version, p. 1 •
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needed God.

In reply to a question which asked if he believed

because he experienced God's presence, James wrote: "No, but
rather because I need it so that it 'must' be true."35

Accord-

ing to Ralph Barton Perry, James needed God and religion as
"a reenf"orcement of the moral will."36
While James disclaimed any mystical experience of God on
his own part, he admitted that he was influenced in his belief
by the testimony of the countless people who had been gifted
with mystical intuition and by "the whole tradition of reli-

I
.!

i I

,:I

gious people, to which something in me makes admiring response. "37

ii[

He felt that the .fact that he could respond so

'II

sympathetically to people who did claim to have experienced
God's presence indicated that there was perhaps a germ of
mysticism even in him.

"The whole line of testimony on this

point is so strong that I am unable to pooh-pooh it away.

No

doubt there is a germ in me of something similar that makes
response. 11 38
William James classed himself as a supernaturalist--not
a refined supernaturalist but a crass one.

In contrast with

refined supernaturalism which bars ideal entities from interfering causally in the course of phenomenal events, the crass
35James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William
James, II, 213.
36 Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, 354.
37James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William
James, II, 213.

38~.' p. 214.
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supernaturalism to which James professed allegiance "admits
miracles and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual
difficulty in mixing the idea1 39 and the real worlds together
by

interpolating influences from the ideal region among the

rorces that causally determine the real world's details. 1140
In James's mind, the empirical world had to be somehow

different in consequence of God's existence.

It seemed incred-

ible to him that no concrete particular of experience should
alter its complexion in consequence of God's being there.
James felt that the world viewed religiously must be concretely
different from a purely materialistic universe.

Although he

was not sure what all the concrete facts constituting the
differences are, he was sure that the influx of energy which
people experience in the raith-state and the prayer-state is
one of them.

He was

certa~n

that in such states, something

ideal actually exerts an influence on man, raises the level of
his personal energy, and produces regenerative erfects unattainable in other ways.
The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that
the .world or our present consciousness is only one out or
many worlds of consciousness that exist, and those other
worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for
our life also; and tha~ although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet
the two oecome continuous at certain points, and higher
390nce _again, the meaning of the word 'ideal' is not immediately evident. Apparently, however, an 'ideal world' in
~his context does not mean one that is merely conceptual.
~he
term seems to refer to that unseen world which is the object
of our religious aspirations.
40 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 392.
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energies filter in. By being faithful in my poor
measure to this over-belief, I seem to myself to keep
more sane and true. I can, of course, put myself into
the sectarian scientist-rs-attitude, and imagine vividly
that the world of sensations and of scientific laws and
objects may be all. But whenever I do this, I hear
that inward monitor of which W. K. Clifford once wrote,
whispering the word 'bosh!' Humbug is humbug, even
though it bear the scientific name, and the total expression of human experience, as I view it objectively,
invincibly urges me beyond the narrow 'scientific'
bounds. Assuredly, the real world is of a different
temperament,--more intricately built than physical
science allows. So my objective and my subjective conscience both hold me to the over-belief which I express.
Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here
below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually
help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his
own greater tasks?41
The over-beliefs of most religious people, as James pointed
out, include belief in some kind of life after death.

In

James's early manhood, however, his belief in immortality was
never very strong.

What was important to him was that his

ideals would be cared for in eternity, not necessarily that
he would be around to see to the matter himself.
grew older his faith in immortality grew stronger.

But as he
In re-

sponse to the question, "Why?", he wrote, "Because I am just
getting fit to live." 42
In 1904, James wrote the following to his friend Carl
Stumpf: "I never felt the rational need of immortality • • •
but as I grow older I confess that I feel the practical need
of it much more than I ever did before; and that combines with
41

~., p. 391.

42 James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William
James, II, 214.

If
281
reasons • • • to give me a growing faith in its reality." 4 3
Indeed as James grew older he began to feel even a rational
need for immortality, for death began to appear to him as a
senseless waste, the inexplicable negation of goodness.

Writ-

ing to his friend, Miss Frances R. Morse, in 1904 about the
death of Sarah Whitman, James said: "Everything in this beautiful world is good except old age and death if one supposes no
'behind the veil' of any kind." 44
The religious faith of William James was truly the mature
faith of a reflective man.

.

It was not the blind belief with
'

which a less speculative person might accept without question
something handed down to him by others.

On the contrary,

William James examined the issues, assessed the evidence, considered the stakes and, in spite of the lack of proof, deliberately espoused the religious hypothesis.

The man, who in

his youth had felt the need to believe in God but whose scientific bias had made accepting anything without proof extremely
difficult, came to see that his very need to believe was in a
matter this momentous sufficient warrant for doing so.

He came

to realize, too, that the very presence of the need for God
could very well be an indication that the Divinity needed exists.
In William James's opinion, the need for God and the need
to believe in him are universal needs--exigencies of the whole
human race.

Religious faith, he said, is essential not only

4 3Perry, The Thou~ht and Character of William James,
Briefer Version, p. 26 •
44

Ibid., p. 269.
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to the well-being of every individual but to the perfection of
the world as a whole.

For the perfection of the world requires

that each man pursue that which is good in life with courage,
enthusiasm, and heroic generosity.

In the view of James, how-

ever, virtues of heroic proportions are possible only to men
of religious faith.

Hence, James asserted that religion is

man's most important function in
a desire to do

~

the world.

And inspired by

best for the world, as well as for the God

with whom he shared a common concern for goodness, James undertook, as his own distinctively religious task, that of making
men realize that by being faith:f'ul to their religious beliefs,
by living in the light of their religious faith, they could
make their greatest contributions to the universe.

In the

following excerpt from a letter to Miss Frances R. Morse,
William James explained the religious purpose which motivated
him in writing The Varieties of Religious E;perience:
• • • the problem I have set myself is a hard one:
first, to defend (against all the prejudices of my
"class") "experience" against "philosophy" as being
the real backbone of the world's religious life--I
mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing
immediately and privately felt, as against high and
noble general views of our destiny and the world's
meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader
believe, what I myself invincibly do believe, that,
although all the special manifestations of religion
may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories),
yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear,
and in which I shall fail; but to attempt it is ~
religious act.45

4 5The t,./ri tings of William James, pp. 740-41.
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